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immediate war with Serbia (see under AUSTRIAN EMPIRE: Foreign Policy): and Count Forgacs, who as minister in Bel- grade, had supervised the anti-Serbian forgeries exposed at the Friedjung trial, was now permanent under-secretary at the Ballplatz and using all his influence with Count Berchtold in favour of war. There is practical certainty, however, that the Archduke Francis Ferdinand on this occasion supported Francis Joseph's aversion to war, and that the decisive factor was Italy's opposition to any "forward" policy from Vienna. As negotia- tions were already proceeding between Berlin, Vienna and Rome for a fifth renewal of the Triple Alliance (actually signed on Dec. 5 1912 for six years), Italy was able to use as a lever the special Austro-Italian agreement of 1909, by which Austria- Hungary had pledged herself to make no change in the Balkan status quo, " without a previous agreement with Italy, based on the principle of compensation." Moreover, Berlin, concerned for the Alliance, insisted strongly in Vienna upon the need for reassuring Rome by a more moderate attitude towards Serbia. The march of events had taken Vienna altogether by surprise, and in complying with its ally's wishes, it was influenced by the altered outlook of the Great Powers. On Oct. 8, in a last effort to avert war, they had warned the Balkan States that no territorial changes would be tolerated. But the success of the campaign and the general relief with which public opinion hailed the downfall of Turkish rule in Europe, soon led to a change in their attitude. On Oct. 30 M. Poincare proposed a general declaration of desinteressement in territorial questions: and though this was rejected by Vienna, its moral effect was only increased when Mr. Asquith spoke in favour of recognizing the accomplished fact and remaking the map of eastern Europe. On Nov. 2 this view was strongly endorsed by M. Sazonov. For the moment all that Count Berchtold could do was to encourage Bulgarian designs on Constantinople and attempt to sow dissensions among the allies. The Turks, seeing them- selves isolated in Europe, made overtures of peace as early as the nth to King Ferdinand, who was not willing to consider them until his troops had been checked before Chatalja. On the 25th, however, negotiations were opened and resulted, not in peace, but in an armistice (Dec. 3) pending a general peace conference in London. When this opened at St. James's Palace on Dec. 16, Serbia was represented by the ex-premier and historian Novakovic, the president of the Skupstina Nikolic, and the minister in Paris, Vesnic. The wisdom of the allies in excluding Greece from the armistice soon became apparent: for her command of the sea limited the Turks to the Anatolian railway as the sole channel of reinforcement. In London Turkey pursued a policy of dilatory diplomatic intrigue and only receded inch by inch before the very drastic demands of the allies. After a month had been wasted, the Powers, with unexpected unanimity, presented a joint note to the Porte, advising the cession of Adrianople to Bulgaria and hinting at the loss of Constantinople as a possible consequence of renewed hostilities (Jan. 18 1913). Kiamil Pasha laid the proposals of the Powers before a specially convoked council of notables, and was on the point of yielding when the extremists of the Committee of Union and Progress overthrew his Cabinet and murdered the com- mander-in-chief, Nazim Pasha (Jan. 23). In view of the united front presented by the Powers, there can be little doubt that the new Cabinet would soon have been driven to the neces- sary concessions. But the Balkan delegates, rightly or wrongly, took the protestations of the Young Turks at their face value, and broke off the negotiations on Jan. 28. The council of ambassadors initiated by Sir Edward Grey continued to sit in London, and devoted especial attention to the Albanian problem and to the friction produced between Albanians and Serbs by the latter's presence on the Adriatic. Since the commandant of Scutari, Hasan Riza, declined to recognize the armistice, hostilities before the town had continued throughout Dec. and Jan., and Serbia sent repeated reinforcements to the aid of the Montenegrins.

Resumed Hostilities. When war was resumed on Feb. 3 the brunt fell upon Bulgaria, and the Serbs, being complete masters

of Macedonia, were free to contribute 47,000 men and a siege train of 38 guns to the operations against Adrianople, which held out until March 26. The dispute which arose as to whether Shukri Pasha had surrendered to the Bulgarians or to the Serbs, was in itself quite unprofitable, but was a symptom of the friction which was daily increasing between the two allies. Gen. Stepanovic, who commanded the Serbian contingent, was allowed to pass through Sofia with his staff, without a single greeting, and on April 16 Bulgaria renewed the armistice with Turkey, without waiting for her allies. The final phase of the war concentrated round Scutari, which Montenegro and Serbia made desperate efforts to reduce. Even the announcement that the council of ambassadors, in fixing the frontiers of the new Albanian State, had definitely included Scutari (while leaving Dibra, Prizren, Pec [Ipek] and Djakovo to the two Serb kingdoms) only served as an incentive to create if possible a fresh fait accompli. But Austria-Hungary upheld her veto, and on March 20 addressed a severe note to Montenegro, reproaching her for the murder of a Bosnian Franciscan and other incidents, and at the same time dispatched a strong naval squadron to the southern Adriatic. Her next step was to urge upon the Powers a collective demand for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Montenegrin and Ser- bian forces from the territory assigned to Albania, and to threaten the use of force unless at least the civil population of Scutari were allowed to leave the town (March 23). This demand was supported by Britain, partly in order to avert a conflict, and was conceded: but the close support of Cetinje by Belgrade rendered the danger of Austro-Hungarian inter- vention increasingly acute. On March 31 the Powers ordered Montenegro to cease hostilities, and on her refusal established a naval blockade of her strip of coast. This seemingly illusory measure at least had the effect of restraining Austria-Hungary, who could not act separately so long as the Powers held to- gether. It was, however, simply defied by King Nicholas, who gained time by consenting to the withdrawal of the Serbian troops and meanwhile closed the frontier and conducted secret negotiations with Essad Pasha, commandant of the town since the assassination of Hasan Riza on March 30. On April 23 Scutari surrendered to the Montenegrins, and the Powers had difficulty in restraining Austria-Hungary from immediate action. What finally decided her appears to have been the knowledge that her seizure of Mount Lovcen (Lovchen), the key to Cetinje, would be followed by Italy's occupation of Valona, with its control of the entrance to the Adriatic.

Amid the countless rival intrigues the Powers presented in public a unanimous front, and on May 14 the Montenegrins found themselves obliged to surrender Scutari to Adml. Burney, as commander of the international fleet. Negotiations could now be resumed in London for a general peace (May 20), and the Powers found it easier to take a strong line. Before the delegates could be brought to business, it was necessary for Sir E. Grey to inform them, with quite undiplomatic bluntness, that unless they were prepared to conclude peace without further delay they had better leave London altogether. By the Treaty of London, which was signed on May 30 I9T3, and only con- tained seven brief articles, Turkey ceded to the four allies con- jointly the island of Crete and all territory lying to the west of the Enos-Midia line, and all the contracting parties agreed -to refer the settlement of Albania and the Aegean Islands to the five European Great Powers, and all financial questions to the International Commission convoked in Paris.

The Dispute between the Allies. The Balkan allies were now faced by the thorny problem of dividing the spoils. Macedonian autonomy, which the treaty had laid down as the ideal solution, was from the first abandoned by all parties. Their success, as it had far exceeded their expectations, also increased their appetites and encouraged them to extend their claims. Thus while Serbia found herself in effective possession of most of Macedonia, and remembered the imperial traditions of Stephen Dusan, Bulgaria saw the possibility of acquiring Adrianople and Thrace, and not content with the " Big Bulgaria " of the