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Rh all measures calculated either to transfer the control of the country's shipping to official hands, or to hamper its development by rigid rules and standards. It has recognized that the first duty of the shipowner is to secure the safety of the lives and property entrusted to his care, but it has maintained that the individual shipowner, as long as he is discharging that duty, is entitled to carry on his business in the manner which will attain the best results.

The Association had much to do, particularly through the work of its secretary, Sir Norman Hill, with the establishment of the War Risks Insurance Scheme. Throughout the war period it consistently worked with the object of getting the maximum number of voyages made and the maximum number of cargoes carried. It coöperated with the Government authorities when control of shipping was obviously necessary, and when the great emergency had passed, it pressed for freedom for the shipping industry.

A marked development has taken place in recent years in the organization of London shipowners through an extension of the activities of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom. Rather curiously, the formation of the Chamber in Feb. 1878, was distinguished by the appointment of a Hull shipowner as president. This member was Mr. Henry John Atkinson. The Chamber was composed of local shipowning associations in various ports and of most of the Protection and Indemnity Clubs, with a central office in London. Its primary objects were to discuss questions affecting shipping; to disseminate information, from time to time, on matters concerning the industry, and to secure the advantages of united action, especially in communications with the Government and various bodies. The Chamber did useful work for many years under its original constitution, but the events of the war showed the need for a more effective organization that would include all classes of shipping. Largely due to the enterprise of Sir Kenneth Anderson, the president of the Chamber in 1915, the reconstruction of the Chamber was carried out. Sir Kenneth Anderson was succeeded as chairman in 1916 by Sir William Raeburn, who held the office for three years assisted by Mr. J. Herbert Scrutton as vice-president. During the years 1916-7 new life was put into the Chamber, and much was done to keep the public informed on matters affecting the shipping industry. Until the reconstruction, the Chamber was fairly representative of the ordinary cargo steamship owners, but the great passenger and cargo steamship companies had not actively been identified with its work. In 1917 a number of highly important steamship companies joined the Chamber, including the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co., the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., and the Union-Castle Mail Steamship Company. The finances were put on a sound basis, enabling the necessary cost of maintaining the work to be secured on the plan of a levy on the tonnage. New offices were taken, and Mr. H. M. Cleminson, a leading shipping lawyer and member of the firm of Messrs. Botterell & Roche, was appointed general manager. Sir William Raeburn, who was elected president in 1916, held office for two years and was succeeded as president by Lord Inchcape in 1918, who also held the position for two years. In 1920 Mr. W. J. Noble was elected president. He was succeeded by Sir Owen Philipps in 1921, with Sir Frederick Lewis as vice-president.

The constituents of the Chamber at the beginning of 1921 consisted of 19 local and special associations, such as those at Belfast, Swansea, on the N.E. coast and Glasgow; 11 Protection and Indemnity Clubs; 7 Freight, Demurrage and Defence Clubs and shipowners entering their tonnage direct, of which early in 1921 there was 5,430,800 tons. The aggregate amount of tonnage entered under the heading of Protection and Indemnity Clubs represented 6,364,300 tons. Membership of these clubs is open to any shipowner possessing a seaworthy vessel who wishes to cover himself against third-party risks. Only British owners are eligible for membership of the Chamber. Until 1919 the Chamber was not incorporated, but in that year it obtained the grant of a Royal Charter. The business of the Chamber is conducted by a council of shipowners who are nominated by the various constituents. Incorporated in the Chamber is the Documentary Committee, which examines and approves forms of charter between shipowners and merchants.

Statistics.—In the 1919-20 edition of Lloyd's Register of Shipping, the figures for the mercantile marines of the principal maritime countries before and after the war were set out. These figures were so important and authoritative that they are given in the table following. Outstanding facts were the decrease of 2,547,000 tons in the shipping owned by the United Kingdom, the gain of 7,746,000 tons to the seagoing merchant marine of the United States, the loss of 1,888,000 tons by Germany, and the gain of 617,000 tons to Japan.

In this edition the Register went further than setting out the actual figures of gains and losses. It attempted to estimate the position of the world's tonnage as it would have been if there had been no war. There were obvious difficulties in the way of arriving at a definite conclusion in the case of various countries, for many factors had to be taken into account, but a careful estimate was prepared on the following assumptions. These were: (1) it was reasonable to expect that the percentage of addition to the world's tonnage would have continued at the ratio (a decreasing one) recorded during the previous 15 pre-war years, and that the percentage of the United Kingdom tonnage to the world's tonnage would show, approximately, the same ratio of decrease recorded during the most recent of these years; (2) countries in which there had been a large addition of

tonnage during the previous quinquennial period might be expected to show a reduction in the ratio of increase, and, as a rule, the larger the previous increase the larger would such reduction be; (3) allowances were made in the special cases of countries where pre-war conditions pointed to the acquisition of tonnage, in the near future, at a higher ratio than that recorded during the previous period.

The net result of the calculations made was to show that the British mercantile marine had suffered a loss of 5,202,000 tons, and foreign mercantile marines, with the exception of the United States of America, a loss of 9,000,000 tons, making a total loss to the world of 14,202,000 tons. As a partial set-off to these losses, the United States gained 6,729,000 tons, so that the net world's loss expressed in gross tonnage, was 7,473,000 tons. Germany's loss was set out as 3,582,000 tons, but it was explained that her losses were actually greater, since vessels which at the date of the Armistice had not been captured or requisitioned by other countries were included in her mercantile marine. Excluding enemy countries, the greatest sufferers after the United Kingdom were Norway, whose losses were estimated at 1,025,000 tons; Italy, which suffered a diminution of 677,000 tons; and France with an estimated loss of 536,000 tons.

In these calculations the question of the comparative efficiencies of the pre-war and post-war merchant fleets was not taken into account. The Register pointed out that, apart from additions to the merchant fleets of the world before the war, replacements of steam tonnage lost, broken up, etc., amounted each year to about 1½% of the total tonnage owned, while during the war it required new tonnage equivalent to 33% of the steam tonnage owned in 1914 to replace the losses. There is no doubt that a large amount of the tonnage afloat at the end of the war represented shipping which, in ordinary conditions, would have been broken up and replaced by modern and more economical vessels. How this factor affected the statistical position is indicated by the statement that in the three pre-war years 1911-3, nearly 2,000,000 tons of steamers were sold to foreign owners and replaced by better vessels, while during the three years 1916-8 probably less than 100,000 tons of steamers were sold in this way. Further, a large proportion of the shipping built during the war was, undoubtedly, not the equal in general efficiency of that built in the few years immediately preceding. Taking all these considerations into account, the Register estimated that, through the war, the world had lost 8,500,000 tons gross of shipping, representing a dead-weight carrying capacity of 12,500,000 tons.

Within 12 months the position was very much changed. The total tonnage of the world increased from 47,897,000 tons in June 1919 to 53,905,000 tons in June 1920, an increase of 6,008,000 tons. The loss suffered by the United Kingdom as at June 1919 of 2,547,000 tons had been reduced to a decrease of only 781,000 tons. The United States gain of 7,746,000 tons had been increased to one of 10,379,000 tons. Germany's loss had been increased by the surrender of tonnage, from 1,888,000 tons to 4,716,000 tons. Japan further increased her gain of 617,000 tons to 1,288,000 tons. Once more the Register endeavoured to estimate what would have been the position of the world's mercantile marines in 1920 if there had been no war. It found that the loss suffered by the United Kingdom was 2,920,000 tons; that of Germany 6,103,000 tons; and that of other countries a loss of 3,330,000 tons, making a total loss of 12,353,000 tons. As against this loss, the United States gained 8,837,000 tons, thus reducing the world's net loss to 3,516,000 tons. This estimate again did not take into account the question of the comparative efficiencies of the mercantile marines before and after the war. While such calculations are of great interest, the fact remains that, as the result of the great shipbuilding effort during the war, the world's shipping was greater in June 1920 by 9,282,000 tons. This figure was increased further during the year. The president of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom stated at the annual meeting held on Feb. 25