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During the latter part of Sept. German H.Q., harassed and preoccupied by the crucial events which were taking place in other theatres, either gave insufficient heed to the precariousness and difficulties of the German military situation on the western front or were too stunned by their sudden and general reversal of fortune everywhere to be able to grasp and cope with them. Ludendorff, it is true, had two lines in rear reconnoitred: one from the Dutch frontier-Bruges-Valenciennes; the other Ant- werp-Brussels-Namur-the line of the Meuse; but neither 'line solved the problem, nor could it be held in the face of a vic- torious pursuing enemy. The desideratum was to find a secure position for the army's winter respite from active operations, and time for the resting, reorganization and recruitment of the armies. It was possible to accomplish this only by a timely withdrawal, to the line of the Meuse at least, if not to the frontier. But Ludendorff still clung to the idea of holding every foot of French territory until the last possible moment.

On Sept. 26 the final Allied offensive, prepared by the directives of Foch, began. The American army under Pershing and the French IV. Army under Gouraud attacked on the Verdun and Champagne fronts (see MEDSE-ARGONNE, BATTLE OF). On Sept. 28 the Belgians, supported by a French army under Degoutte and the British II. Army under Plumer, attacked the line from the coast southward beyond Ypres (see YPRES AND THE YSER, BATTLES OF, Part iv.). On Sept. 27 the British III. and I. Armies, including the Canadian corps, had attacked on a front of 13 m. in the direction of Cambrai, and on the 29th the British IV. Army under Gen. Rawlinson, after a heavy bom- bardment lasting two days, attacked the St. Qucntin sector. ( The American and Belgian attacks had the advantage of coming as a complete strategic surprise; but, in the case of the Meuse-Argonne front, the depth of the fortified zone behind the front lines enabled the German reserves to be brought up and increasingly strong resistance to be made. Both British attacks were made against strongly organized positions held by the best troops the Germans still had; but on the front of the British I., III. and IV. Armies the enemy was already virtually on his rearmost prepared line, the attack was not unexpected, and both opposing armies appreciated thoroughly the consequences of victory and defeat. If driven from the Hindcnburg line the weakened German army must thereafter fight in the open. The contest was therefore bitter to the point of desperation, but, even with the aid of the elaborate system for defence afforded by the long-prepared Hindenburg line, the struggle proved unequal, and the German army was forced back with heavy losses, to begin its retreat through the open country.'

The German High Command had not appreciated the risk of accepting battle on the Hindenburg line, or else had over- estimated either the strength of the position or the remaining fighting capacity of the troops. Once the line was broken, however, they awoke to the situation. On Sept. 28 Ludendorff and Hindenburg agreed that the end had come; on the 29th the Foreign Minister was informed of the army's desperate plight; on Oct. i Hindenburg and the Kaiser went together to Berlin, and on Oct. 4 the first peace offer was sent to President Wilson.

On the battle-front the Allies were not permitting events to lag, and this same day renewed efforts were made on all fronts. The French V. Army under Berthelot had advanced from the Aisne and on Oct. 6 reached the Suippe. On Oct. 7 Foch ordered the attack on the right flank, extended to include the heights E. of the Meuse. On Oct. 8 the British I. and III. Armies re- newed their attacks, and in three days drove the Germans back beyond the line of the Selle river-Le Cateau.

Between the two sectors of the Allied main right and left flank offensives -lay the strong defensive German positions W. and S. of Laon. On Oct. 9 these positions were abandoned by the enemy, and the whole German line between the Scheldt and the Aisne began its retreat. By Oct. 10 the American I. Army had penetrated to the last line of German defences on its front, the Kriemhilde Stellung, and cleared the Argonne forest, while on its left the French IV. Army reached the Aisne.

On Oct. 10 a new directive of Foch gave more distant objec-

tives to the armies; the Northern Flanders Group was to ad- vance toward Belgium; the British armies, debouching from the front Solesne-Vassigny, were to push both in the direction of Mons and toward Avesnes; on their right the French I. Army was to push up the Oise; while the French and American armies between the Aisne and the Meuse were to continue their north- ward movement. The Marshal defined the purposes of these converging attacks to be to force the Germans back on the rough Ardenne forest, where communications were lacking and a modern army would have difficulty in maintaining itself.

On Oct. 12 the French X. Army of Mangin, on the left of the V.,- reinforced by an Italian corps, passed the Aisne and occupied the Chemin des Dames. On Oct. 14 the army group under King Albert renewed its attack on the front from the Lys to Dixmude. The Germans were unable to hold; Lille had to be abandoned, and, under the combined pressure of this and the British attack, the whole German line N. of Cambrai rolled backward in disor- der, toward the Scheldt, closely pursued. The Americans also attacked on the I4th, with important gains W. of the Meuse.

On Oct. 17 the British IV. Army and the French I. Army attacked the hastily improvised German line between Le Cateau and the Oise. On the 2oth the III. Army attacked the line of the Selle, supported by the I. Army astride the Scheldt. Both attacks succeeded.

The conditions of the fighting are best understood by referring to the German reserves. From 69 divisions in reserve when the attack of Sept. 26 was begun the German army had been reduced by Oct. 15 to 26 divisions in reserve, of which only 9 were rested. Of the divisions in line many were unfit for combat, but could not be replaced.

Toward the end of Oct. the dissatisfaction in Berlin and elsewhere with the Government had become intense. The people felt that the war had been mismanaged and that they had been deceived. In an attempt to appease them Ludendorff was dismissed on Oct. 25, and his place as quartermaster-general was taken by Gen. Groener. But it was too late to save either the Cabinet or the Monarchy, for with the disaster to the army from the vigorous Allied attacks of Nov. i and following days the Kaiser was forced to abdicate on Nov. 9.

On Nov. i the Allied armies began their final drive. On the right the American I. Army on the Mcuse-Argonne front effected a clean break through the German lines, and began an active pursuit which was only stopped by the Armistice on Nov. n. On the left of the American armies the French IV. Army was equally successful. Farther N. the British I. Army attacked the line of the Rh6nelle river and completed the evacuation of Valenciennes. This attack was followed on Nov. 4 by a general attack by the British I., III. and IV. Armies, on a 3O-m. front, from Valenciennes to the Sambre, N. of Oisy. In spite of serious natural obstacles, having to force the crossings of the Sambre on the right and to penetrate the forest of Mormal in the centre, the line was advanced 5 m. on Nov. 4. This battle finally broke the German power of resistance, and the German army began a retreat along the entire northern front, though it still offered stiff resistance to the British I. Army on Nov. 5 and 6.

On Nov. 9 the important railway centre and fortress of Maubeuge was taken and the II. Army crossed the Scheldt on its entire front. On Nov. n the Canadian 3rd Div. captured Mons. Farther N. the Belgian army stood before Ghent.

On Nov. 9 Foch had telegraphed all commanders-in-chicf: " The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, yields on the entire front. I appeal to the energy and initiative of the commanders-in-chief and of their armies to render decisive the results gained." On the same day the German delegates pre- sented themselves at Rethondes to ask terms for an armistice, which were accepted on Nov. n.

During the last week's fighting the outbreak of the revolution in Germany, interrupting as it did the service of communication and the forwarding of supplies, had combined, with the pressure on the front, the depleted and disorganized condition of the troops, and the absence of any available reserves to replace broken and worn combat units, to render further resistance on