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It began on May 27 and succeeded beyond all hopes. By the evening the VII. Army's centre had reached the Vesle on both sides of Fismes, the wings holding back somewhat. The morning of the 28th brought an emphatic reminder from Ludendorfi that the object was to get possession as quickly as possible of the high ground W. of Braisne, S. of Fismes and Bazoches and N.W. of Reims. The right wing was to advance by means of a sharp attack to a line on the high ground between the Oise and Aisne canal and the Aisne in a W. direction. The successes of the 28th enabled fresh orders to be given for advancing the objectives of the centre and left wing to Fere en Tardcnois-the heights S. of Coulanges-the S. front of Reims. If the opponent evacuated the territory between the Aisne and the Oise, the XVIII. Army was to draw up forces on the S. bank of the Oise about Noyon and to gain ground in the direction of Compiegne. On May 29 the successes on the VII. Army's front were spreading rapidly, and orders were given at noon for the attack by the left wing of the XVIII. Army and the VII. and I. Armies to be continued in the direction of Compiegne-Dormans-Epernay and the block of hills between the Vesle and the Marne, S. of Reims, taken as a protection against Chalons. The progress of the VII. Army cor- responded to these instructions. The I. Army, which had had difficulties to contend with, received an order on the morning of May 30 toreenforce its right wing from the centre, and shoot out its fighting line to the S. and S.W., thereby facilitating the en- velopment of Reims. The VII. Army meanwhile had reached the Marne on the 3oth with its centre, and on the following day gained a good deal of ground in the direction of Villers Cotterets, but the two wings of the attack did not seem able to make any further progress. The Supreme Command was for the moment inclined to send portions of the VII. Army over the Marne to push forward on Epernay, with the idea of getting the attack of the I. Army into swing again. But this scheme was dropped in consideration of the state of the troops and the strength of the enemy's resistance. The I. Army was to have a rest, and then be required only to undertake partial actions with limited objec- tives and to capture Reims. The Supreme Command was now anxious to get the centre of gravity fixed on the W. front of the VII. Army in the direction of Villers Cotterets and La Ferte Milon, in order to attract powerful French forces. Rcenforce- ments were therefore sent up from the zones of the other army groups. But the VII. Army attack in a W. direction made no more progress to speak of in the beginning of June, as the French had established themselves here in great force by hurrying fresh troops on to the scene.

The continuation of the offensive now depended on the progress of the attack launched on June 9 from the S. front of the XVIII. Army on the Matz brook and the Aisne above Compiegne (code name, " Gneisenau "). But this attack by the XVIII. Army did not have the anticipated success, which would have justified the immediate opening of the Flanders offensive, but came to a standstill on April n. A blow delivered by the VII. Army against Villers Cotterets to the S.W. of Soissons on the following day also failed, and as the immediate continuance of partial actions by the I. Army did not look like succeeding either, a lull set in along the whole new front of the German Crown Prince's army group in the middle of June.

The Bliicher attack was not looked upon as an operation to force a decision, but rather as a diversion. The fact that the original limited objectives were exceeded in consequence of the unexpectedly favourable course taken by the attack is not in- compatible with the leading idea, which aimed at holding and destroying the greatest possible number of the enemy's forces. This aim was fulfilled. The total number of the French engaged in the defence against the Bliicher offensive was estimated in the beginning of June at over 40 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. On the Marne the wavering French lines were only saved by fresh American divisions. This time the Germans spared their troops by avoiding costly independent battles of only local importance. At the same time the development of the tactical success should not have brought about an unfavourable operative situation at the close of the offensive. But this was exactly what

happened. As the wings had not succeeded in getting the region of Compiegne and Reims, with its hilly country, under their control, a new sack-like bulge had been formed in the German position, with the flanks bent far back, to maintain which strong new forces would have to be put in. The rearward communica- tions of the VII. Army were particularly unsatisfactory owing to the lack of railways. This unfavourable operative situation could perhaps have been avoided if from the beginning strong pressure had been used to push forward the right wing along the Oise to the Marne, and the I. Army to Reims, at the cost of some of the excessive amount of ground gained in the centre. Later attempts to work up the operation from the centre were impaired by the gradually failing fighting strength of the troops. According to Ludendorff a subordinate command also failed to carry out a swift and powerful advance through Soissons. The advance of the VII. Army's right wing along the Oise, which began later, was inadequately provided with the means of attack, and the Gneisenau attack by the XVIII. Army W. of the Oise, which followed, was apparently even less well prepared; neither could retrieve the results which could presumably have been obtained without much effort at the very beginning of the offensive, had the forces on the VII. Army's right wing been differently grouped. The disadvantageous strategic situation at the close of the attack corresponded with the tactically difficult fighting position in which the tired-out German divisions were confronted with the active defence offered henceforth by the French and Americans.

The German Offensive in July. The effect of the Bliicher attack very soon made itself felt on the front of Rupprecht's army group, where no little relief was felt. The enemy's fighting activity diminished, and a portion of French reserves intended for the support of the British vanished from the scene. All the same, this degree of slackness on the enemy's part did not seem to the German Supreme Command to warrant the carrying out of the planned and prepared attack on the Flanders front (code name " Hagen ") for the present. They hoped first, by carrying out another of the diversions on the front of the German Crown Prince's army group, to rob the British of the last of their French support, and even in certain circumstances to force them to send direct help themselves to their hard-pressed ally.

On June 14 Ludendorff arranged for the German Crown Prince's army group to attack with the VII. Army across the Marne, E. of Chateau-Thierry and between the Marne and Reims (code name " Marneschutz "), and with the I. and III. Armies between Reims and the Argonne (code name " Reims "). July 10 was the date aimed at for the beginning of the offensive. About 10 days later, after a rapid regrouping of the necessary artillery and so on, the Hagen attack was to be executed by Rupprecht's army group in Flanders. Ludendorff in his Memoirs gives the reasons for selecting new points of attack on the French front as fol- lows: " The greater part of the enemy's reserves were to be found within the curve formed by the XVIII. and VII. Armies in the direction of Paris, only weak forces being left between Chateau- Thierry and Verdun. The Supreme Command intended this time also to attack the enemy where he was weakest."

The underlying idea of the VII. Army's far from simple operation on both sides of the Marne toward Epernay was inspired by the desire to escape from the tactically constrained position brought about by the pocket on the Marne. By flatten- ing out the left flank of the pocket by eastward pressure, not only would the army's rearward communications be widened, but the danger which perpetually threatened the right flank would be diminished. While the necessity of supporting this flank on the sector from Villers Cotterets to the Marne during the attack was pointed out to the VII. Army, the forces needed for such support were not placed at its disposal. It is not by any means clear on what grounds the decision was taken to extend the diversion very considerably toward the east by calling in the III. Army. It was probably in the hope mainly of splitting up the enemy defences along as wide a front as possible. General Buat points out that the offensive, if successful, would have opened up brilliant strategic possibilities, such as extending the successful advance in the direction of Bar le Due and rolling up