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346 During the first few days instructions from Paris to Bailloud (commanding on the spot pending Sarrail's arrival) varied several times, apparently in accordance with political nuances. At first (Oct. 3) the word was to concentrate at Nish, in the heart of Serbia; next, the Greek frontier was not to be crossed (Oct. 10); and then again (Oct. 12) authority was given to take over protection of the railway between Demir Kapu defile and the Greek frontier against possible attack from Strumitsa in Bulgaria, thereby releasing a small Serbian force to rejoin its own army. Meantime the Serbians demanded more direct assistance, but Sarrail (who arrived on the I2th), taking into account the size of his force only 1 5 divisions plus the British roth Div. which was not under his orders and the fact that it could only disembark and push on by driblets, determined to limit his advance to the near side of Demir Kapu. On Oct. 14 the leading French troops arrived at Strumitsa station (in Serbia) in time to aid the Serbian railway guards in repelling an inroad from Strumitsa.

In Sarrail's opinion the only service he could render was to concentrate on the routes to Strumitsa, and, by an offensive into Bulgarian territory, to draw off as many Bulgarian forces as possible from the main attack further north. General Mahon, commanding the British loth Div., took the same view, 1 and formed a mixed force which began to move up to Doiran, on the right rear of the French group in the Rabrovo region. On the 1 7th, however, in answer to a request from the Serbian com- mander at Uskub, Sarrail began to push a brigade beyond the Demir Kapu defile to Krivolak, but he refused to advance it to Veles, though again pressed to do so by the Serbs, and in fact a sharp attack developed from Strumitsa on Rabrovo on the zist and 22nd, which, till it was repulsed, threatened to isolate all French detachments N. of Strumitsa station. Meanwhile, Paris sent further instructions to the effect that all possible help should be afforded to the Serbs, subject to the limitation that the French communications with Salonika were in no case to be compromised. In reality, the French and British Govern- ments were very uneasy about the attitude of the Greek Army, a considerable force of which lay in the region N.E. of Salonika. The fall of Venizelos had put an end to the prospect of Greek cooperation, and under the new regime the local military and civil authorities began to oppose every move of the Allies, which was not entirely covered by Serbia's treaty rights, to the use of Salonika and the railway. Thus, when Mahon's force moved forward the use of the Salonika- Kilkish (Kukush)-Doir- an line was refused, and it had to use the main line, detrain in the midst of the French, and work thence outwards towards its post at Doiran.

On Nov. i the i22nd French Div. began to arrive from France, and Sarrail had already prepared to attack from Rabrovo towards Strumitsa with Bailloud's is6th Div., with Mahon in echelon behind his right, while his forces about Krivolak and Kavadar (sist Div.) made ready to attack in flank any Bul- garian force which should advance up the Cerna (Tserna) in pursuit of the Serbians. On Nov. 3 an attack was accordingly delivered northward from a front E. of Rabrovo; weather and the difficulty of the country brought it, however, to a standstill on the 6th, though local advances were made later. At this moment (Nov. 4) GaUieni, having become War Minister in the new French cabinet, telegraphed orders for the French Army to operate towards Veles, adding that four more British divisions were to be sent, which on arrival would take over the front leftwards from Doiran. The British 22nd Div. was in fact already close to Salonika, with another under orders to follow. But Sarrail judged that it was impossible to wait for these rein- forcements. Todorov's Bulgarian Army had already thrust itself between the Serbian Main Army and Krivolak, and the

1 According to Sarrail, the British Government instructed Mahon that his troops were to remain at Salonika, and it was on his own initiative that the British general formed a mobile force. Further instructions authorized Mahon to move forward but forbade him to cross the Greek frontier, until on Oct. 27 a final telegram removed this restriction.

urgent thing was to relieve pressure on that part of the Serbian forces which was retiring by the Babuna pass on Prilep, while reserving the possibility of action towards Veles if the Serbian Main Army should after ah 1 seek to break through towards its Allies. Orders were therefore given to the Krivolak-Kavadar force (57th Div. to be reinforced by the i22nd Div.) to take the offensive westward over the Cerna, so.as to strike the pursuers in flank or rear. On the 6th9th accordingly the 57th Div. crossed the Cerna and pushed an advance into the mountains towards the Babuna, still held by the Serbs. But the Bulgarians were in force, and the French retired to their Cerna bridgeheads, which the Bulgarians attacked without success on the I2th, i3th, i4th and i5th.

During these and the following days instructions came re- peatedly from Paris to modify the French commander's views and dispositions, now laying emphasis upon cooperation with the Serbs, now upon dangers from the Greek Army in rear. Finally on Nov. 21 Sarrail was given a free hand to decide what aid he could give to the Serbians and at what moment he should retire on Salonika. He adopted at first a middle course. He wished neither to attack at the risk of involving two-thirds of his forces in the Serbian dtbdcle (the Babuna had been turned by the N. on Nov. 14), nor to fall back to Salonika, where prestige counted for so much, but to hold on in the entrenched camp of Kavadar in the hope of " something turning up." On the 2ist-22nd, however, the retirement of the i22nd Div. over the Cerna under some pressure, together with the general military situation and a definitive refusal of reinforcements from France, 2 decided him in favour of falling back to Salonika, a decision approved by Gallieni. Four days later Sarrail was officially informed that the Serbians were retreating in the Adri- atic direction. The preparations for the Vardar retirement had already begun on the 24th with the seizure of a position on the E. bank, to prevent interference with the retreat of the Krivolak- Kavadar force on Demir Kapu. On Dec. i only rear-guards remained at Krivolak. By the night of the 3rd-4th all troops were inside Demir Kapu, and on the 6th this position also was given up. On the 8th the Bulgarians, who had from time to time attacked the rear-guards on the Vardar and the positions near Kosturino on the Strumitsa route, delivered a more con- certed attack on the front Ormanli (now held by the British)- Kosturino-Gradets on the E. and Mirovcha Petrovo on the W. of the Vardar. Their evident intention was envelopment, and on the pth, judging the centre of his line to be too pronounced a salient, Sarrail took up a position along the Petrovska stream, W. of the Vardar and the heights of Dedeli E. of it, the village of Dedeli being held by Mahon's forces, which from that point were echeloned back to Lake Doiran. From this position also the Allies retired under threat of envelopment during the night 11-12, after holding their ground against attacks on the nth. Lastly, the French i22nd and 57th Divs., at Gyevgyeli (Gevgeli) and near Doiran, covered the evacuation of part of Mahon's force on to the Salonika railway and the reconstitution of the is6th French Div., which had been considerably split up.

Thus the drive into Serbia came to an end, with little material loss, but a sad diminution of prestige, and the forces fell back to the following positions about Salonika: advanced guards of I2oth French Div. Karasuli with a detachment at Gumenye, and of 57th French Div. with cavalry, Kilkish, with a detachment at Kilindir; main body (i 22nd, is6th, 57th) in position on the line Doganyi-Daudli. British loth and 22nd Divs. Salonika, with other British forces arriving. Important points on the railway had been destroyed during the retreat. Meanwhile, on Dec. 4,

1 At that moment, according to Falkenhayn, the combatant strength of the Allies in France was to that of the Germans in the ratio of rather more than 3 to 2. Sarrail says that in his interview with Lord Kitchener on Nov. 17, the latter informed him that Joffre had declared that he would not give him (Sarrail) another man, and that the British would furnish five divisions instead. In accordance with this promise, besides the loth and 22nd Divs., the 27th and 28th Divs. from France landed at Salonika in the last days of Nov. and first days of Dec., and the 26th Div. also from France, early in Jan. 1916.