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the execution from day to day. As since April 17 the French had been established at Wytschaete the arrival of further French reinforcements had to be reckoned with.

On April 20, therefore, General Ludendorff ordered the be- ginning of the offensive. With a view merely to improving the tactical situation of the inner wings of the VI. and IV. Armies the attack on Mt. Kemmel was carried out on April 25. The piecemeal capture of Festubert and Givenchy did not succeed.

On May i Ludendorff came to the decision to place Rupprecht's army group and also the XVIII. Army on the defensive for the time being. The Georgette operation had, apart from destroying the Portuguese, undoubtedly inflicted another heavy blow on the British army. Its losses in the defeats of March and April might be estimated at not less than half-a-million men. The fact that Foch was forced to send about 18 French divisions and 6 cavalry divisions to Flanders suggested that the British alone were not in a position to resist the pressure put upon them. It was also an important point for the German Supreme Command that it had for many weeks had the lead in the western theatre of war and had forced the opponent to stand on the defensive. Yet it could not record any operative success in this new place. Then, too, the Michael and Georgette offensives had used up a large number of forces 113 divisions and this fact weighed heavily. Taken in conjunction with the difficulties about drafts there was no doubt that the balance of forces was gradually becoming un- favourable to the Germans.

It is indeed questionable whether the German command had it in its power to raise this strategically unsatisfactory result to the level of a striking success. With the forces actually available, and those that were put in, it would hardly have been possible, even if certain errors in the subordinate command had been avoided. The greater part of the divisions used did not belong to the mobile divisions, which had been trained and equipped for the attack, and others were worn out by fighting. There was, therefore, a certain lack of the necessary freshness and tenacity in attack. If the German Supreme Command had decided at the end of March to stop the Michael offensive and desist for the time being from the attack on the Archangel front, there would have been fourteen more unused divisions available at the beginning of the Georgette attack. With this additional strength con- siderably more pressure could have been exercised, particularly by the IV. Army, to the N. of Armentieres and N.E. of Ypres.

With the situation as it stood at present the difficulties in the way of forcing the decision of the war before the Americans made themselves felt were growing. In spite of this Ludendorff re- mained unshaken in his aim, clearly recognizing that the Germans could now only achieve a success through their own initiative and by working against time. All the clever advice that subse- quent criticism felt obliged to offer Ludendorff is met by the objection that by none of it could the victory of the Germans have been achieved. If the Allies were now allowed time, and were able at a self-chosen moment to use their fighting force, with its ever-growing superiority in personnel and material, for their own final blow, the war might be given up as lost at once.

The necessary forces were lacking for an immediate fresh German offensive. During the next few weeks it was imperative that the mobile divisions, some of which had been overtaxed, should be allowed to rest and freshen up again. By May 27 the German reserves had been brought up to 81 divisions again, exclusive of the transport movement from the east. Of these 58 had been resting.

The direction which the operations were to take had now to be decided. The French and British now formed a united front, and the former plan of beating each separately was no longer in question. At the end of April there were from 10 to 12 French infantry divisions and 6 cavalry divisions estabh'shed in Flanders. In front of the German XVII. Army at Doullens was the French X. Army with from 5 to 6 divisions. At Amiens and S. of it stood a group of from 1 2 to 14 fresh French divisions. As Foch had also released about 20 divisions by putting in territorials and Americans and economizing on numerous sectors, he now had at his disposal a reserve of over 60 French divisions. About half of

these he kept to defend the coast and at Amiens, the other half being apparently distributed in readiness before the fronts of the remaining army groups. An offensive to force a decision against those sectors of the front held almost exclusively by the French from the Somme to the Swiss frontier promised the Germans a far-reaching operative success, at whatever point it might be attempted. The one sharply-defined objective in this connexion was Paris. But on the way there an encounter with the French army, prepared to defend it to the uttermost, was certain; and a defensive battle for them would have various advantages. On the other hand if a German, attack should sooner or later find itself stuck fast on the way to Paris or in Champagne as might almost certainly be predicted the Germans would be in an unfavourable position for operating, with their line bent more or less far forward toward the S.W. or S. There seemed more prospect of success in resuming the offensive on the Michael or Flanders front, where the objectives were not fixed so far away. After all, the Germans had covered half the distance from St. Quentin to Abbeville in March well within a week. If they could succeed in doing this again with the same bulk and expansion, they would throw the enemy forces opposing them into the sea. But even with less success at first they might hope so to cramp their opponent's freedom of movement that his power of prolonged resistance would weaken, and he would be completely crushed by renewed hammer-like blows. The German Supreme Command therefore sought to gain their strategical aim as before in an attack on the northern part of the enemy's front. Clear on this point, it was again confronted, as in the spring offensive, with the choice between carrying out the operations in Flanders or farther S. against the Arras-Amiens front.

Acting on the suggestion of the Higher Command of Prince Rupprecht's army group, General Ludendorff in the beginning of May decided on the Flanders attack. The determining factor was the knowledge that an attack from the Michael front in the direction of Doullens would tactically be extremely difficult, depending for its success on a simultaneous side-attack from the region of Bethune, for which the forces were not adequate. But as there were still strong French reserves in Flanders at the time, Ludendorff decided not to lead the attack against Poperinghe- Hazebrouck until a diversion in another place had drawn off considerable portions of this reserve from the Flanders front, leaving it weakened in consequence. At the suggestion of the Higher Command of the German Crown Prince's army group, a diversion offensive within a limited area from the VII. Army front on the Chemin des Dames across the Aisne as far as the Vesle code name " Bliicher," was given preference over an attack by the I. Army in Champagne, E. of Reims, because its clearly defined aim offered the promise of a line suited both to a prolonged defence and a continuation of the attack. The VII. Army's task was limited to carrying the offensive over the Aisne sector on both sides of Soissons and over the Vesle as far as the heights to the S.W. and S.E. of Soissons and S. of Fismes, while the right wing of the I. Army was to accompany the attack westwards past Reims and nearly up to the Ardre. There was also an idea of letting the XVIII. Army push forward its left wing across the Oise to split up the counter-offensive.

By choosing the Bliicher attack Ludendorff was again faithful to his principles in selecting a markedly weak spot in the enemy's front. There were at this time in the front line only 6 French divisions of which 2 were worn out and i weakened by illness and 2 British divisions which had been defeated in March and April. As regards reserves, there were supposed to be 2 fresh French divisions and 2 that had previously -been beaten in the region between Compiegne and Reims. As against these the VII. Army had 29 divisions, the I. Army 4 divisions at its disposal. The Supreme Command reserved the right of taking back strong artillery forces from Rupprecht's army group and the powerful fighting divisions drawn back behind their front. This time, too, the attack was to break out as a complete surprise, and be re- lieved by opportune feints on different parts of the other armies' fronts. Owing to the comprehensive preparations the Bliicher attack could not be launched until nearly the end of May.