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XXIII., XXVI. and XXVII. Reserve Corps together with the III. Reserve Corps, from Antwerp, and the 4th Ersatz Div. These new corps were detraining S. of Brussels on the I2th, covered by the III. Reserve Corps and the 4th Ersatz Div.

The Allied Plan. On Oct. 4, when it became clear that the forthcoming operations in Artois and Flanders would of necessity be carried out not only by French but also by British and Bel- gian forces, Joffre had entrusted Foch with the coordination of the Allied contingents in the N. The French X. Army (Maud'- huy), around Arras, thus came under Foch's command and formed his right wing, while to reinforce the British in the centre and the Belgians on the left, there was formed an " Army Detach- ment of Belgium " under d'Urbal, shortly to become the VIII. Army. The instructions given to d'Urbal were that he should assume the offensive as soon as possible from his detraining points in the general direction Roulers-Thorout-Ghistelles, while the British on his right advanced on Courtrai and Menin, and the Belgians on his left along the coast. It was hoped by these means to separate the enemy forces, which were following up the Belgians retiring from Antwerp, from the main body of the German army, and hen; them in along the coast, and then to push forward against the right flank and rear of the German VI. Army S. of Lille.

Unfortunately it was found impossible in the event to carry out this far-reaching scheme. Not only was the Belgian army too weak and exhausted to be able to take part in an offensive without a breathing space for rest and refitment, but the first troops of the French VIII. Army only became available on Oct. 23; and by that time the situation had radically altered. It became evident that, so far from being in a position to drive back the enemy, the Allied forces were outnumbered and would do well if they could even hold their own. Consequently, al- though the idea of an Allied offensive was never entirely aban- doned, the necessity for using the various formaticps as they arrived prevented it from being effectively put into execution.

The First Stages of the Battle of the Yser. The detrainment of the German IV. Army was completed on the i3th, and its units, moving forward at once, had reached by the I7th the area Bruges-Thielt-E. of Courtrai. The III. Reserve Corps push- ing eastward in front of the army, with its right along the coast and its left on Roulers, screened the advance of the newly arrived Reserve Corps. It was then ordered to clear the front by closing up on its right, which had on the i5th entered Ostend. On Oct. 16 it came into contact with the Belgian cavalry and forward posts E. of the Yser, and after two days of desultory fighting forced them to withdraw to their main position.

On the 1 8th the first encounters took place between the main bodies of the Belgian 2nd, ist and 4th Divs., holding the Yser line from Dixmude to the sea, and the German III. Reserve Corps, which had been ordered to reach the neighbourhood of Furnes. The advancing Germans early came into contact with the Belgian outpost positions on the E. bank of the river on the line Lombartzyde-Mannekensveere-Schoor-Keyem. The northern part of this line held fast against repeated attacks but by nightfall the Germans had taken Schoor and Keyem; the latter however was recovered during the night. The attacks were renewed next day; the German XXII. Reserve Corps, coming into line to the S. of the III. Reserve, moved against the French and Belgian positions around Dixmude. Keyem and Beerst fell into its hands early in the day; Beerst was retaken about noon by the Belgian 5th Div. and the French Fusilier Marines, who were however forced to fall back in the evening to their former positions owing to the approach of further strong hostile forces (the XXIII. Reserve Corps) astride the railway from Thourout. On this flank the Allied units were now with- drawn behind the Yser, with the exception of the garrison of Dixmude. The preparatory fighting continued on the 2oth on both flanks; the III. Reserve Corps, reinforced by the 4th Ersatz Div., attacked and carried Lombartzyde in the N. while to the S. a concentric attack of the XXII. and XXIII. Reserve Corps from three sides was repulsed with heavy loss by the Fusilier Marines holding Dixmude.

The German IV. Army was now completely deployed against the Yser line. The 4th Ersatz Div. in front of Nieuport, the III. Reserve Corps thence to Keyem, the XXII. Reserve Corps around Beerst and the XXIII. Reserve Corps E. and S.E. of Dixmude, in all seven divisions with over 400 guns, were aligned in face of the five Belgian divisions with their 350 guns. On the 2ist, after a violent bombardment lasting throughout the night, the Germans advanced all along the line, their young troops fighting with the greatest courage but meeting with little success; and the French and Belgians, at the price of serious losses, held their ground at all points. In the night, however, the III. Reserve Corps succeeded in throwing a temporary bridge over the Yser, in the bend N. of Tervaete, and in passing over to the western bank infantry and machine-guns, while their artillery were brought close up to the stream to cover the ad- vance of strong reinforcements. The ist Belgian Div.'s counter- attacks failed to retrieve the situation; the Germans not only held their ground but extended it during the 23rd by seizing Tervaete itself to the S. The Belgian 3rd Div. was thrown into action from general reserve, without effecting more than the temporary checking of the hostile advance; during the day, the French 42nd Div., which had carried out a successful counter- attack on the 23rd to the E. of Nieuport, was placed at the disposal of the Belgian Higher Command and transferred near Tervaete, with the object of striking into the southern flank of the German troops who had crossed the Yser.

The French counter-offensive in the centre, supported as it was by all the available units of the Belgian 4th Div., though it failed to throw back over the river the two battalions of the III. Reserve Corps which held the Tervaete bridgehead, was suc- cessful in checking any further progress on their part. By the evening of the 24th indeed, both sides were showing signs of exhaustion. . The efforts of the 4th Ersatz Div. before Nieuport and those of the XXII. Reserve Corps before Dixmude had met with no success; despite the powerful artillery fire from the heavy German artillery, which had reduced Dixmude to ruins, the Fusilier Marines still held the town, repulsing on the 24th 15 successive attacks. The Belgian army, however, had bought its success at the price of the severest losses; over 25% of its combatant strength had been placed hors de combat, and only 180 guns with only from 160 to 190 rounds apiece were left fit for service. The situation appeared to the Belgian Higher Command to demand extreme measures; it was doubtful if their troops could withstand another series of assaults such as those which had just been delivered, and on the 25th it was decided (it is said on the suggestion of Foch) to open the sluices of the Yser and inundate the country E. of the Nieuport-Dixmude rail- way. The sluices of Nieuport were opened at 4 P.M. on that day, under cover of darkness; the line of defence in the centre was withdrawn to the railway embankment, which it was intended to hold during the few days that must elapse before the slowly moving waters, fed by the successive tides, should engulf the country to the E. and form an impassable barrier.

Before recounting the last German assaults on the Yser front, we must return to the British sector, to the south.

First Stages of the Battle of Ypres. The presence of the new i German IV. Army in his front, and in particular the approach j of the fresh Reserve Corps toward the gap at present open be- I tween himself and the Belgians, was at this date (the isth) unsuspected by Field-Marshal Sir John French, whose attention and energies were concentrated on the offensive which he had arranged to carry out in conjunction with the Allied forces to his i right and left in the direction of Courtrai and Menin. His instructions to his corps commanders were that the advance should be continued during the next few days on the whole front, the II. Corps on the right advancing due E., the III. Corps in touch with it securing the Lys crossings from Sailly to Armentieres, and the cavalry passing over the river at Menin and advancing N.E., while Rawlinson with the IV. Corps on the extreme left moved on and to the N. of Courtrai. The last- named was warned to watch his left, beyond which hostile detachments were reported near Bruges and Roulers.