Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/1032

994

Somme an unusually powerful obstacle will serve as a support for the left flank. The main idea of an operation on the II. Army front must therefore be to break through the enemy front in the first place, in order to protect the left flank against the French anc roll up the enemy front toward the north. The operation would then be continued in the area between the Somme and the Pas de Calais against the enemy forces there, as a war of movement with a N.VV. direction. The enemy would have his back to the sea. There would be a prospect of a decisive victory if the operation were pushed far enough forward. The progress of the operation in detail after the successful break-through would depend upon the measures taken by the enemy, and cannot be foreseen. Operations of this order presuppose strong forces, considerably stronger than would be necessary for the " St. George " scheme. The advantages of this scheme are that in the II. Army area operations are possible at all seasons; that the enemy positions excepting those S. of St. Quentin are not strongly built up and are but thinly occupied at the mo- ment ; that the question of strong enemy reserves need hardly be considered, as the British will make their attack in Flanders, and the French are not likely to make theirs against the II. Army. If the French should prepare an attack at St. Quentin, the German attack would have to set in farther to the north. The disadvantages are that the operations would lead through the ruined tract of coun- try 'Alberich,' 1 and would involve crossing the wide area of the Somme battle, strewn with positions and craters; that the II. Army front runs from N.W. to S.E., while the direction desired for the main operation is N.W. It therefore becomes considerably more difficult to roll up the enemy front towards the N.W. after the suc- cessful break-through.

" The attack would first have to be made in a W. direction as far as the Somme, and could only later develop toward the N.W. A certain amount of time would necessarily be wasted before the operation of movement came into swing. This would give the enemy an oppor- tunity of bringing up his reserves, the network of railways being favourable for the purpose."

Although General Ludendorff and the chief of the general staff of Rupprecht's group of armies, General von Kuhl, were agreed on the main point that the offensive should be directed against the British, the chief of the general staff of the German Crown Prince's army group, Count von der Schulenburg, held at first a directly opposite view, considering an attack on the French to be the better policy. " England, with her dogged self-confidence," h'e said, " is not k'kely to end the war on account of a partial defeat of her army. She will be more inclined for peace when the power of the French is broken by a heavy defeat." Count Schulenburg's proposal was " to attack in the Argonne and to the E. of it, and simultaneously to carry out a strong attack from the St. Mihiel region in a W. direction. The objec- tive of the attack would be Verdun, and, if possible, the de- struction of the portion of the French army enveloped by the attack. The wooded, indistinct character of the deployment area would make it easier to hide the preparations for attack. The attacks would have a good chance of success if managed as a surprise. The French would never get over the loss of Verdun. If the seizure of the fortress were combined with a decisive victory over a portion of the French army, which would mean depriving the French of the possibility of a really promising offensive in 1918, the French nation and its army would be swept by a great wave of depression:

" The British are certain to attack in Flanders if we attack the French at Verdun. A French offensive may be predicted with equal certainty if the British are attacked. If the Supreme Command is not in a position to execute a big attack, and at the same moment fight a defensive battle in another place, there remains the possibility of evading the enemy attack on the threatened front by retreating. This could be carried out by the VII., Land III. Armies, and also to a limited extent in Flanders presumably, but not E. of the Argonne or on the V. Army's front."

The armistice concluded with Russia on Dec. 15 made a considerable difference in the general situation. Russia no longer counted as a military factor, and the balance of power in the western theatre of war had now readjusted itself in favour of the Germans in consequence. All the reports received pointed to the conclusion that the Entente Powers would for the present limit themselves to a strategic defence, and would refrain from a great offensive until strong American forces became available. This was all the more probable because the effect of the sub- marine war so far could not apparently be considered so successful

1 "Alberich " was the code name for the destruction of the ground surrendered on retreat to the Siegfried positions in the spring of 1 9 1 7.

as to force Great Britain to undertake the destruction of the German submarine base in Flanders at an early date. This change in the situation removed the principal presupposition on which Gen. von Kurd's proposed offensive at Armentieres-La Bassee in the direction of Hazebrouck was based. The close massing of the British main forces in Flanders in the coming spring could not be relied on. It was far more likely that the Allies would distribute their reserves behind the front and place them in readiness round important railway junctions. It could not be denied that the operative conditions for a break-through in the St. Quentin region might also be unfavourably affected. The possibility of a French relief offensive had still to be faced. In these circumstances Ludendorff refrained from laying down any definite direction for the attack against the British for the time being, reserving his decision until he could see how the situa- tion developed. On one point only did he insist the moment of the offensive must be fixed as early as possible on account of the Americans. With this in view the Supreme Command issued an order on Dec. 27 1917 for the preparation of several attacks on different parts of the front. The preparations were to be pushed forward so as to be complete by the end of March, j Count Schulenburg's original proposal an enveloping opera* ! tion at Verdun had not yet been rejected, but was for the ! present only to be treated as a rough draft, the German Crown i Prince's group using it as a foundation for an offensive from ; Champagne and the W. of Verdun on Clermont, and Duke Albrccht's group for an attack over the Meuse, S. of Verdun (code name " Castor and Pollux ").

On one point the Supreme Command was now quite clear. The offensive must not take the form of a battle of materiel, ; such as the Allies had over and over again attempted, invariably j without results. German aims would not be furthered by an offensive which condemned the forces to months of strain. The ! break-through must be made to lead up to a decisive operation in the open field. This could only be done if the enemy's trench j system were overrun so rapidly that the reserves he had brought up could not arrive in time to intercept the blow behind the ! dinted-in front. A prompt and complete success was only con- ceivable at the moment of the surprise. This could only be attained by observing the strictest secrecy with the troops concerned in the attacks. Each army must be convinced that the attack which it was preparing was intended to be the one ; actually selected. To this end all preparations for attack, in respect of laying out communications, shelters, aerodromes, etc., ; were to be spread over the whole army front as far as possible. The placing of the troops in readiness was to come later, and was to be undertaken outside the selected battlefield by various large groups which could be quickly and secretly formed up for deploy- ment in different directions by train and by night marches. Another feature was to be the deception of the enemy, who was to be perplexed by the semblance of an attack on the whole army imited objectives, and by feints of great attacks in other places. All the attack preparations were to be carefully observed on the ground and from the air, to see that they were not attracting attention. Although it might be impossible to prevent the enemy Tom discovering the direction of the attack in time, it might reasonably be hoped to keep him in uncertainty as to the move- i ment and the scope of the attack, and the form which it was to I take. Success therefore depended very considerably on the most rapid execution of the attack itself.
 * ront (artillery registration and so forth), by partial actions with

On Jan. 24 the Supreme Command decided which of the attacks should be carried out. The choice fell on the " Michael " operation in the zone of the XVII., II. and XVIII. Armies. I j At the same time the XVIII. Army was ordered to be trans- r erred to the German Crown Prince's group of armies with the Dmignon brook for its northern boundary.

In preparing for the Michael attack, the XVIII. Army's direction was to the N.E. of Bapaume, the II. Army's to the N. of the Omignon brook, and the XVIII. Army's to the S. of the Omignon brook on both sides of St. Quentin. The XVII. Army was to prepare a simultaneous attack S. of the Scarpe (code