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408 of Yugoslav unity and of Russia's acquisition of Constantinople: and (after Rumania's entry) the retention of the whole Dobruja. Dr. Radoslavov more than once proclaimed Bulgaria's resolve to keep all her conquests, 1 and his official organs declared that Serbia's reconstitution, "no matter under what form, would be a perpetual menace to Balkan peace " and will never be per- mitted. 2 Austria-Hungary showed much greater reserve, airing from time to time various alternative schemes for a vassal South- ern Slav State under the Habsburgs, keeping Prince Mirko of Montenegro as a possible candidate for its throne and employ- ing agents in Switzerland to sow dissension among the exiles.

The Serbs in Exile. Soon after the establishment of the Serbian Government at Corfu party rivalries began to revive. The deputies were scattered, living mostly on the Riviera, an independent press was impossible, and regular Allied subsidies made the Government virtually immune from serious demo- cratic control. The supersession of the Voivode Putnik and almost all his staff caused great indignation, and though the whole Serbian Coalition must bear the responsibility, it was known to be the work of Pasid, and his masterful colleague in the Radical party, Protic, then still out of office. In Aug. 1916 an attempt is alleged to have been made upon the life of the Prince Regent at the front, and the Government, after vainly urging the Skupstina to institute a new form of courts-martial, pro- ceeded in the winter while the joint advance under Sarrail was crowned by the capture of Monastir from the Bulgarians to order numerous arrests on a charge of conspiracy and murder. Among those implicated were the late governor of Macedonia, Gen. Popovid, the ex- War Minister Gen. Bojanovic, and several distinguished staff officers: many line officers known for their gallantry were placed on the retired list or confined to the island at Corfu.

The Conspiracy Trial which opened in Salonika in Jan. 1917 and was conducted behind the shelter of a strict military censor- ship, resulted in a death sentence upon nine Serbian officers, and notably of Col. Dimitrijevic, the head of a secret society known as " Union or Death," or more colloquially the Black Hand, whose chief aim had been to fan nationalist sentiments in the army. There is no doubt that " Apis," as Dimitrijevid was called throughout the Slavonic South, interfered unwarrant- ably in politics, and it is probable that he had his hand in the Sarajevo murder; but the lack of convincing evidence for the alleged conspiracy makes it probable that he was the victim of rival military and political cliques. Strong pressure of the Old Radical leaders forced the Prince Regent to sign three death warrants and to disregard appeals for mercy from the Western capitals. This trial revived all the old party dissensions: the reactionaries had triumphed on the very eve of the collapse of their chief support, the Tsarist Government. Pasid found himself between two fires the need for a more democratic restatement of foreign policy, and the demand of the young Radical and Progressive parties for a revision of the Salonika trial. Refusal led to their withdrawal from the Cabinet, and its reconstruction on a purely Old Radical basis under Pasid and Protic. The last occasion when all parties cooperated was on July 20 1917, when the Declaration of Corfu, drawn up between Dr. Trumbid for the Yugoslav committee and Pasid for the Serbian Government, met with unanimous approval. Pasid, having strengthened his position abroad by a visit to Paris and London, declined to convoke Parliament for four months after the legal period had expired. At last, as the result of a direct appeal of its President to the Crown, it met in Corfu on Feb. 12 1918; and* the Government resigned, but after weeks of fruitless negotiation for a coalition ministry, was allowed to resume office. The Opposition, which numbered 60 as against 64 Old Radicals, still insisted on the revision of the trial and the transference of foreign affairs from Pasic to their own candidate Draskovid; and in April, when the budget was intro- duced, they withdrew in a body from the Chamber, thus leaving the Government without the quorum of 84 required by the

1 e.g. in Vossiche Zeitung, Oct. 10 1916.

3 e.g. Narodni Prava, May 19, Kambana, Oct. 9 1916.

Serbian Constitution. Serbian public opinion was too scattered and disorganized to be effective, and the Corfu Government tried to discredit its opponents' action before the uninformed West, as defeatist or even Austrophil. Thus throughout the spring and summer of 1918 there was acute and growing tension among the rival Serbian groups, and the real initiative in the Yugoslav question and in the political campaign against Austria- Hungary, had passed to Trumbid, Benes, Lansing and the Allies and to the leaders of the movement inside the Dual Monarchy. Pasid had reverted to his Pan-Serb attitude, opposed inclusion of Dr. Trumbid in a Yugoslav and no longer purely Serb Cabinet, and steadily obstructed the Yugoslav committee's work. There was, moreover, a certain section in the army which aimed at Serbia's military occupation and annexation of Habsburg ter- ritory, rather than a free union on equal terms. Fortunately all such ideas were absent from the mind of Voivode Misic, whose comprehension of the issues at stake was illustrated by his special encouragement of the Yugoslav volunteers and by his signal tact in dealing with the newly constituted Government in Zagreb. Events, moreover, favoured union on terms of full equality; for Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist and her author- ity had been shaken off by all her Yugoslav subjects long before the Serbian army in its northward advance had even reached Belgrade. Any slight possibilities of initial friction were averted by Italy's action in advancing beyond the Armistice line; the whole Croat and Slovene population thus clamoured for the arrival of the Serbian army and received it everywhere as their liberator from Habsburg rule and their champion in the com- plications which then seemed imminent. (For the completion of national unity, see YUGOSLAVIA.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY. General: C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben (to !537. 2 vols., 1913 and 1917), and 5/aa* und Gesellschaft im miltel- alterlichen Serbien (1913); S. Novakovic, Die Wiedergeburt des Ser- bischen Staates (1912); G. Yakshitch, L'Europe el la Resurrection de la Serbie (2nd ed., 1919); H. W. V. Temperley, History of Serbia (1917); S. Stanojevic, History of Serbia (in Serbian, 1913); Jovan Cvijid, La Peninsule Balkanique (1919) and Govorii Clanci (Speeches and Essays, 2 vols., 1921); G. Gravier, Les Frontieres Historiques de la Serbie (1919). Of war literature may be mentioned: E. Denis, La Grande Serbie (1916); Miss Waring, Serbia (1918); G. Yelinic- Devas, La nouvelle Serbie (1919); Crawfurd Price, Serbia's Part in the War (1918); Barby, L'epopee Serbe (1916). On the Balkan wars, see Diplomaticus, Nationalism and War in the Near East (1915); R. W. Seton- Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (1917); Immanuel, Der Balkankrieg (1913) ; H. Barby, Les Victoires Serbes (1913) and Bregalnitsa (1913). On economics, see Vuk Primorac, La Question Yougoslave (1918) ; G. Djurid, " A Survey of the Devel- opment of the Serbian (S. Slav) Nation " (Royal Statistical Journal, May 1919); La Serbie Economique, 1914-1918 (1918); M. Zebitch, La Serbie Agricole (1917); Costa Stoyanovitch, Economic Problems of Serbia (1919). The Serbian standpoint on the Albanian question can be found in Vladan Georgevitch, Die Serbische Frage (1909) and Balkanicus (S. Protic), Le Probleme Albanais (1913); on the Macedonian question in Tihomar Georgevitch, Macedonia (1918). For sources concerning origin of war, see A. F. Pribram, Collected Diplomatic Documents: Die Politischen Geheimvertrdge Oesterreich- Ungarns (1879-1914) (1920); R. Gooss, Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges (1920); Diplomatische Aktenstucke (1920); Die Deutschen Dokumente (4 vols., 1920); H. Kanner, Die Neuesten Geschichtslugen (1921). See also History of the Peace Con- ference (ed. H. W. V. Temperley, vol. iv.). (R. W. S.-W.)

SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS. Although the Balkan area developed into one of the side-shows of the World War, it was there that it started in 1914 with the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Ser- bia. The 1914 operations and the conquest of Serbia in 1915 are narrated in separate sections below. Under SALONIKA CAMPAIGNS an account is given separately of the Allied operations on the southern Serbian front, 1915-8.

The Austro-Hungarian military problem in starting a cam- paign against Serbia was complicated by the prospect of a Rus- sian intervention in Galicia. The alternatives were: to defeat Serbia completely before the Russian threat became deadly, or to stand on the defensive against Serbia till after a great battle had decided the issue in Galicia.

The strategic geography of Serbia was, in its broad lines, simple. On the N. side there is the formidable obstacle of the