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reassembled N. of Koritsa, in readiness to participate in the general offensive when this should be ordered.

Meantime the British advance beyond the Struma, originally developed out of the demonstrations made during the first stages of the Monastir offensive, had been consolidated on the line Jenimah-Osman Kamila-Hrostian Kamila-Nevolyen-Kuku- luk-Elishan-Barakli Dzuma-Alipsa (All Pasha). This position formed a useful bridgehead in case Sarrail should be able to resume the old scheme of an offensive by way of Demir Hisar and Rupel against the Bulgarian communications, and meantime it immobilized a Bulgarian force of approximately equal strength. But the supply of the lines beyond the Struma was difficult and laborious during the winter months, and it was to be expected that the valley would be a hotbed of disease in the summer. On the Doiran front several small local attacks were made on the enemy's positions on and about Dub mountain the Achi Baba or Hermada of this front.

The scheme which Sarrail intended to carry out was the old scheme of a principal blow from the mountain front in the direction of Demir Kapu, cutting off the defenders of the Doiran and Lyumnitsa fronts. Combined with this, local and subsidiary advances were to be made on the Cerna bend and Monastir fronts, with, to the left of all, an enveloping movement by the 76th Div. from Koritsa by Resna upon the rear of the Bulgarians N. of Monastir. Meanwhile, the British, after exercising a holding action which was to increase in intensity from left to right and culminate in a real attack on Seres, would quickly shift their centre of gravity to Demir Hisar, and thence, by Rupel and the Struma, force their way to a position on the rear of the Bulgarian line of retreat. If, as in 1915, Sofia was to be the ultimate objective if, in short, the campaign was intended to be a decisive one the sweep of the extreme left would pass through Uskub and Kumanovo, that of the left centre through Veles and Shtip, while the Italians bore down on Demir Kapu and the British marched on Simitli a romantically complete success. In many ways, indeed, the scheme is identical with that eventually carried out by Franchet d'Esperey in Sept. 1918. But in both cases there were four postulates: (a) Greece friendly or under entire control; (6) synchronization of the offensive with those in the main theatres, so that the enemy could not transfer German reinforcements in time to the Balkans; (c) enough men; and (d) enough material. Of these postulates Franchet d'Esperey was in the sequel to possess all four. Sarrail, on the other hand, though (b), the most important strategically, was within his power, had little real security as to (a) and a definite lack of means in respect of (d), and this last ranked as one of the most important factors for the tactical break-through on which all the rest depended. Several of these requisites being absent, Sarrail was under no illusions as to the chances of pushing success to the gates of Sofia. But he consid- ered that there was a possibility, becoming a probability if he were given more heavy guns, of forcing the offensive of his left centre in the mountains so far north-eastward as to compel the evacuation of the Lyumnitsa-Doiran-Belashitsa front. In the absence of these additional heavy guns, however, the tactical break-through in the Moglena-Cerna region would be a matter of great difficulty, and Sarrail accepted a proposal of Milne that the British holding attack should be delivered on the Doiran front where its effect on Sarrail's battle would be immediate and tactical instead of towards Seres. This change of plan, made between Feb. 9 and 19 was due in the first instance to the difficulties of movement in the Struma valley, where exceptionally bad weather had made motor transport almost impossible. But the decision was one of grave importance since the height of Dub, now chosen for the British attack, was one of the strongest points on the whole front, and it was an attack, and not a demonstration, that was intended.

In this form the scheme was accepted by the Inter-Allied conference that met at Calais on Feb. 27 in circumstances of great tension and Sarrail was ordered to hold the enemy to his ground, and authorized to seize any opportunity which offered itself to inflict real damage. So far this represented

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merely the waiting policy of the Rome conference. But an important modification of that policy was implied in the actual instructions to Sarrail, for not only was he told that the v plan of operations had been agreed to by the British War Council, but he was instructed to be ready to launch his offensive about April 15 a few days after the date selected for Nivelle's battle on the Aisne in spite of the fact that no Russo-Rumanian offensive could be expected so soon. That authority should be given for an attack of any kind in the conditions of the time was of doubtful wisdom. But that the conference sanctioned an attack on the strongest parts of the enemy front in order to obtain the very limited results at which it aimed is a fact that is more than difficult to explain. The strategic results that would or might accrue from a break-through in the Moglena region were indeed so great (as 1918 showed) that special tactical risks might fairly be taken to achieve this break-through. But the conference of Calais not only had no great strategic results in mind, but had expressly agreed that the circumstances of the time excluded them. And when, in addition, we find that Sarrail was, at one and the same time, told that the decisive defeat of the Bulgarians was excluded, and instructed to " take " according to the Calais proces-verbal or " seek out " according to the French Ministry of War telegram " every favourable opportunity for inflicting a serious check," we can only conclude that the Calais conference was so preoc- cupied with troubles nearer home that it could think of nothing better, as regards Salonika, than to shift the responsibility and trust to luck.

But before the offensive period arrived events had already blurred the scheme. The British were to attack the Dub, and demonstrate at other points; the French, Russians and Italians in and W. of the Cerna bend were then to move, and lastly the Serbians were to deliver the principal blow between the Cerna and the Duditsa mountain, E. of which were the French 1 2 2nd Div. and part of the Greek "Archipelago" Div. (the first of the Venizelist National Defence formations), ready to drive forward on the Huma-Vardar front so soon as the flank attack had begun to make itself felt. But the Serbians, still angered by the breakdown of joint action in the Monastir battle, and also seriously affected by their internal troubles, refused to move till after the Allied general offensive had opened in France. The Russians were deeply shaken by the revolution in their own country. Weather conditions were terrible, and the zero day of battle was several times postponed, both owing to these conditions and to the slowness with which the preliminary offensives at and W. of Monastir were developing.

As early as March 12 the French 76th Div. had begun its advance from Koritsa on Resna. But owing to snow and to the harrying tactics of enemy irregulars who were supported by small Austrian forces from Pogradets it made but little prog- ress, and on March 19 Sarrail suspended the movement. Meanwhile, on the i8th, Grossetti, after several days of local attacks, delivered a larger attack on the front N. of Monastir, which by the 27th had advanced the line in this sector to height 1248, Snegovo and Rastani, with corresponding gains to the left on the spur of Peristeri called Crvena Stena, and to the right about Dobromir and height 1050. Over 2,000 prisoners were taken, and these gains eased the uncomfortable position of Monastir, but they were not pressed, as Sarrail not only held his reserves for the April offensive but sought to disengage part of the troops engaged at Monastir for the same purpose.

On the Doiran front the British attacks began about the middle of March with enterprises intended to secure advantageous positions for the general engagement. On April 22, after several postponements, the artillery preparation began, in terrible weather, and on the evening of the 24th the infantry assault was delivered on a two-division front against Dub and its under-features. The positions of the defence were strong in themselves and strongly entrenched, and, as in the trench- warfare battles of the French front in 1916-17, the attack preparations and especially the prolonged bombardment had given full warning. Along the whole front the infantry reached