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defence units in Thrace and E. Macedonia, the whole of Bulgaria's mobilizable force was present between the Devoli in Albania and the mouth of the Struma. In the depots were practically only the 1919 class recruits, just called up; 55,600 men had fallen in battle since 1915, some thousands were prisoners, many thousands had died or been invalided. Thus the ration strength of the Bulgarian Armies on the Macedonian front can hardly have exceeded 420,000, with some 8,000 Germans (principally Jager battalions, heavy artillery and mountain machine-gun detachments). The combatant strength may be taken roughly as 310,000 Germans and Bulgarians. The Italians of Ferrero and the Austrians of Pflanzer-Baltin, whose operations in Albania were entirely unconnected with the battle on the main front, are ignored in this calculation.

On taking up their battle grouping the larger formations of the Entente Armies were arranged thus: Devoli valley to Staravina (E. of the Cerna bend), the French Army of the East, in seven French, Italian and Greek Divs.; Staravina to Nonte (exclusive), the Serbian I. and II. Armies under Boyovich (3 Divs.) and Stepanovich (5 Divs.) respectively, the latter consisting of the Strumaja, Timok, and Yugoslav Divs., and the French izznd and iyth Colonial Divs.; Nonte to Lyumnitsa, Gen. Anselme's group, Greek and French Divs.; Lyumnitsa to Dub (exclusive), astride Vardar, 26th and 27th British Divs.; Dub to Dova Tepe, 22nd and 28th British and two Greek Divs.; Dova Tepe to mouth of Struma, 3 Greek Divs.; Salonika, i Greek Div. ; in all, 28 divisions. In addition there were a small Serbian cavalry Div., a French cavalry brigade, and other lesser formations and details. The ration strength of these forces, after making allowances for men invalided during the hot months, was about 550,000, and the combatant strength perhaps 350,000.

In sum, then, there was no great numerical disparity between the opposed forces. The equipment of the Entente Army in heavy artillery was, however, considerable. Sarrail's repeated requests for an adequate equipment in this respect had been in the end met, just before his recall. As to the number of heavy batteries on the other side accounts differ, but in any case the regrouping of guns to meet an attack, in the movement condi- tions of Macedonia, would be difficult if not impossible for the defence, and the mere possession of a reserve of such artillery was, in the conditions, a big element in favour of an attack, provided the duration of the artillery phase of it was reduced to a minimum. On the other hand, to oppose to the powerful material of attack, the Bulgarians had all the advantages of natural and artificial strength of position. But the success or failure of an offensive would turn more on moral than on material factors. Presuming that the tactical break-through was pos- sible, would the Bulgarians knit up again on a new line further back? Or would it be found that the third winter had completed the war-weariness on which Sarrail had twice vainly counted, so that one heavy blow would finish the matter? In the light of events the answer is easy. The new government in Bulgaria was pacifist in character. Ludendorff regarded a breakdown as almost certain and detailed several divisions from the eastern front early in Sept. to proceed to Bulgaria and Serbia, the nearest indeed being ordered to Sofia to keep order. On the front itself, according to German accounts, conditions were " indescribably pitiful," and for food the greater part of the troops were dependent on ox-transport from a base 60 m. distant, and upon what they had themselves grown behind the lines, this last fact indeed making it almost impossible to induce a unit to quit its sector for a concentration. But 1917 had for the Entente been a tragedy of disappointments founded on optimistic estimates of the enemy's broken moral and vanished man-power, and in 1918 a not unhealthy scepticism prevailed in their intelligence staffs, although it was agreed that Bulgarian moral was low. Then, too, there was the question of Serbian moral. Since the deadlock of May 1917 the Serbians had consistently followed the principle that it was useless to rescue Serbia if no Serbs were left to inhabit it, yet they alone possessed the fire and passion which would convert tactical victory into

strategic triumph, who would disregard food and rest sufficiently to exploit success by leaps and bounds, who would not stop short of the Danube. And nothing less than victory without remainder would be of any value to the Entente.

When the plans were under consideration this latter question was unexpectedly answered by the Serbs themselves. They proposed an offensive with limited objective in the Moglena sector, i.e. that lying between Kaimakchalan and the Srka di Legen. At once the situation was cleared up. If they were ready to carry out an attack on the mountain front for no more than a limited objective, it was unlikely that an offensive from that group with the objective of Belgrade would not fall to pieces as in 1917. On June 29 the plan was definitely fixed, and about July 7 the Serbian headquarters (now directed by Mishich) agreed to engage all its forces in the operation. The date of the offensive (which needed a good deal of material preparation as the Moglena sector had never been equipped for battle) was fixed for Sept. 15, though, owing to objections and preoccupations in Paris, the higher command did not give leave to carry it out till little more than a week before that date (Sept. 4).

On Sept. 14 a bombardment opened which, less overpowering than those of the western front, was far heavier than anything previously witnessed in the Balkans. Next day the original date the offensive was launched. From the Lechnitsa river to the Sokol mountain the I. Serbian Army (Boyovich), consisting of the Danube, Drina and Morava Divs., had a frontage of 5 kilometres per division. From Sokol to the Suchitsa brook the II. Serbian Army (Stepanovich) formed the break-through force. In front of the Dobropolye were the two French assault Divs. with the Shumaja Div. on their right, and the Exploitation Divs., Timok and Yugoslav behind them. The I. Army and the Exploitation Divs. were not to move till the French had carried Sokol, Kravitsa and Vetrenik heights. Then, passing through, the Yugoslav Divs. were to master the Koziak, and the II. Army front was to advance at the utmost speed on Gradsko, flankguarded by the I. Army on the left and the Timok Div. on the right.

The attack succeeded according to programme. It continues to be a matter of controversy whether the Bulgarians offered an earnest and fierce resistance. The impression left on the Allied infantry was that they did so; the Germans in their midst assert the contrary. In any case, it is probable that the backbone of resistance was the German mountain machine- gun detachments which were dispersed in the battle zone. Be this as it may, the French Assault Divs. carried their objectives by the evening of the isth, the Yugoslav Div. passed through them in the night of the 15-16, carried Koziak on the i6th, and on the I7th drove a deep wedge, of which the point was armed midway between Gradsko and Demir Kapu, and the lengthening left flank along the Cerna was taken up by the I. Army. On the other side there was little or no tactical handling in the ensemble. Machine-gun groups and specially resolute parties of riflemen in broken ground constituted the whole resistance. This, indeed, was the Jypical form of defence in all theatres of war by 1918, but here it lacked the essential element of organized counter-attack. Here and there a unit turned upon its pursuers, but in the main the rear of the enemy's position was void of reserves, although it is said that only 12,000 Bulgarian and German infantry were in line on the front attacked. Later, .all attempts at reinforcement always failed, as the troops concerned had to traverse instead of following the valleys and ridge-systems. In sum, by the igth, the wedge had developed two horns, of which one, following the Cerna, was at the outskirts of Kavadar, and the other was engaged in rolling up the front opposed to Anselme's group.

Meanwhile, on the i8th, the British and Greeks of the Doiran front, under orders from Gen. Franchet d'Esperey, assaulted the whole enemy line from the Vardar to beyond Lake Dcriran, with the general idea of cutting the communications between the Bulgarians opposed to Anselme, and the apex of their own country at Strumnitsa. Here, at any rate, the Bulgarians