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drew her troops, but covered her retreat by a note to the Great Powers, begging them to enjoin upon their Albanian proteges a respect for the frontiers created for their benefit (1804). Even after this crisis was over, Count Berchtold made further trouble for Serbia by steadily opposing her Government's very natural desire to take over, so far as Serbian territory was concerned, the shares of the Orient railway hitherto owned by Austrian subjects. Vienna's permanent ill-will was further revealed by attempts to block the conclusion of a concordat between Serbia and the Vatican. 1

By Christmas 1913 the situation in Old Serbia 2 was rapidly becoming normal, but the administration in the new territory left much to be desired, and the closing of Bulgarian schools, the expulsion of Exarchist clergy and occasional excesses against the Moslem population caused serious unrest and discontent. The Paiic administration became absorbed in defending itself against the increasingly violent onslaughts of the Opposition. In Dec. 1913 and again on June 2 1914 it resigned, but eventually remained in office. On March 4 the Opposition had withdrawn from the Chamber as a protest against alleged unconstitutional action of the Government in budget matters. But though the tension was increased by the activities of a powerful military clique known as " The Black Hand " and by the sudden and arbitrary seizure of its club premises by the masterful Minister of the Interior, Protic, the Government was still in office in the summer. The visit of Crown Prince Alexander and Pasic to St. Petersburg early in February had given rise to rumours of a new Balkan League under Russian auspices; but the advent of Radoslavov to power in Sofia had really made any such plan impracticable, and King Charles of Rumania, though bent upon cooperation with Serbia and receiving the Tsar with special honours at Constanta (Constantsa), had no idea of breaking his connexion with the Triple Alliance.

The Assassination of the Archduke. On June 24 King Peter, incapacitated by ill-health, appointed Prince Alexander as Regent, and simultaneously dissolved Parliament, Pasid having in April pledged himself to the election as for a " Great Skup- stina " for constitutional changes. Only four days later the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo revived the latent Austro-Serbian conflict in a more acute form than ever. The authors of the crime, Princip and Cabrinovic, belonged to a group of Bosnian Serb students, mostly under the age of 20, who gave terrorist expression to the universal discontent aroused by Austro-Hungarian repression throughout her Yugoslav provinces. The victories of Serbia during the Balkan Wars and the openly hostile policy pursued towards her by Vienna and Budapest had assured to her in the eyes of public opinion the position of the Yugoslav Piedmont. Thus no external incentive to the crime was needed: and the young hotheads were further swayed by sentimental considera- tions. The motive of the Archduke's visit was to conduct manoeuvres which had no meaning save as a rehearsal for a future campaign against Serbia: while the selection of " Vidov- dan " (St. Vitus's Day the anniversary of Kosovo) for his public reception in Sarajevo was regarded as a deliberate chal- lenge to the Serb idea. It was, however, proved that the assassins had been in Belgrade and had been secretly smuggled across the Drina into Bosnia, after receiving hand grenades and revolvers from the Serbian Komitajis Major Tankosid and Ciganovic. On these facts the Ballplatz sought to establish the complicity of the Serbian Government, but for this no evidence has ever been produced. Indeed presumption overwhelmingly favours the opposite theory. The country was exhausted by two wars; the Albanian campaign in the previous autumn had shown the reluctance of the peasant soldiers to return to the colours, and it was now the eve of harvest. Military stocks were alarmingly

1 This statesmanlike measure was negotiated by Vesnic, the Serbian minister in Paris, and Gavrilovic (afterwards Yugoslav minister in London), aided by Bakutic, a Croat expert in canon law, from Sebenico.

2 Since 1912 this name was transferred to the original kingdom and the " Old Serbia " of Turkish times became " New Serbia."

low, as the next winter was to show. The young Prince had only just assumed the reins of Government; the position of the Cabinet was shaky, and a fierce electoral campaign was opening. The Concordat with the Vatican had only just been signed, and delicate negotiations with Montenegro for a customs and military union and perhaps even a dynastic arrangement, were still pending. Serbia had every conceivable motive for avoiding aggressive action. After the tragedy, it is difficult to see what other course her Government could have pursued; its one omission was to offer a thorough inquiry, without wait- ing for any suggestion from Vienna. The situation was from the first envenomed by the press of Belgrade, Vienna and Buda- pest; but it is to be noted that while the former had always had an irresponsible and highly scurrilous section, which the Govern- ment was unable to restrain owing to the lack of any proper press or libel laws, the two latter had always been extremely sensi- tive to the directive of the Ballplatz, and the worst offences were committed by journals with the strongest official ties.

Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The ominous silence preserved by Austria-Hungary for nearly three weeks after the murder has been very largely explained by the documents published since the war by the Austrian and German republican Govern- ments. From memoranda on Balkan policy prepared for Count Berchtold during May 1914, and re-drafted by him personally both before and after the murder, it is evident that Austria- Hungary was pressing upon Germany the need for clearing up the situation with Rumania, and for attaching Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, and that Germany wished to use Bucharest as a bridge between Vienna and Belgrade, but dropped this idea after the tragedy. On July 2 Francis Joseph wrote to William II. that the main basis of Austro-Hungarian policy must be the isolation of Serbia, and " her elimination as a political factor in the Balkans," again advocated alliance with Bulgaria and proposed that Rumania should be warned that the friends of Serbia cannot be the friends of Austria-Hungary and Germany. 3 On reading the letter the Emperor William said that he must be prepared for European complications and must therefore talk with his Chancellor; but he at once authorized Count Szogyeny to inform Francis Joseph that he might reckon upon Germany's full support " even in this case," and he urged that if there was to be an advance into Serbia, it should be at once, especially as Russia was certain to be hostile, though unprepared for war (July 5).* Next day Herr von Bethmann Hollweg instructed the German minister in Sofia to cooperate with his Austro-Hungarian colleague in favour of the Bulgarian alliance, and the German minister in Bucharest to announce Germany's abandonment of all idea of agreement with Serbia. That Germany gave carte blanche to Austria-Hungary has been vehemently denied by Bethmann Hollweg in his Memoirs, but is admitted in so many words in the preface to the official German White Book, 6 and is proved by Herr von Tschirschky's assurances to Francis Joseph on July 2, by the instructions which he received from William II. and Bethmann Hollweg, and by William's letter of July 14 to Francis Joseph. 6 As early as July 8, Tschirschky reported to Berlin Berchtold's intention of drafting an ultimatum in such a form that " its acceptance seems out of the question," r and not merely is there no trace of Berlin rebuking this tendency, but there are repeated signs of impatience in Berlin at Vienna's delays. Not merely was the full initiative left to Vienna, 8 but on July 12 there was a joint decision between Vienna and Berlin not to inform Italy of their intentions, but to place her before " an irretrievable situation." ' In Vienna the only counsels of moderation came from the Hungarian premier, Count Tisza, who at the Crown

p. 29.
 * Goos, Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges,

'Ibid., p. 31.

6 P. 5 (Authorized English Edition).

6 Die Deutschen Dokumente, Nos. n, 15, 26.

7 Ibid., No. 19.

8 Goos, op. cit., p. 44.

Diplomatiscke Aktenstiicke (Republik Oesterreich) i., p. 51 (No. 16).