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of 1916, in which he was inevitably the Democratic candidate. It enabled his supporters to declare that he had vindicated the rights of the United States successfully, and at the same time had " kept us out of war." The slogan made a strong appeal, especially in the districts of the Middle West. The Republicans, on the other hand, who had nominated Charles E. Hughes, criticized the whole foreign policy of the President. They in- sisted that he had failed to take prompt action for the protection of American lives and honour, alike in his dealings with Germany and in his handling of the Mexican crisis. They characterized his domestic policy as demagogic, instancing the Clayton Act and the Adamson Act; the latter had been urged on Congress by Mr. Wilson to avert a railroad strike in Sept. 1916, and many citizens regarded it as an untimely surrender to labour threats. They also criticized his attitude on " preparedness," to which the President had been opposed until the close of 1915, and ridiculed the cautious expansion of military and naval j forces provided for in the National Defense Act of 1916. In the east and in most industrial centres of the middle west, Mr. Wilson was unpopular, but the election showed his strength in the farming districts west of the Mississippi and on the Pacific coast; in spite of Mr. Roosevelt's return to the Republican fold the President drew largely from the Progressives, and on election j to 254) and a popular plurality of 9,129,606 to 8,538,221.
 * day received a slight electoral majority over Mr. Hughes (277

His re-election enabled Mr. Wilson to proceed with plans for I peace proposals to the European belligerents. These he had I been preparing since the early summer of 1916, and, regardless of the German peace balloon of Dec. 12 1916, he sent on Dec. 18 i identical notes to the belligerents, asking them to state the ' terms upon which they would consider peace. Informed of the [ undercurrents of German military circles, he evidently feared that if the war continued, the United States would necessarily [become involved; he also hoped that a clear definition of war aims would strengthen pacific elements in both belligerent [camps. The German reply was evasive; that of the Allies refused to consider peace until Germany should offer " complete, restitution, full reparation, and effectual guarantees." The replies gave the President opportunity to expound what he had come to believe was the only sure basis of an enduring peace. he peace must be organized by the major force of mankind, i thus emphasizing the need of a League of Nations; that no [nation should extend its policy over another nation; that no ne Power should dominate the land or the sea. There must be a nitation of armaments. As a guarantee of future peace and slice, the ending of the existing war must not be the violation E the rights of one side or the other: it must be " a peace without ictory." Further efforts to secure a peaceful arrangement ere frustrated by the determination of the German militarist Jique to renew the submarine warfare, regardless of the effect i the United States. On Jan. 31, the German ambassador, von Sernstorff, delivered a note to this effect, and four days later he President handed him his papers. He still, however, avoided formal war with Germany, and on Feb. 26 asked for a resolution armed neutrality, which would permit the arming of Amer- an merchant ships for entrance into the barred sea zone. The olution was blocked by a filibuster. Finally, in view of con- nued sinking of American ships, the President came to Con- > on April 2 1917, and asked for a declaration that a state of warfare existed with Germany. The resolution was passed by he Senate on April 4, by the House on April 6. President Wilson had always abhorred the exercise of force i international relations, and the war which he at last regarded i necessary was, in his mind, a war to ensure peace. Neverthe- ss he was determined that it should be waged efficiently and at the mistakes of previous wars should not be repeated, hose mistakes, he believed, had resulted chiefly from the inter- xture of politics in military affairs, and from the decentraliza- on of the American military machine. He opposed a coalition ar cabinet, as leading to divided responsibility. Military olicy was handed over to the military experts. He approved
 * This he did in a speech of Jan. 22 1917, in which he insisted that

the immediate development of the general staff as the centraliz- ing military organ, and it was upon the recommendation of that body that he urged, against the wish of Congressional leaders, the Selective Service Act. On the advice of the general staff he appointed Gen. John J. Pershing commander of the expedi- tionary force to France, and, also following that advice, he refused to authorize a volunteer force under Mr. Roosevelt. Similarly the plans for the development of a large army in France were inaugurated and translated into fact by the military experts. As regards conduct of operations the President gave to Gen. Pershing complete authority, and permitted no interference by politicians. In the building of the new army, the President took no direct part, but he used his authority consistently to favour centralization under the general staff. He followed a similar policy in the mobilization of the industrial resources of the nation. He encouraged the centralizing efforts of the Council of National Defense and its committees, and sought always to secure for them executive rather than the merely advisory powers which they at first possessed. He urged the Lever Act, which in Aug. 1917 created a Food and a Fuel Admin- istration, and advocated the taking over of the railroads by the Government in Dec. His policy of economic centralization was ultimately assisted by the many protests against his war policies which were made in the winter, and which centred round the demand for a non-partizan war cabinet or ministry of munitions; for his supporters were able to insist that the more effective handling of war problems demanded not new machin- ery but greater efficiency of the existing mechanism. The President asked for powers to cut through red tape and rearrange bureaus without reference to Congress. His demands were embodied in the Overman Act, which was passed in May 1918, and which enabled him to grant executive powers to the various boards that had been created. The War Industries Board, released from its dependence upon the Council of National Defense, at once became the centralizing organ of the economic activities of the country. In his war appointments Mr. Wilson disregarded party lines, a notable fact since in political appoint- ments he always showed himself strictly a party man. Repub- licans such as Hoover, Stettinius, Goethals, Schwab, Vanderlip, were chosen because of their administrative qualities and regard- less of political'affiliations.

During the war President Wilson consistently developed his ideals of a new international system which should perpetuate peace and assure justice and security to every nation regardless of its material strength. He hoped thus not merely to construct a basis for just peace when the war should end, but to hasten the end of the war by appealing to the peoples of the enemy states against their Governments. The most notable of his speeches was that of Jan. 8 1918, in which he stated 14 points necessary to a just and lasting peace. This, with his later addresses, was ultimately accepted as the basis of the final settlement. Their effect in Germany and Austria-Hungary was not apparent until the military defeat of those empires, but his words acted con- tinually as a corroding factor, weakening the enemy's deter- mination to fight. When in the autumn of 1918 they faced mili- tary defeat, they turned to Mr. Wilson offering to accept his Fourteen Points as the basis of peace. The President's insist- ence upon justice as an essential to a lasting settlement had brought him great prestige in Allied countries, but the chiefs of the Allied Governments hesitated to accept the Fourteen Points in the fear that the material advantages of the victory might be thrown away. They yielded, however, to the persuasive diplo- macy of Col. House, who represented the President at Paris, and it was on the understanding that the Fourteen Points (reserva- tion made of " Freedom of the Seas " and inclusion of Germany's promise to make full reparation) should be the basis of the peace that the Armistice was granted to Germany. 1 The Presi- dent realized, however, that it would be difficult to translate his principles into the actual treaty. Aside from the opposition he might expect from selfish nationalistic interests among the

1 The Fourteen Points are set forth in full in the article WORLD WAR, under the subhead Political History.