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1034 hopeless situation, had ordered the evacuation of the tip of the salient, which had not been attacked, and during the night the movement was successfully carried out except for the loss of about i ,000 stragglers.

In the course of Sept. 13 and 14 the troops of the American IV. and V., and French II. Colonial Corps moved forward with- out serious opposition to the line designated by Marshal Foch facing the German Michel position and which the I. Corps had already reached on the 1 2th.

On the German side the attack showed a complete demoraliza- tion in the Higher Command and a lack of initiative in the lower officers. The men showed little will to fight. The advance of the left division of the IV. Corps with one flank uncovered and of the American division of the V. Corps- with both flanks uncovered was nowhere taken advantage of.

In regard to the halting of the American offensive the German general staff, in a study of the St. Mihiel attack published for the information of the armies shortly after its occurrence, while giving high praise to the dash and fearlessness of the American soldier, added that the army H.Q., which showed itself so unable to reap the advantages so clearly afforded by its striking initial success, was not to be feared. It is not impossible that Foch, had he himself been in immediate command of the I. Army on the morning of the 1 2th, or had he been present, might, in view of the manifest military advantages, have felt justified in permitting the Americans to grasp the opportunity offered to complete the destruction of Army Detachment C and to seize and hold the Michel Stellung. Indeed Petain, on the night of the I3th, learning that the German army behind the sector was in great disorder and that the American troops on the right had reached and in some instances gone beyond their objectives, did send an authori- zation to take the Michel position; but by the time this permission was received the opportunity of taking the position cheaply and completing the German rout had passed. Tactically, Foch's avowed purpose would have been better served had Petain, as long as he was going to prescribe dispositions in detail for the American army, originally called for two main attacks from the two faces of the salient to meet in the centre the first day, advances which the Soissons attack had already shown could be easily made by American regular troops.

Of the troops engaged on the Allied side the Americans aggregated 550,000, the French 110,000. American losses were 7,511, of which considerably more than half were borne by the I. Corps which received the brunt of the counter-attack; French losses were 597. The captures included over 15,000 prisoners and 443 guns. (A. L. C.)

WOLFE-BARRY, SIR JOHN WOLFE (1836-1918), English engineer, was born in London Dec. 7 1836, the youngest son of Sir Charles Barry (see 3.443), architect of the Houses of Parliament. He was educated at Trinity College, Glenalmond, and King's College, London, and became a pupil of Sir John Hawkshaw, whom he assisted in the building of Charing Cross and Cannon St. stations and railway bridges. In 1867 he set up for himself, becoming well-known as a railway engineer and traffic expert. Through his initiative and energy the British Engineer- ing Standards Committee was established in 1901, a great step forward in effecting railroad economy. He was made a K.C.B. in 1897. He died in London Jan. 22 1918.

WOLSELEY, GARNET JOSEPH WOLSELEY, VISCT. (1833- 1913), British field-marshal (see 28.777). The closing years of Lord Wolseley's life were spent in virtual retirement. His health gradually failed, and on March 25 1913 he died at Mentone, the title going by special remainder to his only daughter, Frances. His eminent service to the State had not been forgotten, for he was accorded an imposing public funeral and was buried at St. Paul's; an equestrian statue of him on the Horse Guards Parade was unveiled in 1920. It had not been Lord Wolseley's good fortune to hold responsible positions in the conduct of warfare on a great scale, but he was undoubtedly a brilliant commander in the field. His campaign in Ashanti and his overthrow of Arabi Pasha were model operations of their kind, while the failure to save Gordon and Khartum in 1885 was attributable to delays in starting the expedition, for which he was not responsible. His labours in modernizing the organization and developing the efficiency of the British army often in face of strong opposi- tion were of incalculable value to the country. He proved him- self at the War Office to be an energetic, far-seeing and able administrator. His insistence upon officers fitting themselves for the duties that they would have to perform in war, and upon their taking their profession seriously, was to bear rich fruit in days when he had retired into the background. An excellent judge of men and of character, he was extraordinarily successful in his choice of subordinates. Cultured, possessing varied inter- ests, well read and of wide experience in many lands, he was in private life a man of unusual charm.

WOLVERHAMPTON, HENRY HARTLEY FOWLER, VISCT. (1830-1911), English statesman, (see 28.781), died at Woodthorne, Wolverhampton, Feb. 25 1911.

WOMAN SUFFRAGE. In the earlier article (under WOMEN, 28.786), the story of the movement for woman suffrage was brought down to 1910. The narrative may here be continued for the United Kingdom up to the passing of the Representation of the People Act in 1918, with some estimate of its results up to 1920, followed by accounts of the growth of woman suffrage in other countries.

UNITED KINGDOM

In the later years of the agitation in Great Britain the consti- tutional suffragists concentrated their efforts on the formation of public opinion: they sought to form a non-party, non-militant suffrage society in every parliamentary constituency and brought local influence to bear in contested elections to obtain promises of support from candidates of all political parties. They were so far successful as to secure a majority of members pledged to their support in every House of Commons elected since 1886: and in that year, and also in 1897, 1908, 1909, 1910 and 1911, woman suffrage bills passed their second reading, but made no further progress, each successive Government declining to give facilities for the passage of the bills into law. At this period the movement was receiving very valuable support from platform, press and pul- pit, besides remarkable help from the theatre in plays by leading dramatists of the day. .

In Parliament for several years important support had been given to woman suffrage by leaders of the Conservative party. Among them may be mentioned three successive Conservative Prime Ministers Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Salisbury and Mr. Arthur Balfour besides the 7th Duke of Rutland and Lord Iddesleigh, while the younger generation were ably represented by the Earl of Lytton, Lord Robert and Lord Hugh Cecil, and Mr. Alfred Lyttelton. On the Liberal side the leaders, with a few important exceptions (which included Sir H. Campbell-Banner- man, Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Edward Grey), were against it. Among the strongest Liberal opponents during the gen- ; eration before the World War were to be found Mr. Gladstone, I Mr. John Bright, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Sir W. Harcourt, j Mr. Labouchere, and Mr. Asquith.

In 1908 the death of the suffragist Sir H. Campbell-Banner- 1 man and the succession of the anti-suffragist Mr. Asquith to the Liberal premiership were very disadvantageous to suffrage j prospects in the House of Commons. This misfortune was, however, partly counteracted by the emergence of the Labour \ party, the leading members of which were convinced suffragists; i in a short time they induced the party to make woman suffrage I a plank in their platform.

The question of " militancy " on the part of a section of the, woman suffragists was mishandled from the first by the Liberal i Government which came into power in 1906. The Women's Social and Political Union, led by Mrs. Pankhurst and her' daughter Christabel, which came into existence about this time, ; confined its activities to asking inconvenient questions of mem-j bers of the Government at public meetings. This was in itself a | perfectly legitimate method of propaganda. Instead of meeting! it by giving reasonable answers, the questions put were in many instances met only by shouts of anger and disapproval or, when written on paper, were contemptuously torn and thrown on the