Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/1150

1106

the Pilckem ridge; it was from this spur that the town was over- looked from the N. But the general direction of streams and spurs alike being that they run from S.E. to N.W., it followed that an offensive directed north-eastward had to cross them successively and that they tended to provide the defenders with a succession of minor positions. Seeing also that, from about the point where the V. Army was in contact with the II. Army, the main ridge ran in a generally northerly direction, while the front occupied by the V. Army before the attack was launched ran from S.E. to N.W., General Cough's forces which were to carry the operation out, with the French I. Army cooperating on their left, necessarily pivoted on their right and in throwing their left forward were confronted by this succession of minor positions. The shallow depressions representing the valleys of the Steenbeke and its affluents tended to be marshy and to flood and become almost impassable in wet weather.

Anticipating that the Allies would embark on a great offensive in this quarter sooner or later, and becoming aware during the spring that such an offensive was actually in preparation, the Germans had taken steps to meet the eventuality with charac- teristic thoroughness and ingenuity. Experiences on the Somme, on the Ancre and at Arras, as well as on battle-fronts in Cham- pagne where they had been attacked by the French, had taught them that a continuous system of trenches did not proffer an altogether satisfactory form of defence against the terrific bom- bardments which the Allies could bring to bear, unless abundant underground cover could be provided; and the nature of the soil in Flanders, with water always near the surface, militated against the creation of subterranean galleries. A continuous line in any case offered a favourable target for guns and was objection- able on that account. They were therefore holding the ground over which attack was expected by a system of numerous dis- connected trenches and strong points which were arranged in depth rather than in breadth and which permitted of the for- ward defences being held by relatively small forces, with the idea of gradually absorbing attack rather than of giving no ground at all. Scattered about were small concrete blockhouses with walls of great thickness which could not be harmed by shell of less than about 6-in. calibre, and which contained garri- sons of about twenty men each, with two or three machine-guns; the British soldiers when they came to make acquaintance with them called them " pill-boxes." A defensive system designed after this fashion was more difficult to map by aerial photog- raphy than were continuous lines, and a preliminary bom- bardment directed against it was in consequence necessarily so much the less effective. As their front line near Ypres had been in existence since 1915 and as much labour had been ex- pended upon it the Germans were, however, trusting to the old system to meet the first shock in the event of attack. It was rather in the later offensive operations that the Allies found themselves confronted with the new devices.

The front which Sir D. Haig had decided to extend his initial advance along stretched from opposite Deulemont on the right, to beyond Steenstraat on the left a distance of over 15 miles. But the most important blow was to be delivered by the V. Army in the middle on a front of approximately 7? m. between the Zillebeke-Zandvoorde road and the village of Boesinghe (inclusive) on the left. The task of the II. Army to the S. was limited to that of increasing the area threatened, so as to occupy the enemy's attention, only a trifling advance being intended. The French I. Army on the British left was to push forward its right in close touch with the left of the V. Army, with the primary object of securing this against counter-attack from the N. The start of the offensive had originally been fixed for July 25. It was however postponed for various reasons until the 3ist. Owing to the enemy having retired out of his foremost trenches along the northern portion of the V. Army front, British and French troops on the 27th crossed the Yser canal (which had hitherto formed an awkward obstacle at this point) about Boesinghe; this enabled bridges to be thrown and it greatly facilitated the attack in the left sector when this took place four days later.

The order of battle of the V. Army (II., XIX., XVIII. and XIV. Corps), enumerating the divisions from right to left, was as follows: 24th, 3oth, 8th, isth, 55th, 3gth, sist, 38th and Guards Div., with two divisions to each corps in support. The French ist Div. was next to the Guards beyond Boesinghe. Starting at 3:50 A.M. on the 3ist, the Allied infantry generally experienced little resistance at first and only began to meet with serious loss when advancing towards their second objectives. This was particularly the case on the right, where the 24th and 3oth Divs. were endeavouring to gain possession of all the com- manding ground about and beyond Shrewsbury forest and Sanctuary wood to the S. of the Menin road; they failed to push forward more than a few hundred yards. But further to the left the assailants were successful at almost all points, reaching the line of the Steenbeke and capturing St. Julien. The French stormed Bixschoote, which was beyond the furthest objective given them. Even if the check to Cough's right discounted the completeness of the victory, the third battle of Ypres had opened most encouragingly for the Allies. The Pilckem ridge had been wrested from the enemy so that the town of Ypres was no longer overlooked by hostile forces to the N. and N.E., the front had been pushed forward along its full extent, and over 6,100 prisoners (including 135 officers) and 25 guns had been taken by the British alone.

But the weather had broken. July had up till the 3ist been an almost consistently fine month, but that morning opened threatening, and rain came on during the course of the day. It fell steadily all that night and continued without cessation for four days, while for several days following the weather remained unsettled. The low-lying clayey soil, pitted with shell-holes, became a succession of muddy pools. The valleys became almost impassable except at a few points. The delay that ensued gave the German troops time to recover from their defeat of the 3ist and also to bring up reinforcements before there could be any question of continuing the offensive; it was not indeed until Aug. 1 6 that improving weather had sufficiently dried the ground to justify the launching of a fresh general attack. This was again undertaken by the V. Army and by portions of the French I. Army on its left, the Menin road marking about the southern limit of the offensive operations. The four corps of the V. Army (II., XIX., XVIII. and XIV.) were disposed in line in the same order as on the opening day, but on this occasion the divisions in front line were in most cases those that had been in support before. The advance was timed for 4:45 A.M., and the operations were quite successful on the left, but the result on the right was even more disappointing than it had been on the 3ist and on this occasion comparative failure extended further along the line toward the left. Except for some trifling local gains of ground the II. and XIX. Corps improved their position very little, suffering repulse at most points; nor was the resistance of the enemy purely of the passive kind, for the Germans delivered some determined counter-attacks, and as a result of several hours of fluctuating fighting the troops in front line in the right half of Cough's Army lost heavily. The XVIII. Corps on the other hand did much better, its left division indeed gaining all its objectives, while the XIV. Corps, still further to the left, was entirely successful. Langemarck was taken, the Steenbeke passed along a front of two or three miles, and a large gap made in the German third line of defence. The French advanced their line all along their front and occupied Drie Drachten on the extreme left, on the borders of the inundation area. Still, if the Allies were entitled, upon the whole, to claim victory in view of what had been accomplished along the left half of the battle-front and of their having secured 2,000 prisoners and 30 guns, their arms had met with reverse in the other half. Nor was there reason to suppose that the enemy losses had been more severe than those of the assailants.

The Flanders offensive, unavoidably started late, had now been in full swing for more than a fortnight, and little improve- ment in the position had been effected in what represented the really vital sector of the front the ground about the crest of the ridge stretching away from the uplands won at the battle