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Rh Nivelle when he succeeded Joffre. That change had permitted Ludendorff to prepare for and carry through the retreat into the Hindenburg line, and had postponed the date of the Allied offensive from Feb. i, the date fixed by Joffre, until April 9 a delay of nine precious weeks. As Joffre, had anticipated, it had been necessary for the British army to bear the brunt of the fighting, but it would have done so under very different conditions if the Germans had been hustled back into the Hindenburg line, as they were in Sept. 1918, and if Messines had been fought at the beginning of April, and the third battle of Ypres had begun on May 30 instead of July 31. The battle of Cambrai might then have synchronized with the last offensive of the Russian army, and the combined effect might well have

een such as to have saved that army from dissolution, for

dequate French and British reserves would have been available France to support Byng's attack, and the war might have

tided victoriously in the autumn of 1917. As it was, the battles 1917 showed clearly that the solution of the problems of

ench warfare at which Haig and Joffre had arrived was correct. It was first necessary to exhaust the German reserves and then to strike a surprise blow or series of surprise blows. Cambrai had shown how surprise might be achieved. But all this experience, which had been purchased at great cost, had been acquired too late to be put to profit in 1917, owing to the fatal delay in opening the campaign of that year. The collapse of Russia was definite and complete, and the Germans were transferring their divisions from E. to W. as rapidly as their railways could carry them. The French divisions had since the middle of the year been gradually reduced in strength, as France had no longer the men to replace the losses in the ranks, and now Petain found himself compelled to cut down the number of his divisions. The British army was not receiving from home the men to fill the gaps caused by the bloody fighting of Passchendaele; and Haig, early in 1918, was compelled to follow the example of the French and reduce the strength of his divisions, while n British and French divisions had been removed to Italy. True, American troops had reached France, but it was improbable that they would be able to take their place in the line of battle before the middle of the summer. In April 1917 there were in France and Belgium 64 British, 108 French and 6 Belgian divisions, or 178 in all, opposed to 128 German divisions. At the end of the year there were 59 British, 98 French and 6 Belgian divisions, a total of 163, opposed to 175 German divisions. Further, the British and French divisions were considerably weaker at the end of the year than they had been at the beginning, though this was offset, to some extent, by a corresponding reduction in the size of the German divisions. Most important of all, there were still large German reinforcements, which might amount to as many as 40 divisions, and did, in fact, amount to 32, ready to come across from the Russian front. The Allies could only obtain reinforcements in the shape of formed divisions by withdrawing troops from Palestine and Salonika, and to this their statesmen were opposed. So fate decreed that at the very time when the Allies had at last found out how to breach the trench barrier, they were thrown willy-nilly on the defensive, and had to prepare to meet the greatest effort which Germany had yet made in the west. (F. B. M.)

III. GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918

The military situation of the Central Powers at the end of the year 1917 and the beginning of 1918 has been thus described by Ludendorff in his Memories of the War:

" Throughout the latter half of 1917 I had strained every nerve to bring about the results that had now been attained, sparing myset no more than I spared others. The western front had held, the Ital- ian army was defeated and the Austro-Hungarian armies m Italy were inspired with new courage. The Macedonian front was holding out. In the east the armistice negotiations were finished and the way to peace lay open to the diplomatists. Negotiations at Brest Litovsk were to begin about Christmas. There was a prospect ot our winning the war. Only in Asia Minor had there been any hitch, but the great events in Europe had pushed into the backgrot

Under the influence of this hopeful outlook the German Supreme Command decided in favour of a decisive battle in the

western theatre of war in the spring of 1918. This decision was justified in the first place by the collapse of Russia. Fortune had favoured the Central Powers there, apart from their own military successes. Yet these might be regarded by them as having made good fortune deserved. The problem of a " war on many fronts " had been clearly comprehended, and the principle of first com- pleting the work that had to be done in the east had been con- sistently maintained. But the fortunes of war are seldom all on one side as Hindenburg and Ludendorff were to discover. The peace negotiations in the spring of 1918 dragged on so long in Trotsky's hands that not only did a new appeal to arms, though a brief one, become necessary, but the final result was merely an " armed peace." This involved keeping strong German forces tied up in the east to secure the treaty and profit by it, and pre- vented the best use being made of these forces in the decisive battle of the war on French soil. But the fact remains that the chief presupposition indeed, the indispensable one on which the Supreme Command founded their project was the breaking up of the enemy in the east. By the end of March 44 divisions had gone to the west, followed in April and May by 15 other divisions, among which were 3 of cavalry.

It was a question of considerable importance whether, and to what extent, the participation of the Austro-Hungarian forces in the coming decisive battle would be possible. The Italian army, though not destroyed by the short autumn campaign of 1917, had been so thoroughly beaten, and was so unstrung morally, that it might reasonably be neglected as a military factor for the next few months. The offensive there had also had the important result of drawing off n French and English divisions from the French theatre of war to Italy. The duration of Italy's collapse was, of course, uncertain. It would presumably end automati- cally when the Central Powers dropped their menacing attitude. All the more was it important to maintain this. But it was not considered necessary to keep German fighting forces in the Italian theatre of war to this end. The moral of the Austro- Hungarian army had risen so markedly since the success of the last offensive that it seemed equal to carrying out this task without German support. The 6 German divisions in Italy were accordingly withdrawn during the winter, and were in the French theatre of war by the end of March. The German Supreme Command would have liked to use the Austro-Hungarian army to still greater advantage in the general scheme by bringing over a number of good fighting divisions and some heavy artillery to take a direct part in the forthcoming battles in France. This had been agreed upon in principle at a conference between Ludendorff and General von Arz on Nov. 3. The matter was further discussed in writing up to the beginning of Jan. 1918. But in the meantime other influences were at work, opposing the designs of the two Supreme Commands. According to Gen. von Arz the Austrian Emperor and Empress were averse to sending Austrian troops to fight on French soil against the French ; and the non-German nations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, sup- ported by the Social Democrats, were strongly opposed to taking part in the war in the west. The German Supreme Command, on being informed of this, sent Gen. von Cramon, their repre- sentative with the Austro-Hungarian army in the beginning of 1918, " a definite order to insist upon a binding declaration." Arz replied that no Austro-Hungarian divisions would be available until peace had been concluded with Russia and Rumania, but that artillery could be sent, though it would be deficient in muni- tions. This offer was accepted. 1 General von Cramon succeeded in persuading Hindenburg and Ludendorff, in spite of the doubts which these proceedings had aroused in them, to make another request for the cooperation of Austro-Hungarian divisions in the western theatre of war. But Cramon's intervention with General von Arz in the meantime did not succeed. General von Arz explained to him in the end in strict confidence that it would not be agreeable to those in high places if infantry were sent to the west. As a last resource now the German Supreme Command tried to stir up its ally to an attack in Italy. On March 15

l Von Cramon, Unser Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Verbundeter, p. 6. The number of heavy batteries sent was 46.