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in the direction where there was still movement, that is, on the S. wing of the II. Army and with the XVIII. Army. As the inter- vention of the French so far gave the impression of being pre- cipitated, it was concluded that the opponent had not yet fully organized his forces. The point was to keep him from doing so now. The cooperation of the II. Army's N. wing, now held fast on the Ancre, in the forward wheel toward the Somme below Amiens, could indeed no longer be counted upon. It seemed, therefore, all the more urgent to get possession of Amiens, the strategically important railway junction, by the quickest means, and also to cross the Avre. The centre of gravity of the offensive was therefore laid exclusively on the inner wings of the II. and XVIII. Armies in the next few days, all reserves being switched off in that direction. However, no real progress could now be made in the direction of Amiens. A last attempt on April 4 broke down before the enemy resistance, which had visibly increased.

The close of the Great Battle left the Germans in possession of a narrow salient stretching far out toward Amiens. This position had its dangers, which necessitated perpetual watching, and kept strong forces tied to the spot. On April 24 the II. Army tried to improve its positions between the Somme and the Avre by a partial attack, which after a passing success at Villcrs- Bretonneux ended in a recoil. After this for a long time no important battle actions took place on this section of the front.

The Michael operation had not achieved the full operative success, but had nevertheless dealt the British a heavy blow and crippled their fighting power for a long time to come. More than 40 British divisions were seriously affected, and also about 20 divisions of the French army which had been drawn in.

In the light of subsequent criticism, the question arises whether General Ludcndorff's leading idea would not have had more chance of being realized if the decision of March 26 had limited the objectives aimed at in one direction or the other. Persistence in the double intention of dividing the opponents and simul- taneously dislodging the British at and N. of Arras by frontal shock had the effect of dissipating the still available attack energy of the reserves, and made it impossible to focus on a single object the largest possible part of the forces still capable of a great effort. In view of the general outlook the only limitation worth considering was one which would have facilitated the progress of the Michael operation by temporarily renouncing the Mars attack and the proposed frontal attacks farther N. which went with it. The danger then would have been that the British, not being threatened from the front, would throw all their available reserves on to the battle-field as it now stood, and also release forces from their front for the same purpose. It would be the task of the XVII. Army and the portion of the II. Army fighting on the Ancre to continue their attacks and so draw these forces upon themselves, preventing a flanking attack against the German main operation in the direction of Amiens. It was for the moment less important to gain much ground in the direction of Doullens, provided that the decisive blow on Amiens on both sides of the Somme were kept going. Supposing that the 5 divisions which had been put into the attack on both sides of the Scarpe had been used in the continuation of the Michael opera- tion with the XVII. Army and on the right wing of the II. Army from March 27 on, it would have been possible by this time to shift a number of reserves toward the S. to the decisive wing. A portion of these reserves did gradually find their way to the wing S. of the Somme a few days later, together with a number of divisions which had been engaged in the previous fighting. But they arrived too late, and the offensive had meanwhile come to a standstill. The conclusion is that events might have shaped themselves more favourably, from an operative standpoint, if the decision of March 26 had limited itself to the separation idea, laying increased stress on this at the cost of the intention to break up the whole British front at the same time.

Finally, there is no doubt that the Germans, by their last attempt to get possession of Amiens, put too great a strain on their available forces. However strong the grounds for this, it should have been of supreme importance to the Germans to avoid the wearing effect on their fighting force of a battle of

material. This would have been easier to accomplish if a decision had been made by the end of March to close down the Michael operation. Instead, the attack on April 4 placed the inner wings of the II. and XVIII. Armies in the salient over against Amiens on both sides of the Avre in so difficult a fighting position that, whatever the result, the reserve strength which was still coming in had to be committed and was used up.

German Attacks April, May, and June. Closely connected with the Michael offensive, which came to a standstill on April 5, was the VII. Army's Archangel attack which followed. Between April 6-8 the right wing of this army threw back the enemy from its positions S. of the Oise through Amigny and Coucy le Chateau to beyond the Ailette. The ground gained made an improvement in the difficult rearward communications of the XVIII. Army's left wing. Following immediately upon this came the resumption of the great operations by the Georgette attack on the Lys front. General Ludendorff had had this attack in view since the end of March, and had prepared it at first as a diversion only. When it became clear in the beginning of April that the Michael offensive would not lead to a complete operative success, the Georgette attack was extended in its scope and aims to an operation for forcing a decision. It was proposed to break through the British-Portuguese front in the direction of Haze- brouck-St. Omer and then to continue the operation through St. Omcr-Bethune and as far to the S. as possible. The VI. Army was to attack on the front Armentieres and the La Bassee canal with its centre of gravity on Hazebrouck; the left wing at first only to wheel in on the general line Aire-Bethune- La Bassee canal; the centre to push through toward Hazebrouck and the heights W. of it and to seize the canal crossings between St. Omer and Aire; the right wing to take possession of the commanding heights to the E. and S. of Godewaersvelde and then to take the direction of the barrier of heights at Cassel. The IV. Army, attacking one day later from the line Hollcbcke- Frclinghcm, was to attach itself with a strong left wing. Armen- tieres was to fall by envelopment. Beyond all these there was a proposal for the IV. Army to attack in Flanders from the Houthoulst Forest in the direction of Popcringhe, with the object of cutting off the Ypres salient.

The enemy's situation seemed favourable to the Germans. The British had hardly any more fresh reserves to draw on, so that the only reserve to be considered consisted of divisions worn out by fighting. The Portuguese stationed on the Lys were not credited with any great power of resistance.

Seventeen divisions from the VI. Army and 4 from the IV. Army were placed in readiness, and the necessary artillery was brought up, some of it being obtained by regrouping from the Michael front. In the course of the operation 14 more divisions, mostly from the zones of the XVII. and II. Armies, were put in.

The attack by the VI. Army, beginning on April 9, took the opponent at first by surprise. On this same day the whole stretch of the Lys at Sailly was conquered. But the battles of the next few days, though successful, were obstinate and costly, and already it appeared doubtful whether the attack would de- velop into a break-through. The left wing had not succeeded in taking Festubert and Givenchy or in reaching the canal. On the other hand there could be no question of stopping the offensive immediately, as the inner wings of the VI. and IV. Armies were still fighting in a difficult tactical position. Their position improved, however, with the seizure of the Neuve figlise and Bailleul heights, but in general the gains of ground were only local. The advantages of the initial surprise were forfeited and the opponent found time to organize his resistance more and more thoroughly. The hope of being able to set the interrupted operation in motion again by a surprise assault on the Belgian front, delivered by the IV. Army from the Hout- houlst Forest, vanished when it became known on April 16 that the enemy was eluding the carefully built-up attack from the Ypres salient by slipping away behind the Stecnbeek. The IV. Army higher command considered that on account of the difficult ground the attack across the Steenbeek had no chance of success unless it were newly organized, and postponed