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114 points were that the department had to communicate with the front through the War Office, which caused delays and mistakes, and that defensive arrangements, the provision of gas masks, etc., so intimately connected with offensive research, remained with the War Office. But, for the rest, the department had only to obtain the approval of the War Office for new designs and material, with an indication of quantities to be provided, and could then make its own arrangements. To this, however, one very impor- tant exception had to be made; they were not allowed to design or manufacture gas shell, and as other branches were not in a position to design them this led to serious delays. These delays were accentuated by the fact that in 1915, when shells were scarce and the value of gas shell had not been proved, the authorities responsible for shell generally were very unwilling to allocate shells to gas.

Gas warfare both in France and Russia began with divided control, and as this gave very unsatisfactory results, in each country after some time a separate organization was formed with complete control of design and supply. In the autumn of

1916 for instance, when the British were scarcely beginning to produce gas shell, Russia with her poor manufacturing resources was already sending to the front a steady supply of 25,000 gas shells a week for field guns. The British on the other hand, having begun on the right path, had left it. Within the ministry, at the end of 1915, research and supply were separated. It was assumed that they would work together as closely as before; but in fact, the Supply Department immediately and inevitably drifted away, and not only lost the advantage of supervision by the designers, but began to research on its own account, thus causing overlapping and confusion. Early in 1916 a Department of Munition Design was formed, and the Trench Warfare Research Departm;nt passed under the control of that depart- ment. Their work was then much restricted, and was directed by a d jpartment which knew nothing of it, and which intervened between them' and the War Office. The confusion and friction that followed had a serious effect both on progress and output.

In the summer of 1917 the large number of casualties caused by the German mustard-gas shells occasioned some anxiety on the British front, and it was asked why the British army had not something equally effective. The reason was that since 1915 research in irritants had been discouraged; and as the Chemical Research branch was not in direct touch with G.H.Q. the ques- tion had never been properly discussed. In the result, in Oct.

1917 the Chemical Warfare branch was reorganized and con- siderably expanded. It had more direct communication with the front, and the Defensive organization from the War Office was amalgamated with it. The Supply Department was however kept separate.

In April 1918 the Trench Warfare Supply Department was broken up. This was the opportunity to restore the supply of gas and gas shells to the Chemical Warfare branch, especially as they already had supply on the " anti-gas " side; but the manu- facture of gas went to the Department of Explosives Supply, and the filling of shells and bombs to the Department of Gas Ammunition Filling. This continued until the Armistice.

Objects of Gas in Warfare. It must be clearly recognized that in the use of gas a new weapon of war has been found, which supplements without displacing the existing arms. Explosive and shrapnel shell have their limits. A very small amount of cover will give entire protection against shrapnel, and deep dugouts will protect against the most powerful explosive shell. When the enemy has provided cover and such shell become ineffective, gas becomes effective. A gas heavier than air will settle in trenches and remain in them; it will drop down the approaches to the deepest dugouts and permeate them. Accord- ing to the nature of the gas, whether lethal or irritant, the enemy, if unprovided with gas-masks, will then be either killed or driven up into the fresh air. In the latter case, he comes once more under the action of the ordinary artillery shell. If he has masks he can remain under cover, but the masks must be worn, not only until the bombardment stops, but afterwards until the shelter is cleared of gas.

In trenches also, and in the open, as long as there is gas, masks must be worn, and the troops fight under a heavy handicap. This condition may be kept up indefinitely with a slow bombard- ment of irritants and occasional bursts of lethals. In the case of a smoke-cloud discharged for eight or ten hours continuously the protection afforded by the mask with its refills will be ex- hausted, and the troops attacked have three alternatives: to counter-attack, which without prearrangement and the necessary supports is hopeless, to die at their posts, or to retire.

The effect of gas differs fundamentally from that of ordinary shell in its persistence. A bombardment with explosive shell is effective only while it lasts. The moment it is over troops can move freely over the area of bombardment. With gas, on the other hand, troops cannot cross the area without masks until the gas has been dissipated.

Again, a shrapnel bullet or splinter of explosive shell may hit or may miss; troops may pass through such a barrage with considerable losses, but still in sufficient numbers to attack. The gas cannot miss. If enough has been discharged over a certain area to give the necessary concentration, every man passing over that area without a mask will be affected.

In clearing up a captured line of trenches during an advance, gas bombs are most effective for bringing the enemy out of deep dugouts. For this purpose a non-lethal irritant of low per- sistence, which will penetrate the enemy's mask, may be used.

There is also the question of the effect of gas behind the lines. Such a discharge of cloud-gas as has been described may travel for miles before it is sufficiently diluted to lose its destructive effect. A long-range bombardment of an artillery or engineer depot will make it impossible for some days to handle the ma- terial without good protection.

That gas shell had a real military value as compared with ordinary shell is proved by the fact that both combatants used them so freely in the last year of the World War. Thirty per cent of the total American casualties were caused by gas, and no estimate can even be attempted of the general loss of efficiency brought about by the necessity for wearing respirators. Sillevaerts gives the following German order for the proportion of different shells to be used in the bombardment before the attack on the Aisne on May 27 1918:

Object

Explo- sive

Blue Cross

Green Cross

I. Counter-battery and long-range bombardment ._. . . 2. Bombardment of infantry posi- tions (a) Moving barrage ('>) Back hi mire

20%

60%

30%

70%

30% 60%

10%

10% 10%

Experience showed also that batteries attacked by gas shell were generally put out of action for several days.

Future of Gas Warfare. Such then is the new weapon. Its potency is undeniable, as is the fact that it is effective where other weapons fail. The question is, will its use be continued? The answer, from a military point of view, may be found in the fact that, if one belligerent uses gas and the other does not, the former will in all probability win. Since experience has shown that conventions made in peace-time are not always respected when war comes, the argument that no nation can allow its exist- ence to depend on the security of a convention prohibiting the use of such a weapon, is even strengthened by the fact that, after the lessons of the World War, nobody in 1921 could predict what further chemical or physical developments scientific investigation might produce in the future. Great advances might well be made in the discovery of gases that would penetrate any mask hitherto designed, and in the utilization of them. The nation that cares for its safety must therefore keep pace with such discoveries and with the means of protection against them. To prevent the production and the study of toxic gases is impracticable, because many of them are either necessary elements or by-products of manufactures essential to modern industries in peace-time.

As for the ethical side of the question, it must be considered dispassionately. Every new means of warfare, intensifying its