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But it may be seen, too, how a German success was bound always to remain without a sequel, for it was through this conception of the economy of forces that Joffre was able always to keep in hand strong, rested reserves, free guns and unallotted ammuni- tion. (V.L.E.C.)

(II.) BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL (SEPT. IZ.'TO 14 1918)

For four years the St. Mihiel salient had projected 28 km. deep into the French line, constituting alike a menace and an invitation to attack. Its original purpose, to serve as one of the jaws of a nutcracker attack on Verdun, having failed, it was used in 1916 as the anvil against which von Falkenhayn sought in vain to drive home his hammer-blows against Verdun from the north. In 1918 Ludendorff again hoped through its posses- sion to gain Verdun and much more by the wider encircling attack in Champagne of July 15, but again the attack failed. During all these years also it had remained not only a threat of further German aggression but a serious interruption of French railway communication with Verdun and also with the Lorraine front. In 1915 the French army had twice attacked to compel evacuation of the salient but both attacks had failed, the first, made in April at Les Eparges, with serious losses.

Tactically, the salient afforded a strong defensive position. The Cote de Meuse, a range of hills rising abruptly 500 metres above the Meuse valley on the W. and the Woevre plain on the E., afforded strong supporting points on the western face of the salient, while Mont Sec and the lower-lying hills S. of the Rupt de Mad were well adapted to a strong defensive organization.

To the general staff of the American Expeditionary Forces the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient had appealed strongly as a favourable initial or try-out operation for the American army as soon as sufficient forces should have arrived to undertake it. The reason for this selection was not so much the material gain to be reaped from it as the consideration that the fresh and eventually preponderant American force should preferably be employed against a part of the line where it could strike a vital "blow to the Germans. Metz, the centre of important railway communications and surrounded by coal and iron fields, obvious- ly presented itself as such a region, and, in addition, while the American forces were being gathered for the later major opera- tions, the same installations and lines of communication needed for them could be utilized by the earlier arriving troops to gain an initial success on a smaller scale, mainly for moral effect though also as a factor in troop training.

General Pershing had discussed this view with General Petain in June 1917, and, after further study of the front, port facilities and railway lines, this had been adopted as the work- ing plan. However, the slowness of the transportation of troops to France during the first year of American participation in the war, and the exigencies caused by the success of the German offensive operations in the spring of 1918, caused the plan to be temporarily laid aside, and, during both spring and summer of that year, American troops in France and arriving were scat- tered along the western front to meet needs of the moment.

By the end of July the situation had stabilized sufficiently in favour of the Allies to enable the question of reuniting the troops of the American army to be taken up. On July 24 Marshal Foch confirmed the understanding arrived at the previous year, that the first American operation should be the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, and, a few weeks later, he authorized the transfer to the I. American Army of that sector of the Allied front facing the salient. This transfer occurred on Aug. 30.

By this time the American army consisted of forces far be- yond the number requisite for the mere reduction of the salient and the question of their subsequent employment arose. Gen- eral Pershing desired to exploit the St. Mihiel attack to the ut- most; Foch, however, with other plans and considerations in

lind (see MEUSE-ARGONNE, BATTLE or), limited the attack

ictly to the forcing of the salient, although Petain, in a con-

rence on Sept. 2, sided with Pershing in desiring the American to gain at least the German " Michael " position across
 * mouth of the salient.

By Marshal Foch's direction, Petain, on Sept. 2, issued the directive for the operation which called for a main attack on the S., to debouch from the plateau Seicheprey-Limey toward the objective Vigneulles-Thiaucourt, and a secondary attack, to debouch from the vicinity Eparges-Mouilly toward the S.E., and in connexion with the main attack, to effect the cutting off- of the German forces in the salient. To the main attack there were assigned eight American divisions; to the secondary, one American and one French; the French troops occupying the intermediate sector were to exercise " pressure " against the enemy forces on their front. The wording and the date of this directive and the disproportionate number of American divi- sions assigned to the main attack, which alone could hope speed- ily to reach the Michel Sttttung, suggest that it was originally drafted to carry out Petain's conception of at least a partial exploitation of the attack, to include the seizure of the Michel position, and that, in a subsequent alteration to conform td Foch's insistence on a more limited scope, only the names of the objectives were changed.

General Pershing's order for the attack assigned the main attack to the I. and IV. Corps with two regular divisions to each corps; the secondary attack, on the Cote de Meuse, to the V. Corps, the attacking troops to consist of one American National Guard Div. and one French division; the French II. Colonial Corps in the centre was to guard the adjacent flanks of the main and secondary attacks, to execute deep raids and to be prepared to follow up a withdrawal. At the disposal of the American I. Army for the operation were 2,971 guns, mostly French artillery. The I. Army also had a marked superiority in aviation, thanks to French cooperation and the assistance of the British Independent Air Force.

On the German side the salient was held by Army Detach*- ment C, under Gen. von Fuchs and comprising, on Sept. 12', the date of the attack, eight divisions on the line, organized ais three corps groups, and three in reserve.

As early as Sept. i a deserter had given the Germans warning of the impending attack, and Ludendorff had at the time seri- ously considered ordering a withdrawal from the salient, but was deterred by the representations of the army detachment and army group commanders who were confident of their ability to hold, and also by reports from Duke Albrecht's army group in the Vosges region, of American preparations for attack farther south. These feints which General Pershing had caused to be made in the vicinity of Belfort had led to German uncertainty as to the real intentions of the American commander. By Sept. 8, however, the evidences of a coming attack on the salient had become unmistakable and Army Detachment C was ordered to withdraw to the Michel Stellung. No need for haste was felt and the preparations were deliberate and methodical. The night preceding the attack the dismounted batteries were being with- drawn and consequently could not be used in the battle.

Preceded by a four-hour bombardment the main attack was launched at 5 A.M., Sept. 12; the secondary attack at 8:30. Deprived of artillery support the German infantry though ordered to hold, made virtually no resistance. The American I. Corps on the right made its objectives in a few hours, and, 'in spite of German counter-attacks brought by two divisions against it and against the right of the IV. Corps but beaten off, begged permission to continue its advance; but, because of the precise instructions by which the American staff felt itself bound, this permission was refused. The IV. and V. Corps also made their objectives and halted, awaiting orders.

Army H.Q. in this battle, as also in the earlier part of the Meuse-Argohne battle, appears to have had little conception of the difficulty and time required in the transmission of orders on the battlefield and in consequence to have left but little initiative in the hands of subordinates. The result was that the orders for the troops of the IV. and V. Corps to move forward to Vigneulles and effect the cutting off of the salient did not reach the troops concerned until after dark on the I2th so that the connexion, though unopposed, was not effected until the morning of the I3th. Meanwhile the German commander, realizing his