Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/541

Rh

Armies, were instructed to aim first and foremost at cutting off the British in the Cambrai bend. The armies were to advance with strong inner wings, the XVII. on Ypres and the II. on Equancourt. Subsequently the XVII. army was to deliver an assault in the direction of Arras-Albert and gradually roll up the adjacent British front, the II. Army to push forward in a westerly direction with the left wing on the Somme.

In the German Crown Prince's group of armies the XVIII. Army had to conquer the Somme and the Crozat Canal and eventually to extend to Peronne. If the II. Army should en- counter any considerable resistance the XVIII. Army was to advance strong forces through Beauvois-Tertry to cut off the opponent in front of the II. Army. The Mars attack S. of the Scarpe was to follow the Michael attack as soon as possible and amplify the Michael operation. Farther N. preparations were also made to profit by it (Mars, N. Walkxirenritt).

The forces provided for the break-through were 15 attack divisions and 2 position divisions for the XVII. Army, 15 attack divisions and 3 of position for the II. Army, and 19 attack divisions and 5 of position for the XVIII. Army. Be- sides these, 3 divisions were retained by the Supreme Command for disposal, first at Bouchain, then at Denain. As regards artillery, 950 field batteries, 701 heavy and 55 heaviest batteries were called up. Added to these were a few Austro-Hungarian heavy batteries, inadequately supplied with munitions.

In the prolonged preparations now carefully made, the attack front was kept as lifeless as possible, with the troops unchanged and the day-traffic kept down. Detrainments went on a long way to the rear on a wide front, and all movements of impor- tance were held over until night time.

In March, each of the four groups oi armies executed a first attack. In the Crown Prince Rupprecht's group the prepar- ations were so elaborate in the region of Ypres and Armentieres that even the troops themselves and their leaders were con- vinced that a great attack was really imminent. The German Crown Prince's group made a show of preparing an attack in the neighbourhood of Reims. From the i4th onwards reconnais- sance attacks, bombardment of the enemy headquarters, bomb- ing by airmen and the bringing up of reinforcements, set in. The increased artillery activity continued until March 24. Gallwitz's group of armies carried out a great attack on Verdun systematically up to the stage when the infantry should have come in, with several days of artillery preparation, a gas attack, and the bombardment of railway stations behind the lines. Duke Albrecht's group feigned an attack on the Lorraine front, and carried out a heavy artillery battle from March 20 to 24.

The result of these German operations was to intensify the opponents' suspense to the utmost. The British put themselves in a position of defence against a great attack between Armen- tieres and La Bassee and between Arras and St. Quentin, and shifted forces from Flanders to the south. The French evidently expected an attack at Reims. New defensive works arose every- where in the chief opponents' lines. They reinforced their bat- teries and sought by increased activity on the part of the air- men and patrols, to penetrate the obscurity which enveloped the German mode of procedure.

In the front of the actual attack the Germans counted upon having, in front of the XVII. Army, 15 strong British divisions of the III. Army (General Byng), and in front of both armies 23 divisions of the V. Army (General Gough). The Germans as- sumed, further, that the leader of the combined operations of the Entente, General Foch, would have in readiness strong re- serves, mainly French, somewhere in the region of Meaux behind the centre of the enemy front. The majority of the Brit- ish reserves were supposed to be behind the centre of the British front. No signs of withdrawing were seen on the enemy's part. A restricted foreground was counted upon.

The actual forming up for deployment of the attacking armies began on March 10 with the munitioning. The artillery deploy- ment followed, and the attack divisions next moved into their positions at the front. Everything passed off smoothly and with- out any great counter-measures being taken by the 'defence.

All the difficulties due to compressing within a narrow space great masses of human beings and piles of utensils and contriv- ances were easily overcome. The divisions were organized in groups, usually three lines deep, the first line being made the strongest in order to ensure rapid results at the beginning. The first line advanced close up to the front trenches on March 20, the second standing at a distance of 3-5 km. and the third 7-10 km. behind. The hindermost lines were looked upon as reserves for the higher command. They were not simply to follow up the others but to be fetched up according to the needs of the tactical situation.

The Supreme Command held in readiness, besides the above mentioned three divisions at Denain, other reserves behind the remaining army fronts, and reserved to itself the right of with- drawing forces from the front line when necessary.

On March 20 the attack divisions, protected by aircraft, were drawn up behind the position from which the assault was to be made. The deployment of the artillery and minenwerfer was complete and the munitions in readiness. Only the order to advance had still to come. But here the weather threatened to upset all plans, for the direction of the wind was such as would spoil the effect of the artillery's gas, and the fog would make the attack movement difficult for the infantry. By 12 at midday the weather conditions had so far improved, however, that it was decided to carry out the attack on March 21. On that day, accordingly, at 3 :3O A.M., the gassing of the Allied batteries began. Tftis was followed by a 3-hours' preliminary bombardment of the British positions by the German artillery and minenwerfer. At 9:40 A.M. the German infantry dashed forward to the attack. The mass of artillery then made a barrage, which, creeping gradually forward, was to pave a way for the infantry into the depths of the opposing trench system.

The attack itself turned out very differently at different points. In the XVII. Army, commanded by Otto von Below, the cooperation of infantry and artillery was not without its hitches. The barrage " ran away from the storming infantry," who only reached the opponent's first position and found itself in the evening before the strongly occupied second position. At Vaulx Vrancourt and to the N. of it, as also at Doignies, the British put up strong counter-attacks, to repel which several 2nd line German divisions had to be put in. The British de- fended themselves here with great stubbornness against the obvious danger of being shut off on the Cambrai bend.

The II. Army, commanded by von der Marwitz, pushed through to the line Gonzeaucourt-E. of Epehy-Templeux le Guerard-Le Verguier. Their main battle raged around the high-perched village of Epehy, which the XXIII. Reserve Corps failed to take in spite of heroic efforts. With this army only a small portion of the second line divisions needed to be brought up. There were no serious counter-attacks.

The greatest success was achieved by the XVIII. Army, com- manded by von Hutier. Its right wing pushed through the second British position and took the Holnon Wood. The centre got through beyond Savy, Dallon, Fontaine les Clercs, and the left wing took Urvillers, Essigny le Grand and Beney, and forced the Oise crossing. The XVIII. Army also took the most booty.

On the whole a great initial success had been achieved. Every- thing depended upon whether it could be successfully developed.

The German Supreme Command was determined to order the continuation of the attack according to the results of the first day's fighting. It allotted the first reinforcements brought up to the XVIII. Army and the left wing of the II. Army, direct- ing the XVIII. to ease the advance of the II. by pushing for- ward on Tertry. The II. Army was likewise to put its weight upon the left wing. On the second day the fighting was heavy, the chief burden falling on the infantry. A systematic prelim- inary bombardment was impracticable on account of the progress made on the first day, and it was a difficult matter to pull the batteries through the obstacles and shelled areas. The heaviest and most thankless task was once more allotted to the XVII. Army. Its infantry penetrated the second British positions time after time, only to be forced back just as often by strong count-