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Rh throw of the Constantine regime was the only logical outcome of maintaining a Salonika front at all. But between that logical extreme and the other logical extreme of evacuation, which was always the desire of the British War Office, diplomacy built up a series of compromises which satisfied nobody. It was to the indefinite and equivocal position created by these compromises, even more than to any military factors or personal disagreements, that the positive ineffectiveness of the Macedonian forces was due. It remains to the credit of Sarrail that he was sanguine in the most confused and difficult conditions and resolute in carrying the occupation to a common-sense issue. In spite of proposals to retreat again into the entrenched camp, he maintained the army on the front from which, nine months later, it was to deliver the great offensive blow for which he had always hoped. On the other hand he left the Allied Army in a state of badly shaken moral. The consciousness of inef- fectiveness, the blight of malaria, the infrequency of leave, the sense of being a forgotten " side-show," the international causes of friction all these factors told on the moral of the Salonika forces at the most critical period of war-psychology. 1 A period of remise en main was necessary before the troops could be employed either in this theatre or in another, and Sarrail had taken the line of defending his army against all criticism, fair or unfair. It was essential, therefore, if the army was to be pulled together, that new men should be put in power.

General Guillaumat, the new commander-in-chief, set himself to this task under favourable conditions. No important military operations were in prospect. The Greek danger had been liquidated. The atmosphere of exasperation was largely dis- persed by his appointment alone. With Russia and Rumania in collapse, and the final military trial of strength obviously imminent in one or both the western theatres, not one of the three great Powers concerned was inclined to press its Balkan interests very closely. His military position, too, soon came to be much stronger than that of his predecessor. Although the British had withdrawn two of their six divisions (the 6oth in June and the loth in Sept. 1917, both proceeding to Syria), and one battalion per brigade in the four remaining (spring 1918), the French and Italian contingents remained practically unaltered (save for the withdrawal of the Russians), while the Serbians acquired a whole new division created from Yugoslav prisoners of war, and the Greeks were taking their place as a regular Allied contingent, the " national defence " divisions at Salonika (Archipelago, Crete, Seres) being augmented by those of the regular army, reorganized by a French military mission.

The question of the use of these forces had been put on one side by the central councils of the Entente. German pressure on the Western Front, beginning with March 21 and culminating on July 15, threw all other questions into the background, and when the tide began to recede it proved as difficult as ever to convince the directors of the War that good could come from a Salonika offensive, while, at the same time, it was impossible to offer the Central Powers the opportunity of repeating at Greece's expense their customary autumn triumph. No de- cision imposed itself and none was taken. The only event of the early summer was a brilliant coup de main with limited objective, which on May 30 carried the Srka di Legen on the left of the Vardar. In July Guillaumat, after practically complet- ing the work of reorganization, was recalled to Paris, where an energetic governor was needed in case of a German break- through. He was succeeded by Gen. Franchet d'Esperey. At Paris he continued to act as advocate of, and so to speak agent for, the principles of a Salonika offensive. After much persuading he obtained for his successor authority to prepare one, but au- thority to begin was not given till a few days before the battle.

Meantime, operations in Albania, which for two years had been in the nature of post and police warfare, rose for a moment in the summer of 1918 to the level of major operations.

In the winter of 1917-18 the posts of the Italian XVI. Corps (Gen. Ferrero) in Albania ran along the Voyusa from the sea

1 Nevertheless it is clear that the phase of the mutinies passed off more easily than the corresponding phase in France.

to Memaliadz, where it turned abruptly N. and then N.E., facing Glava and Cafa Glava, Parasboar, Barguzyasi, and Cerevoda. Here it joined the French posts, which ran in a N. to S. line along the mountains to Golik in the Skumbi valley and thence nearly E. to Point 1704 S. of Lin on the shore of Lake Okhrida. Early in July 1918 a frontal advance of Ferrero's Italians from the Voyusa and combined by flank pressure by the French syth Div. in the mountains of the Devoli regions, forced the two Austrian Divs. (47th and 8ist) of Gen. Konnen- Hozak's XIX. Corps to evacuate the whole Berst region in haste, with a loss of nearly 3,000 prisoners. By July 20 the Italians lay along the Semeni and the lower Devoli from the coast to Petrohaudi (with a bridgehead in front of Fieri), and thence in an E. to W. line to the foot of the Mali Siloves range which was held by the French. The positions of the latter formed a marked salient, the apex of which lay at the confluence of the Holts and Devoli rivers, and the right flank of which passed by Kumichan to Golik on the old front. The importance of this salient lay in the fact that it kept the right wing of the general line echeloned well forward, threatening the rear of the enemy's lines near Berat and ultimately the connexion between Elbasan and Lake Okhrida.

In August the Austrians, now commanded by Generaloberst von Pflanzer-Baltin and reinforced by the 45th Div., as well as by the fresh i2th Bulgarian Div. in the Okhrida-Skumbi sector, began a counter-offensive all along the line. Between August 20 and 24 they recaptured the line of the Semeni and the Devoli and drove back the Italians to positions only slightly in front of Fieri and Berat. On August 24 those towns fell again into their hands, and the Italians then withdrew to a line from just S. of Fieri, along the Janitsa, S. of Berst, and along the Osum to Mt. Tomor. Meantime, the French, the left rear of their Devoli salient being thus threatened, had had to fall back in the Devoli and Tomorica valleys to regain touch with the Italians at Mt. Tomor, while still holding on to their posts between the Devoli and the Skumbi. These operations are of interest as being the last military success won by forces of the Central Powers in the War. Three weeks after their conclusion the Bulgarian front was in ruins.

At the close of these operations and the eve of the final act on the Salonika front, the numbers and positions of the forces of the Central Powers were approximately as follows: In Albania, XIX. Austro-Hungarian Corps (45th, 47th, 8ist Divs.) under Generaloberst von Pflanzer-Baltin; between Skumbi Valley and Lake Okhrida the I2th Bulgarian Div.; from Lake Okhrida (exclusive) to Koziak Mountain (inclusive), the XI. German Army (Gen. von Steuben), consisting of, from right to left, the LXII. German Corps staff, with under it the Bulgarian ist, 6th and Composite Divs., and some few German and Austrian units, the LXI. German Corps staff, with the* 302nd German Div. (staff German, troops Bulgarian), the 4th Bulgarian and the 2nd Bulgarian Div., and the 3rd Bulgarian Div.; from E. of Koziak to Lake Doiran (inclusive) astride the Vardar, the I. Bulgarian Army (Gen. Nerezov), three Bulgarian Divs.; from Lake Doiran (exclusive) to Lake Tahinos (inclusive), the II. Bulgarian Army (Gen. Lukov), three Bulgarian Divs.; from Lake Tahinos to the mouth of the Struma, thence eastward in coast defence positions, the IV. Bulgarian Army (Gen. Petrov), two Bulgarian divisions. The whole of these forces were under the control of the German headquarters, which had formerly been Mackensen's and Billow's but was now the Armeegruppe Scholtz; Gen. Scholtz was, however, for certain purposes under the control of the Bulgarian higher command, at Sofia, over which Todorov presided. An exact account of the forces of Bulgaria at the crisis can hardly be given, 2 but, save for one division in Rumania and some coast

2 Some of the newer divisions had an irregular constitution whereas the older ones still retained the six-regiment organization of 1915, and some of these even the old four-battalion regiments. Moreover, at that moment movements were in progress for replacing 15 Ger- man battalions by 45 Bulgarians; the Germans had departed, all but three battalions, but few of the Bulgarians arrived in the XI. Army in time.