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410 the scheme of operations adopted against Serbia was apparently the full scheme outlined above; concentric advance from all the fronts in varying strengths and at various dates. Nearly half the army was placed in position for this advance, and the Austrian supreme headquarters intended to conduct the campaign itself. But at the last moment, it is asserted, the Germans, rightly or wrongly, changed their minds, the allies' scheme for Poland and Galicia fell to pieces, and, in trying to adapt their plans to the new conditions, the Austrians threw their S.E. forces into con- fusion before they had even deployed. The responsibility for a grave initial blunder, then, lies ultimately with Moltke, if he failed to keep his promise, or with Conrad, if he interpreted a mere interchange of views as a binding engagement. In any case the effect was to withdraw the forces on the San-Danube front to another theatre amid the battle for the river crossings.

The Yadar Campaign. The deployment, carried out accord- ing to the original scheme, 1 in spite of the fact that, at some date not yet known, it had been decided to make a radical alteration, was as follows:

II. Army. General of Cavalry Bohm-Ermolji on the Danube- Sava front from Weisskirchen to Mitrowitz (Mitrovicza). Left to right VII. Corps (34th and I7th Divs.); 7th Div.; IV. Corps (32nd and 3ist Divs.); IX. Corps (29th Div. only); loth Cavalry Division. In reserve 23pd Honved Division. Total: 131 battalions, 42 squadrons, 56 batteries.

V. Army. -General of Infantry Liborius von Frank. On the Lower Drina from mouth to Lyuboviya, and Jeft to right VIII. Corps ' ith Div., 2lst Landwehr Div. and combined brigade) ; XIII. Corps

j6th Div., 42nd Honved Div., one brigade, one mountain brigade), 'otal: 79 battalions, 15 squadrons, 39 batteries.

VI. Army. Feldzeugmeister Potiorek. Vishegrad-Focha region, left to right XV. Corps (ist and 48th Div. staffs with 4 mountain brigades) ; XIV. Corps (l8th Div. staff and 6 mountain brigades) ; in reserve doth Honved Division. Detached, facing Montenegro, 47th Div. and 3rd Mountain Brigade. Total : 74 battalions, 5 squadrons, 40 batteries.

Each army had in addition one Landsturm brigade and the V. and II. one to three " march " (i.e., reinforcement) brigades.

Of these forces the II. Army was withdrawn on Aug. 14,* leav- ing the others in full battle on the Drina. That this battle was in being, however, was due not to Conrad, who naturally, under the changed conditions ordered the " Balkan Forces " to stand on the defensive, but to "Feldzeugmeister" Potiorek, comman- der-in-chief as well as commander of the VI. Army. This officer, high in favour at Court, had been for some years viceroy in Bos- nia-Herzegovina, and regarded the problem from the standpoint of the Sarajevo residency rather than from that of a military head- quarters faced with a military problem. He saw above every- thing else the possibility of the Serbians advancing over the Drina to excite insurrection among their brothers and cousins, although there was nothing in the layout of the Serbian deploy- ment to suggest this, and he not only kept the centre of gravity of the forces on the Drina, but, on his own responsibility, launched a "preventive" offensive on this unfavourable front.

On the Serbian side, general mobilization had been ordered on July 25, months since the demobilization that marked the end of the Balkan Wars. Of a population of about 3,100,000 in Old Serbia and about i ,800,000 in New Serbia (where there had been no time to set up the administrative machinery of conscription), 489,500 men were mobilized at the outset and some 43,000 more between August and September.

On Aug. 5 1914 Montenegro declared war on Austria-Hun- gary. Her forces amounted to about 50,000 militia with very little artillery, and were of no direct assistance to Serbia. But they occupied the attention of three mountain brigades of the enemy's army and, what was perhaps more important, they added considerably to Potiorek's politico-military anxieties.

Strategically, there were three possible courses open to the Serbs: the defensive in their own country, the offensive W. into Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia, and the offensive N. into Hun- gary; but the first course was the only one practicable. An offen-

1 The III. Corps (6th and 28th Divs., 22nd Landwehr Div.), how- ever, which mobilized with the other seven corps, did not proceed to the Serbian front, but was dispatched to the Dniester at once

1 It arrived in Galicia too late for the crisis there.

sive into Bosnia, even with Montenegrin aid, could only have succeeded if the populations there had been ready to rise at the first signal, which they were not. Politically, it would have played into the hands of the enemy by showing the world that Austria's fear of Serbian ambitions had been justifiable. Mili- tarily, an offensive over the Drina presented the same supply difficulties in either direction. An offensive into Hungary, whether to the right or left of the Danube, must begin with the forcing of the Danube or the Sava, and in view of the dispropor- tion between the opposed forces had no chance of success unless the bulk of the Austro-Hungarian army were at the same time closely engaged in Galicia and Poland. In the initial stages of the operations at any rate, therefore, such a movement was out of the question.

The strategy adopted was, therefore, purely defensive, in spite of the offensive victories of 1912-3 and the mania for the offen- sive at all costs and in all conditions which then pervaded almost every army in Europe.

The order of battle was as follows, the Crown Prince Alexander being commander-in-chief, and Voivode R. Putnik chief -of-staff, with headquarters at Kraguyevats:

I. Army. General Boyovich. Divisions Timok I., Timok II., Morava II., Danube II., 52 battalions, 7 squadrons, 26 batteries: approximate strength 55,000, grouped about Palanka and Racha and Topola.

//. Army. General Stepanovich. Divisions Shumaja I., Mo- rava I., Danube I., and " Combined Division." 64 battalions, 10 squadrons, 33 batteries, about 71,000 men. Grouped about Arang- yelovats, Lazarevats, Belgrade.

///. Army. General Yurichich-Stiirm. Divisions Drina I., Drina II., 28 battalions, 5 squadrons, 16 batteries, about 32,000. Grouped around Valyevo.

Uzhitse Army. General Boyanovich. Division Shumaja II., Uzhitse Brigade, 24 battalions, 2 squadrons, II batteries, about 26,000. Grouped at Uzhitse and Bainabashta.

Independent Cavalry Division. Sixteen squadrons, one battery, about 3,000 concentrated at Ub.

Belgrade Group. About 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, 10 batteries.

Obrenovats Croup. About II battalions, sJ batteries.

Other frontier troops, in all about 25 battalions, 13 batteries.

In infantry, therefore, the Serbians had about 213 battalions to pit against the 272 of the enemy's II., V. and VI. Armies. On the other hand, nine out of ten of the men in these 213 battal- ions had fought in the wars of 1912-3. In artillery the opposed forces were nearly equal, about no Serbian to about 130 Austro- Hungarian; three-quarters of the Serbian guns were of a better model than the Austrian, and some heavy artillery was available. On the other hand, the equipment of the Austrians and their re- sources in ammunition and stores were much superior, for Serbia was nearly isolated, the one available arsenal was small, and stocks depleted in the Balkan Wars had not been made good.

In sum, then, it would appear that the Austrian expeditionary force even counting the II. Army which appeared only to be withdrawn, and the III. Corps which did not appear at all was none too strong for the defeat of the Serbian field army, let alone its destruction. And as soon as it had been decided to withdraw the II. Army, replacing it by a mere screen along the Danube, it was or should have been obvious that the 141 battalions, 17 squadrons and 70 batteries of the V. and VI. Armies were far too weak a force to attempt an offensive into difficult country held by superior numbers of well-trained and war-experienced troops. Potiorek, however, decided otherwise.

From July 26 to August n only minor incidents took place bombardments of Belgrade and other places, by the monitors, raids over the river for reconnaissance purposes. Then, on the night of August 11-12, the Austrian main bodies began to cross on a wide front at Drenovats (near Shabats) on the Sava, several points between Lyeshnitsa and Loznitsa on the Lower Drina, and Zvornik and Lyuboviya on the Middle Drina. On the I2th the frontier troops of the Drina defence were pushed back concen- trically in the general direction of Valyevo, those of the Sava defence driven out of Shabats. E. of that point the II. Army, under orders for Galicia, remained inactive except for the seizure of Gipsy Island (Ostrovo Tsiganlya) close above Belgrade, while in and S. of the Vishegrad region the XV. and XVI. Austrian