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cover, which constitute the rest of the hostile " line." It is the latter which is the average, though not the decisive, incident in mobile warfare, especially when, as in 1918, the principle is to " drive a nail where it will go." In these average incidents sustained fire is the rare exception German light machine-gun squads in the spring offensive of 1918, for instance, seem to have found that 2,000 rounds daily per L.M.G. sufficed and mobility is of supreme importance as the machine-guns must push along as fast as the rest of the infantry, and, indeed, get ahead of it in many cases. This is a strong, and indeed the principal, argument in favour of the automatic rifle of less than 20 Ib. weight, as against the light machine-gun of 20-40.

In sum, therefore, the light machine-gun, by reason of its greater weight and steadiness, can deliver a fire of greater accuracy and more sustained intensity than the automatic rifle, and so can perform functions for which the heavy machine-gun would otherwise have to be called in. The automatic rifle, on the other hand, possesses a greater mobility than does the light machine-gun and can for a few moments at a time develop a fire power practically as heavy. In four-fifths of a day's work in battle, then, it is as useful as, or more useful than, the light machine-gun. But the last fifth, often more important than the rest put together, it cannot undertake with much hope of success. Both have the disadvantage that they must be fed with ammu- nition in very difficult conditions. They must, therefore, be squad weapons and not personal weapons, and there is a tendency for the squad to group itself about the gun and so to reveal itself for what it is. Both, on the other hand, have the advantage that very few of these squads are needed, as compared with rifle-armed infantry, to attack or defend a given front.

On the whole, it seems probable that a type of the future, evolved from both, will take the form, not of the lightened machine-gun, but of the automatic rifle provided with increased magazine capacity, a cooling device, and a mount sufficiently steady, with the weight of the gun, to give a bullet grouping at short ranges as close as that of the heavy machine-gun at longer.

The rise of the light machine-gun to importance as the main weapon of the infantry battle has been followed by another development of some interest, viz. a change of principle in what may be called the personal armament of the infantry soldier. Hitherto self-sufficing, but now become a member of a gun detachment, he has felt the need of possessing some handy weapon of his own which would give him intense fire power in emergen- cies. The same is the case with the artilleryman and, in the present day, with many specialists such as range-takers, observ- ers and others, who have to work in the front line but are not armed with the normal battle weapon. For these, first an increase in the capacity of the pistol magazine was tried, and later an altogether new class of weapon was designed the machine-pistol, which is a fully automatic arm of the carbine or long pistol kind, capable of firing pistol ammunition as fast as a heavy machine-gun fires rifle calibre ammunition. Such weap- ons may also usefully replace the light machine-gun itself in certain conditions, e.g. bush or mountain-warfare. Some exam- ples of this new class of arm are described below.

As to whether the semi-automatic rifle that is, the military rifle fitted with self-loading mechanism but fired by the trigger shot for shot will become a universal infantry weapon, opinions differ. On the whole, it seems unlikely that it will do so. On the one hand, for group action the light machine-gun or per- fected automatic rifle is definitely superior in accuracy, volume, and control of fire to an equivalent number of semi-automatic rifles in individual hands, whatever the discipline and team work of the individuals. On the other hand, as a personal armament for fighting at close quarters the new machine-pistol is superior in intensity of fire and at least equal in handiness. The semi-automatic rifle may develop as a weapon for sniping and skirmishing, and as the soldier's personal armament in theatres of war where the country is very open and troops are required to do a good deal of individual patrolling and stalking. Of these services, however, all except sniping can be performed by the machine-pistol; and, in sum, the semi-automatic rifle

seems likely as a military arm to become a sniper's rifle pure and simple the military analogue of the sporting rifle, for which the semi-automatic principle is already well established. Speculation as to the nature of the cavalry firearm of the future is now difficult, depending as it does on the tactical ques- tion of how far dispersion will be carried in the dismounted fire

fight. (C. F. A.)

PRACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The improvement of the rifle has been confined mainly to the development of auto-loading, or semi-automatic, rifles for both military and sporting purposes, and the development of the automatic or machine-rifle for military purposes.

The semi-automatic shoulder-rifle has become an efficient and reliable weapon for sporting purposes, but no military weapon of this type has been adopted by any of the leading powers to replace the bolt-action shoulder-rifle, although some fairly successful weapons have been produced. The principal difficulty in the way of perfection of an arm of this type is the weight limitation. The present bolt-action rifles are considered by many designers to be as light as is consistent with the pres- sures obtained with modern powders, and the automatic action can only be obtained through additional parts, and consequently additional weight. Successful automatic rifles of 12-20 Ib. weight have indeed been produced. Such rifles are somewhat less heavy than the light machine-gun, the latter being defined as an automatic, rifle-calibre weapon, with a tripod as muzzle support weighing from 20 to 30 Ib. complete, and it is possible that further developments in the type may lead to its superseding the light machine-gun as above defined.

Bolt-Action Military Rifles. It has already been noted that no important progress was made in the design of the bolt-action rifle during the World War. Quite apart from the manufactur- ing difficulties attending upon an alteration of model in the midst of a great crisis, and setting aside also the changes in the tactical relations of rifle, gun and machine-gun in the war, the rifles used by the various belligerents were so nearly equivalent that no one possessed any advantage over the rest which could not be compensated for by slightly better training or slightly higher moral on the other side. And not only was the invention of necessity wanting, but also the conventional type of rifle had reached a point of development beyond which it was difficult to see possibilities of radical improvement.

Substantially, then, the rifles in use at the end of the war were the same as those in use at its beginning, and this is the less surprising as many peace-time criticisms levelled at one or another model proved to be useless, or practically unimportant, in war. Thus, rifles looked upon as obsolete revealed unsus- pected good qualities in the severe test of war service, and modern rifles failed to show the superiority expected. The German Mauser had been popularly credited with being the best military shoulder arm; while the British short Lee-Enfield had been severely criticized on the score of its weak body and poorly designed bolt. Yet, under service conditions, the performance of the latter was excellent; the simple action, good balance, and rapidity with which it could be worked compensating for the superior ballistic qualities of the German arm. Similarly, the French Lebel, one of the oldest service rifles (1886-93), has been looked upon as being outclassed by modern arms, it being the only military rifle with a tubular magazine; yet this rifle with the " Balle D " cartridge has greater velocity and greater strik- ing power at ranges in excess of 800 yd. than the American Springfield, which has 360 f.s. greater initial velocity. In only one instance, apparently, did a rifle prove so unsuitable that it was withdrawn from use. The Ross rifle, the original arm of the Canadian forces, while a good sporting and target rifle, proved unsatisfactory in the mud and dirt of trench fighting.

Another factor which tended to stabilize the rifle in its existing form was the interchangeability of rifle and machine-gun ammu- nition. Before the war there was a distinct tendency towards reducing the calibre of the rifle and employing a lighter bullet, in order to obtain flatness of trajectory at ranges within about 800 yards. But the modern light-weight high-velocity bullet