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delegation, declined American arbitration and threatened to withdraw altogether from Paris unless their territorial demands were conceded. This in turn strengthened the hands of the extreme section among the Yugoslavs, who now advanced the full ethnographic claim, involving Trieste and Gorizia as well as Dalmatia and Istria, and at the same time increased their demands against Bulgaria, Austria and Albania. Nor was it very easy for the Serbs and Croats to show moderation toward Italy, without appearing to desert the Slovenes, at whose expense, for obvious geographical reasons, the main amputations must inevitably take place. The bad impression made by the claims now submitted to the Supreme Council was only partially re- moved by a speech of Trumbic and by his proposal to leave the settlement of frontiers to a plebiscite (April 16). This offer was made in the knowledge that the memorandum addressed by President Wilson two days previously to Orlando and Sonnino had met with rejection, and was indeed well calculated to heighten the contrast between the outlook of the two rival nations toward Wilsonian principles. The American note re- affirmed these principles as the accepted basis of armistice and peace, and insisted on applying the same methods toward Austria-Hungary as Germany. It accepted the Brenner as a fair strategic line on the north, but argued that the Treaty of London was no longer applicable in respect of Italy's eastern frontier, since the line which it traced was designed to secure Italy against future Austro-Hungarian aggression, and Austria- Hungary had by now ceased to exist. It then defined what came to be known as " the Wilson Line," which assigned to Italy Gorizia, Trieste and Istria west of the river Arsa, but not Fiumc, which must become an international port, nor any points south of it, save perhaps Lissa and Valona: it also advocated the dismantling of the whole eastern Adriatic coast. On April 23 President Wilson followed up this private memorandum by a public manifesto to the Italian nation, in which he repudiated the Pact of London and appealed for the application of the same principles on the Adriatic as those enforced against Germany. Fiume, he declared, must be the outlet, not of Italy, but " of Hungary, Bohemia, Rumania and Yugoslavia." Unhappily, despite its warm assurances of American friendship, this docu- ment met with a most hostile reception in Italy, where it was interpreted as an attempt to undermine the position of her spokesmen and so mete out to her a different measure from that prescribed by France and Britain. Thus the proposal entirely failed of its effect, and as Italy, Yugoslavia and America each adhered to its standpoint, and the two western Powers shrank from any constructive policy, a fresh deadlock ensued. At the end of May, however, M. Tardieu suggested a compromise by which the port and district of Fiume with most of eastern Istria and a total population of over 200,000 (mainly Yugo- slavs) would form a small buffer state between Italy and Yugo- slavia, under the guarantee of the League of Nations. President Wilson adhered to his own scheme, but made it clear that he would not oppose any direct agreement, whatever might be its terms: while the Yugoslavs, though accepting the idea of a buffer state, insisted upon their enjoying at Fiume a status analogous to that of Poland at Danzig, and added the impossible condition of a plebiscite after three years. During the final stages of the German treaty the Adriatic problem was once more shelved, until on June 29 and July 6 armed conflicts took place in the streets of Fiume between Italian and French soldiers, resulting in several deaths. A commission of inquiry was then at last appointed by the Allies, and ordered elections under inter-Allied control and the dissolution of the terrorist " League of Volunteers." But on Sept. 12, the very day on which American and British police were to be installed, D'Annunzio and his Arditi occupied the town, with the open connivance of the Italian naval and military authorities though to the embar- rassment of the Roman Cabinet. The Allies, so far from attempt- ing to restore order, withdrew their forces and allowed their authority to be flouted. The fresh deadlock that ensued was by no means distasteful to Rome, which drew encouragement from Wilson's increasing impotence at home and therefore

played for time. At last on Dec. 9 1919 the Supreme Council (Clemenceau, Polk and Crowe) addressed a memorandum to Italy, outlining new terms of settlement viz. the Wilson line (modified so as to leave Albona in Italy), a demilitarized buffer state, a special regime for Zara, cession of Pelagosa, Lissa and Lussin to Italy: Valona in full sovereignty, and an Italian mandate in Albania, under the League of Nations. The Italian claim of territorial continuity with Fiume was definitely re- jected. Italy in her reply (Dec. 10) insisted on continuity (the real if unavowed motive of which was to control the port of Fiume in the interests of Trieste and Venice, and so retain some hold over Yugoslavia's commercial development), demanded the island of Cherso and the neutralization of the Yugoslav coast, and suggested a triple division the corpus separatum of Fiume to Italy, the port to the League of Nations, and the rest of the buffer state to Yugoslavia. On Jan. 6 1920 Nitti, meeting with no response, wrote to Lloyd George to demand the execution of the Pact of London. At this stage the Yugoslav delegation com- mitted a grave tactical blunder, Trumbic's views being over- ridden by the Balkan imperialistic aims of Pasic. While pleading for a plebiscite against Italy and doing lip service to an inde- pendent Albania within the frontiers of 1913, it added that in the event of any revision of those frontiers Yugoslavia would claim Skutari and all territory north of the river Drin (Drim). The sole justification for such a claim lay in the terms of the Treaty of London, which the Yugoslavs could not adopt as a basis without stultifying their whole position against Italy. But Italy, in her next memorandum to the Conference (Jan. 9) thus found it easier to reaffirm the validity of the treaty, while arguing that as it had envisaged the creation of three separate states (Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia) rather than of a big Yugoslavia, the clause regarding Fiume could no longer be upheld. On Jan. 13 Clemenceau and Lloyd George addressed new proposals to the Yugoslavs, in the form of a scarcely veiled ultimatum. The buffer state was now abandoned, the corpus separatum (with territorial continuity) falling to Italy, Susak to Yugoslavia and the port of Fiume to the League of Nations: Italy was also to receive Lussin, Lissa and the Albanian mandate, while Zara was to be independent under the League. In originat- ing this impromptu scheme, Lloyd George was influenced by secret indications that the Serbian reactionaries, if promised Skutari in return for Fiume, might throw over Trumbic and abandon the Wilson Line and American principles generally. As however Trumbic rallied the Yugoslav delegation to refuse the Franco-British project, Clemenceau the very next day intro- duced the important modification that Fiume should be an independent state under the League. When the Yugoslavs placed various conditions upon their acceptance, they were bluntly informed that unless they accepted within four days, France and Britain would authorize the literal execution of the Treaty of London, thus leaving Fiume to Yugoslavia, but all northern Dalmatia in Italian hands (Jan. 20). But this ulti- matum was rendered invalid by a wire from Lansing, protesting against any settlement without the participation of America.: Paris and London having assured Washington that neither concealment nor lack of courtesy was intended, Belgrade found it quite safe to reject the note of Jan. 20, which it pointedly described as " a friendly proposal, not as an injunction." It further expressed its inability to believe that the Powers wished to impose " a treaty concluded unknown to it by third parties, and whose clauses have never been communicated to it." (Jan. 28.) This incident led President Wilson to address to the Allied Cabinets a series of three notes (Feb. 10 and 25 and March 6) which will remain the classic documents of the controversy, and reduced his opponents to silence, though not to surrender. After their passage the Adriatic question was again allowed to stagnate, the Powers resuming their negative attitude, while advocating direct discussion between the two parties. At last on April 25 Trumbic, having obtained the special sanction of the Belgrade Cabinet, informed Nitti of his readiness to ne- gotiate, and a meeting between the two statesmen did actually take place at Pallanza on May n: the commercial experts had