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with a reformed Government. The dismemberment of the Duma into a number of small party groups gave additional influence to the Cadet nucleus, which, though it counted few members in the Duma, acted under strong discipline and had a powerful press.

In one direction only the majority of the Duma was fairly in agreement with the Government, namely as regards foreign affairs and in questions concerning the interests of the dominant nationality of the Empire. In spite of certain minor disagree- ments between the parties of the Left and the Centre and Right, the Duma as a whole was decidedly Nationalistic. The Third Duma had bequeathed to the Fourth a definite line of policy concerning the Finland conflict: the Legislature backed the Government in its endeavours to subordinate the autonomy of the Finnish State to the superior claims of the Empire. The view that the union between the Grand Duchy and Russia was a real and not a personal one led to the assertion of the supreme jurisdiction of the Imperial Senate and of the St. Petersburg Court of Appeal over Finnish tribunals; to the passing of laws commuting the obligation of personal military service for money payments; and to the recognition of Russians dwelling in Finland as citizens of the Grand Duchy on equal terms with native Finns. Even the Cadets did not contest the general principle from which such demands were derived, although they disapproved of the raising of issues which embittered the intercourse between nationalities and led to unpleasant consequences in the shape of passive resistance and the incarceration of Finnish officials who refused to recognize the legality of the interference of Russian institutions in Finnish affairs, apart from the traditional channel of the governor-general and Senate as representing the authority of the Grand Duke.

The creation of the new province of Chelm (Kholm), separated from the provinces of Lublin and Sedlitz, envenomed another national conflict of long standing that between Russians and Poles. The new Government was formed out of districts in which the dominant ethnographic element of the population was Little Russian and not Polish, although this population had been included for centuries within the boundaries of the Polish State and had been recognized as part of Congress Poland annexed to Russia by the Treaty of Vienna (1815). The Duma passed the law of separation without taking heed of the violent protests of Polish public opinion.

The Conflict with the Central Empires. The Nationalistic orientation of the Third and Fourth Dumas was put to the test by the growing entanglements of foreign policy in the course of the years 1911-4. Russia had definitely joined the combination of Western Powers against the predominance of Germany, and opinion in the country fully supported this momentous change of front. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria under the protection of Germany " in shining armour " was strongly resented, not only by Stolypin and Isvolsky as the official exponents of Imperial policy, but by the nation at large, the more bitterly as it was felt that Russia was not in a position to give free vent to her dissatisfaction. No wonder that in 1911, during the Agadir affair, Russia was found on the side of Kaiser William's opponents. But matters became especially serious when the Macedonian hostilities, which had been smouldering for decades, burst out into flames in 1912. The coalition between Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks against Turkey had been ren- dered possible and effective by the support on which they reckoned from Russia; and 0. Hartwig, the Minister Resident at Belgrade, was one of the principal agents in bringing it about. M. Sazonov, the successor of M. Isvolsky at the Foreign Office, cautious, but devoted to the great tradition of Russia's protec- torate over the Balkan Christians, was intent on using to the full the favourable situation created by the union between the three Balkan States, the sympathy of Western Liberals and the tem- porary indecision of the Central Powers. In this he was sup- ported by the Tsar Nicholas, who, however, made it clear to his agents that Russia would not risk an actual war.

The crushing defeat inflicted on the Turks by the Balkan allies seemed to justify completely the combination engineered by Hartwig. But the harvesting of the fruits of victory proved

a more difficult task than the actual fighting. The Central Powers had realized the menace of a permanent Balkan League to their ascendancy in the Near East. Austria vetoed any exten- sion of Serbia towards the Adriatic. With the support of Ger- many she succeeded in depriving the Serbs and Montenegrins of the position they had won in Albania. Russia did not dare to back the latter's claims to the finish at the London Conference, and the Western Powers were disinclined to proceed without Russia. The eviction of the Serbs from the west proved fatal to the peace of Europe. They tried to recoup themselves in the east by demanding districts of western Macedonia which had been previously conceded to the Bulgarians. M. Sazonov tried to stop the growing animosity between the Balkan allies by offer- ing the mediation of Russia, and Nicholas II. attempted rather late in the day to exert his personal influence on the wily Ferdi- nand of Bulgaria as well as on the Serbians. These attempts at conciliation proved unavailing: the Bulgarians broke away first, but were soon checkmated by a coalition between Serbia, Greece and Rumania. The Peace of Bucharest, which gave the Do- brudja to Rumania, western Macedonia to Serbia and important districts of Thrace and Macedonia to Greece, shattered all hopes of an effective Balkan League, and laid Bulgaria open to the insidious intrigues of Austria and Germany. M. Sazonov manifested clearly the ill-humour of Russia; but this powerless discontent made her diplomatic defeat still more humiliating.

All these events were watched by Russian public opinion with keen interest and warm sympathy for the cause of the Slavs. It was realized more and more clearly that the struggle did not con- cern merely the small States of the Balkans, but also their big neighbours; in the Duma and in the press the attitude of the Government was applauded or criticized from the point of view of national self-consciousness and imperialistic aspirations. M. Sazonov found unexpected support from M. Milyukov, the leader of the Cadets. B. Maklakov and V. Bobrinsky came for- ward as the spokesmen of Slavonic solidarity. No one knew ex- actly how much was involved in the risk of a breach with Ger- many, but the public at large sought a kind of compensation for the disappointments of home politics in a bold attitude in foreign affairs. In this way, when the climax in the antagonism between Austria and Serbia was reached in the assassination of the Arch- duke Franz Ferdinand, the Russian public was prepared to back the Government against any hostile acts of the Central Powers. The outrageous treatment of Serbia by Austria-Hungary was rightly interpreted as a provocation to the Entente, and especially to Russia. It is well known that everything was done to preserve peace, short of surrendering Serbia to an Austrian inquisition and waiting patiently till Germany should complete the mobili- zation which was proceeding under the guise of " precautionary measures." The only person of any weight who advised submis- sion at any price was Count Witte. Everybody else, from the Emperor to the most humble citizen, understood that no choice was left but to fight for existence. The dynasty was granted a unique opportunity to retrieve its misdeeds and blunders by placing itself wholeheartedly at the head of a great popular movement. The Duma, usually so critical, expressed by the voice of its various leaders the unanimous resolve of the nation to withstand the common enemy with patriotic unanimity.

Russia in the World War. In the light of subsequent events the declarations made on the outbreak of the World War assume a particular significance. The representatives of alien nationali- ties expressed emphatically their resolve to stand by Russia in the struggle. Goldman, a Lett, said: " Neither our nationality nor our speech nor our creed prevent the Letts and the Estho- nians from harbouring warm patriotic feelings towards Russia and from standing shoulder to shoulder with the great Russian people for the defence of the fatherland." Friedman, a Jew, spoke in the same strain: " We have lived and we live in particularly oppressive conditions. Nevertheless, we have always felt our- selves citizens of Russia and faithful sons of the fatherland. No power will ever be able to tear us from our mother-country Rus- sia, from a land to which we have been tied for centuries. We come forward to the defence of this country not only to perform