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Rh of the world, will be a permanent triumph of right over wrong. At the same time, according to the mentality of the nation, it will insist on historical military glory, on the pursuit of the national aspirations such as recovery of ancient rights, redress of old wrongs, material benefits to be derived from victory, appalling consequences of defeat. The outrageous conduct of the enemy, his unnecessary cruelty, his breach of international law are all important.

(2). Control of Neutral Opinion.—The propaganda addressed to Neutrals covers much of the same ground, with the least possible stress on the interested motives, much stress on the defensive and inevitable sides of the war, the certainty of victory and its benefit to all humanity. Very careful attention is devoted to explaining as necessities all the steps that have interfered with the rights of Neutrals or have been positively harmful to them. Much care is given to exposition of the thesis that victory would also be to the benefit of the Neutrals.

(3). Control of Allied Opinion.—This is of great difficulty and of increasing importance with the prolongation of a war. It is necessary to anticipate points of friction, gloss over points of diverging interest, pay very careful deference to the Allied contribution to the common cause and to the absolute identity of interest. In the World War many mistakes were made in this aspect of propaganda, but by none more conspicuously than by the Germans, whose treatment of their Allies was marked by compulsion rather than by persuasion.

(4). Control of Enemy Opinion.—The efforts in this direction fall under three main heads: Insistence that victory is certain and that prolongation of the war is only increasing the inevitable disaster to the Enemy. Attempts to stir up disaffection amongst the Enemy's Allies; attempts to stir up internal trouble in the Enemy's country.

The four sub-divisions enumerated above cover the main purposes of both propaganda and counter-propaganda, but they are only formal, and it is of vital importance to remember that under modern conditions a propaganda cannot be limited to the group for which it was intended. The most rigid censorship and scrutiny at the frontiers did not retain within Allied Countries or in Germany what was prepared for home consumption, with the result that the propaganda of one camp was often used almost without alteration as counter-propaganda in another. Neutral countries were the battle-ground in which contending propagandas met, and where statements of alleged facts and arguments came in contact.

.—In the usual British fashion propaganda in the World War came into existence by the extension of the normal duties of several different bodies, with the result that there was much overlapping, as well as many gaps and considerable diversity of aim and method. From time to time new bodies were created, partly absorbing, partly replacing and partly combining the agencies in operation. Even when the Armistice came, no complete organization had been achieved, and the very great success actually obtained may be ascribed to the flexibility of the methods, the devotion of those who conducted them, and a very remarkable unity of purpose which overbore such personal rivalries as are inevitable in human affairs. A logical and consecutive account of the British propaganda is impossible. No complete organization ever existed, and as much of the most successful work was necessarily conducted secretly, and much was done by private enterprise, for instance by the spontaneous patriotism of universities, publishers, newspapers and private persons, an exhaustive description is impossible. The official side of it was conducted at first chiefly by the Foreign Office, the War Office and the Admiralty, as extensions or side issues of their normal duties. Many special missions were inaugurated by these bodies, or directly by the Cabinet.

In the beginning of 1918 a special body, the Ministry of Information, under a Cabinet Minister, Lord Beaverbrook, was created to combine and extend British propaganda with special reference to the control of Home and Neutral opinion, and another special body, the Department of Enemy Propaganda (afterwards the British War Mission), under Lord Northcliffe, for the same purpose, with special reference to control of opinion in enemy countries. Under the energetic direction of these two

great publicists and the brilliant staffs they assembled, British propaganda enlarged its sphere, increased its potential and began to approach coherence. The steps of most vital consequence, however, must be attributed to Lord Northcliffe and his staff. They were early impressed with the conception that propaganda must be closely linked with policy. With the willing coöperation of the Ministry of Information, they first secured a general unity of method and purpose in purely British work, and, next, by propaganda conferences in London, extended a similar unity to British, French, Italian and American propaganda. Still later, as the war appeared to be nearing its end, they formed a general committee containing representatives of all the great Departments of State and worked out a Peace Propaganda Policy, to which the assent of the British Cabinet was obtained and which was at once made the basis of all British propaganda. Arrangements had been made for another conference of Allies in which the British Peace Propaganda Policy was to be coördinated with the policy of our Allies, when the signing of the Armistice made further effort of this kind unnecessary. Later in this article the steps which led to this ultimate coördination will be described more fully, or will become more apparent as the scattered agencies which led to it have been explained. But it is pertinent here to observe that the final stage, reached by slow experience, should have been the initial stage. In any national propaganda, the national policy, if such indeed exist, should be within the cognizance of those who have to create and direct the machinery for endeavouring to control opinion.

From the outbreak of the war in 1914 to the end of 1915, the official organization of British propaganda was highly tentative. The task of creating and directing public opinion during war had never before been a function of British Governments and did not consort well with the national traditions. In the first months of the war, during Mr. Asquith's Ministry, a War Propaganda Bureau was set up in the National Assurance Offices at Wellington House; a Neutral Press Committee, with special reference to Cabling was established under the Home Office, and a News Department, to deal with the Press, was formed by the Foreign Office. Gradually these three departments came more under the authority of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but they operated to a large extent as independent agencies without central control.

The Admiralty and the War Office had to exercise strict control over the publication of news relating to actual or proposed operations and other matters relating to the navy and army. The censorship which they had to exercise strictly for military reasons, gradually acquired a wider purpose and passed into a dissemination of news essentially propagandist. The direct effect of this bias given to news was upon home opinion, but naturally passed from home countries to neutrals, and from neutrals to enemies. It had therefore the legitimate objects not only of concealing what it was useful to conceal, but of making suggestions which might deceive. From indirect or accidental propaganda, it passed over to deliberate propaganda. Similarly the official representatives of the Foreign Office in Allied and neutral countries quickly found that their routine duties of explaining the intentions of the British Government, and of assisting public and private British interests, necessarily acquired a propagandist bias. As there were obvious inconveniences in this course, the propagandist activities in foreign countries gradually became detached from the official diplomatic activities, and acquired direct relationship with special departments at home. A similar series of events took place in the case of the representatives of the British army and navy in foreign countries, especially those attached to the Secret Services. As their efforts became more propagandist, it was convenient to separate them. Thus in various ways a propagandist service crystallized out of normal services.

During this period, and, indeed until the end of the war, the voluntary work of the great newspapers and publishing houses made an important contribution to British propaganda. It is perhaps necessary to insist on the voluntary side of this work. It has never been the tradition of the British Government to