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Rh Anxiety about the attitude of Great Britain was now beginning to influence the Kaiser's mind, and his rage was sudden and great when his ambassador in London reported that Sir Edward Grey regarded the situation as serious and had suggested medi- ation. He described this as a piece of English pharisaism, and Sir Edward Grey as a " base deceiver, arch-base and Mephis- tophelian. Great Britain ought to put pressure upon. Russia," etc. On July 29 began the rapid interchange of telegrams be- tween the Kaiser and the Tsar, which was to be continued up to and even immediately after the German declaration of war, and in which the object of the Kaiser's frequently rhetorical appeals was to induce Russia to reverse her measures of mobiliza- tion against Austria and to refrain from mobilization toward the German frontier. He hoped to score over Russia, by a policy of menace, a diplomatic victory in the Serbian question similar to, but far greater than, that which he had obtained in 1909, when, as he boasted, he had appeared beside his Austrian ally " in shining armour." On July 29 a " Kronrat " with the whole dy of the Kaiser's military and political advisers was held at Potsdam, and from Bethmann Hollweg's interview the same vening with the British ambassador (Sir Edward Goschen) and his bid for British neutrality it seems clear that the decision had fallen in favour of war.

After the proclamation of the state of " danger of war " (dro- hende Kriegsgcfahr) on July 31, and the delivery of an ultimatum on the same day at St. Petersburg, and after a public mobiliza- on order on the afternoon of August i, a previously prepared laration of war against Russia was delivered by the Ger- an ambassador at St. Petersburg on the evening of August i. Throughout the final episode of the German attempts to ure British neutrality the Kaiser was in a state of violent ge and disappointment, and he gave vent to his feelings in a emorandum to his chancellor on July 30 which may well be the vildest outburst of political passion that a monarch ever com- ! many in the trap of her loyalty to her Austrian alliance, that this " though he is dead, is still stronger than I am "; and, finally, he exhorted the chancellor to inflame the Mahommedan world, for " if we are to bleed to death, England shall at least lose India," j William II. 's brief exchange of telegrams with King George V., sed, as the Emperor's assumptions were, on a false report by brother, Prince Henry, and on a mistaken account by the erman ambassador in London of a telephonic conversation nth Sir Edward Grey, may be mentioned in passing. If King orge's Government would assure the neutrality of France, the r was prepared to " employ elsewhere " his troops then mov- sports, a Berlin mob broke the windows of the British em- sy. The Kaiser sent an aide-de-camp to the ambassador with i unkingly message, truculently delivered, expressing his regret, it telling Sir E. Goschen that he would " gather from these currences an idea of the feelings of the German people respect-, [ing the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo."
 * mitted to paper. He declared that Great Britain had caught Ger-
 * was the crowning success of the policy of King Edward VII., who
 * against her. After Sir Edward Goschen had asked for his

On August 4, William II. opened the session of the last Reichs- ' tag of his reign by a war speech, to which he added a personal appeal to the deputies (the Social Democrats alone were absent) ! to support him " through thick and thin," and individually to ' shake hands with him in token of their promise to do this. To one of the deputies he said. " Now we will give them (his ene- mies) a good thrashing."

If during the World War William II. ever attempted to inter-

\\ fere in military dispositions, it is clear that the leaders of the

army were successful in preventing his effective intervention.

If He paid the inevitable visits to the fighting lines at critical


 * moments, especially when a German success was believed to be

impending, but there is no reason to believe that he was ever,

\ in accordance with the traditions of his house, under fire. He


 * once or twice narrowly escaped aeroplane attacks, but this was

accidental. He lived in his comfortable Imperial train or in a

portable asbestos hut, or at Supreme Headquarters at Pless

Castle in Silesia, and afterward at Spa. He took no practical military part in the war. His crude rhetoric was from time to time employed in firing the ardour of his troops, as when he exhorted them in Oct. 1914 to destroy French's " contemptible little army," or when in the last year of the war he celebrated the 3oth anniversary (June 15 1918) of his accession by describ- ing the struggle as a mortal combat between Anglo-Saxon and Prusso-German ideals. In the eyes of his people his personal prestige did not increase; it distinctly diminished, even before the last phase of open aversion from him. He formally retained the final decision in military as in political affairs. There was a long and bitter struggle between three successive chancellors (Michaelis may be left out of account) and the higher military command on a variety of questions hypothetical terms of peace, the Brest Litovsk negotiations, the armistice question, and, throughout the war, the best method of maintaining the war- spirit of the population. More than once Hindenburg and Lud- endorff threatened to resign, and it was between them and Beth- mann Hollweg that William II. had to choose when he parted (July 14 1917) with his first war chancellor. "The Govern- ment," as Ludendorff says, " had itself to blame, as it frequently appealed to its agreement with the chief military command, and dismissed proposals and demands on the ground that the military leaders objected."

In naval matters the Kaiser had greater success in resisting the authoritative methods of Grand Adml. von Tirpitz, and carrying out his own policy and Bethmann Hollweg's of holding the High Seas Fleet in reserve, or (as he called it in his order of Aug. 6 1914) " on the defensive." For a long time Bethmann, and perhaps also William II., seem to have hoped that Great Britain might be detached from the Allies, if the struggle for naval ascendency were not too keenly pressed. This hope was chimerical, but Bethmann was not a far-seeing statesman, and the views of the Kaiser, who reckoned upon an intact fleet as a valuable political asset for peace negotiations, were seldom based on sound calculations. Tirpitz found himself compelled to resign on March 16 1916.

William II. 's reputation in peace-time had been largely based upon the spectacular setting which he gave to his policy and upon his rhetorical speeches. All effects of that kind gradually failed him during the World War, and some of them lent them- selves to ridicule. In Jan. 1916 he had a meeting with his Balkan ally, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, at Nisch, when Ferdinand at a banquet addressed him in obsequious terms and exclaimed in unconsciously ambiguous Latin, " Tu es Caesar et gloriosus! " The Emperor's part in the attempts to secure a " German Peace " in 1916 and 1917 was singularly unfortunate. The declaration issued on Dec. 12 1916 by Germany and the powers associated with her was manifestly a manoeuvre to anticipate President Wilson's peace action, to represent the Allies as blood-thirsty and unconciliatory, and to hearten the German working-classes for the fight. It gave no information as to terms, and it con- tained no reference to the crucial question of the future of Belgium. What the Kaiser's ideas of peace terms at that date may have been is a matter of inference from what has since become known regarding his attitude some six months later. After the Reichstag's so-called " Peace Resolution" of July 1917, efforts were made to induce the Vatican to interest itself in the question of peace, and ultimately a papal note on the subject was issued. In a document addressed on behalf of William II. to Mgr. Pacelli, the Papal Nuncio at Munich, the Kaiser's peace terms were described as including an indemnity of 30 milliard dollars from the United States and 40 milliard dollars from France. Longwy and Briey, rich mineral districts on the French frontier, were to go to Germany, and Great Britain was to give up Malta. The disclosure of these items in the Imperial document was made in the Reichstag on April 27 1921, by the Independent Socialist, Dr. Breitscheid, Chairman of the Reichs- tag Committee for investigating responsibility for the origin and prolongation of the World War. In 1917 as in 1916, the only peace which William II. and his military and political backers contemplated was a peace with victory (Siegfrieden).