Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/370

352

victorious, closed with the occupation of a line from Krani on Lake Prespa '-Saddle 2227-Orizar N. of Monastir-Makovo- heights S. of Staravina-N. slopes of Kaimakchalan.

In view of the weather victory had come in the nick of time. The force of the attack rapidly died out, even the Serbian Army with its positive and eager moral being too weary, and all formations being too far ahead of their administrative services 2 to be able to push on. Fighting went on in the Cerna bend till Dec. 12; the French operating in this quarter captured Dobromir on the 2ist and height 1050 on Nov. 27, and the Serbs Stara- vina on Dec. 4; but the troublesome height 1248, overlooking Monastir and the plain, remained in the hands of the Bulgarians, and the town was under shellfire throughout the winter.

By this time the evident defeat of the Rumanians and the consequences of the Venizelist coup d'ttat at Salonika called for a reconsideration of policy. The offensive, considered as a re- lief offensive on Rumania's behalf, had completed its usefulness, and on Dec. n, Sarrail was instructed to establish his forces on a defensive line, holding as much of the regained territory as possible and keeping in mind the resumption of the offensive at a date that was to be fixed according to the general plan of campaign for 1917, and particularly according to the date at which the Rumanian Army, reorganized by Gen. Berthclot, should be ready for the field. Meantime, the contingency of rapid action against Greece was to be provided for.

Henceforward, for some months, it is this last element in the problem which governs the action or inaction of the Salonika Armies. In answer to the Venizelist coup of Aug. 30, King Constantine began a threatening concentration of troops in Thessaly, on Sarrail's left rear. To this the Venizelist forces, hardly yet in being, were no counterpoise, and Venizelos's policy, which was also that of Sarrail, and as a rule that of the British and French Governments, was to prevent contact between the two Greek parties. 3 Sarrail therefore drew a neutral zone of some kilometres width from the Koritsa basin to the sea. Nevertheless, throughout the period of his offensive, anxieties for the flank and rear limited the play of such reserves as the Allied commander-in-chief possessed. On Dec. i the attempt to enforce the delivery of certain war material to the Entente representatives at Athens produced an tmeute, in which the Allied landing parties suffered severe losses and the Legations were for a time practically besieged. This affair brought the confusion of the Greek problem to a climax. Though on Dec. 2 Sarrail's demand for authority to advance into Thessaly was refused, and some disjointed efforts at naval and military action led to nothing, sufficient unity of policy was achieved to enable the Allies to deliver an ultimatum on Dec. 14, demanding withdrawal of the Greek forces in Thessaly. 4

The policy of the Salonika forces for 1917 was fixed at the Inter-Allied conference held in Rome in Jan., to which Sarrail was summoned. The first conclusion was that Greece was not to be attacked, both for other reasons and especially owing to the effect that any high-handed action would have on American sentiment, which was at that moment in the crisis of deciding

1 The French on the W. side of Lake Prespa occupied Liskovats, a village on the same latitude as Krani, and then Horesovo. The viaduct at Ekshisu was not repaired till Nov. 27.

1 The first battalions organized by the Venizelists were sent to the British front on the Struma. At one time the idea seems to have been entertained of reconquering Eastern Macedonia (Drama- Kavalla region) by means of an advance of these troops, presumably in concert with a British expedition. Nothing, however, was done in this direction. The regular Greek forces on this side, cut off by the Bulgarian invasion, had accepted an offer of internment as " guests of the German Government " (Sept. 14) and been trans- ported to Germany, except a small force which from Seres had made its way to join the Allies.

4 In the midst of these events came mutterings of trouble in the Serbian Army. Little is known as to the details, but as early as the beginning of Jan. 1917 a division commander and several brigade commanders and senior staff officers were deprived of their posts; by mid-March over twenty such officers were in prison at Bizerta charged with plotting against the Prince Regent. Finally, a number of these were brought to trial, some being condemned to death and (July 29) shot, others sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

for peace or war. The second was that operations on the front should be governed by a waiting policy a compromise between Sarrail's demand for forces sufficient for a grand offensive, and Robertson's and Cadorna's demand for a withdrawal 6 and that the divisions sent or to be sent to Salonika should be liable to recall, in the event either of a crisis on the Italian front, or of one in Palestine. On the other hand the full subordination of the British contingent to the Allied commander-in-chief was agreed to, 6 and (according to M. Mermeix) Sarrail's personality made so favourable an impression on Mr. Lloyd George that the agitation for his recall came to an end for the time being.

In the first weeks after the end of the battle and these decisions, the Salonika front was for the first time formed as a regular and continuous system. On the right, as far as the Vardar, were the British under Milne, consisting now of the loth, 22nd, 26th, 28th, 2gth, and 6oth Divs. (the last newly arrived) with some organized units of the Venizelist forces in support. On the left of the Vardar the national contingents were more intermingled, the Lyumnitsa region being held by the French, the Kaimakchalan-Vetrenik-Duditsa front by the Serbs (6 Divisions), 7 the Cerna bend by the Italians (13 Divisions), and the remainder of the front by the French main body, to the command of which Gen. Grossetti was shortly appointed in succession to Cordonnier. The French Army were now being reinforced, and included besides the old 57th, lyth Colonial, I22nd and is6th, the i6th Colonial (arrived early Dec.), 76th (arrived end Dec.), 3oth (arrived Jan.) and nth Colonial (newly formed from odd units on the spot). In all, therefore, there were no less than 215 Divisions in this theatre at the outset of the 1917 campaign, besides two Russian brigades, and the Greek National Defence Army in embryo. The Italians in Albania are not counted, as they were not under Sarrail's command, and operated entirely as a separate force in their own theatre, interesting the Salonika force only in so far that their positions protected the opening up of the line of communication Santi Quaranta-Koritsa-Lake Prespa. This force was strong enough to hold all its line and yet to have larger reserves than in 1916, for either an offensive northward or a march into Thessaly.

The Bulgarians on their side established themselves solidly on the final battle line of 1916, and improved it on Feb. 15 1917 by the recapture of height 1050 in the Cerna bend from the Italians, who had only shortly before taken up this sector. An attempt to retake it failed on the 28th. The end of active operations against Rumania about the middle of Jan. released additional Bulgarians for the Salonika front. As a beginning Sarrail sent his newly arrived 76th Div. inland to Koritsa 8 just in time to prevent the seizure of that point by an Austrian force coming down from Pogradets (early Feb. 1917); the division then moved on to clear the Santi Quaranta road the new alternative line of communications of bands and make the junction with the Italians in Albania, which at present only existed by wireless and aeroplane. This mission was completed by the meeting of the French and Italian troops at Ersek, Feb. 17, after which the limit between Sarrail's International Army and the purely Italian force of Gen. Ferrero in Albania was fixed at a little N. of that point. The ?6th Div. was then

8 The idea of a Salonika front had never had any real support in the British War Office, and the Italian point of view seems to have been that the abolition of an Inter-Allied force in the Balkans would give Italy greater freedom of action in Albania.

Sarrail had already been released from control of the French G.Q.G. when Joffre left it and was replaced by Nivelle (Dec. 1916).

7 Owing to losses the Serbian Divisions were now reduced from the old high establishment and were equivalent in rifle strength to French Divisions, viz. 9 three-company battalions.

8 Here, in the previous summer and autumn, French cavalry had operated to disperse irregular bands that were practically bandits, and to intercept communications between Athens and the enemy. For a time Venizelist sympathizers reigned at Koritsa, and the idea of annexing the district to Greece was not far in the background; but in the face of protests from Italy and from Essad's Albanian party at Salonika, Sarrail replaced them by an autonomous gov- ernment of inhabitants under French protection, a course which he considered would commit nobody and yet give no excuse for the formation of Royalist bands.