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a subsidiary attack by the IV. Army N. of the Ancre, and yet another by the III. Army upon the Gommecourt salient. Upon July i both the subsidiary attacks and the whole left of the main British attack failed completely and with heavy loss, but the right of the main attack and the whole of the French attack e such good progress as to warrant the continuance of the battle. The British failures were in the main due to want of rience in the artillery. More than two- thirds of the British

tteries engaged had been created since the outbreak of war, at that time they did not possess sufficient ammunition to such practical experience in intense bombardment as the ans had given their gunners before the battle of Verdun.

ie chalky soil of the Somme hills lent itself to the construction

deep dugouts, of which the enemy had a great number, and

prevent his men from coming out of these in time to meet the ritish infantry special and very accurate methods of artillery

iparation were required. In default of these the infantry yet found themselves checked on the greater part of the front

the deadly German machine-guns, and it was mainly through devoted valour of the infantry through the first days of the

tie that the gains made by the right of the IV. Army were rmed and extended. The first successes won by Foch's men

ing the river itself were greater and were obtained at less

it, partly because the Germans, overrating the effect of the

ttle of Verdun, had not expected attack from that quarter, partly because of the better preparation of the attack by the

inch artillery, the French having a far larger number than the ritish of trained gunners for the expansion of that arm. The n of the first days of this great battle is that the creation of armies during the course of a war is an even more intricate and difficult business than had been imagined, even by those who, knowing some of the difficulties, had undertaken the creation of Kitchener's armies with devotion and enthusiasm.

One of the results of the events of the first days of the battle was that Sir Douglas Haig decided to divide his fighting front between two armies. He directed Rawlinson with the IV. Army to exploit the advantages won on the right, and formed on his left a V. Army under Sir Hubert Gough which was to keep the enemy busy on its front and act as a pivot to the IV. Army. The ibattle was fought out in three phases, the first being the struggle [up the slopes from the valleys of the Ancre and of the Somme to the S. crest of the Somme plateau, the second the struggle for possession of the plateau, the third phase consisting of the ad- vance down the N. slopes. The first phase was consummated by a brilliant night attack by the IV. Army on July 14, and on July [17, the British and French troops N. of the river were abreast [of the French S. of the Somme, who had for some time been established opposite to Peronne. The whole front of attack icould again move forward together. The second phase con- stituted a long series of fierce struggles, the Germans bringing i up more and more troops and disputing every yard of ground, so it was not until Sept. 9 that the British, with the French on jtheir right, were able to look down upon the N. slopes of the plateau and the plains beyond.

By this time two of the objects for which the battle had been fought were gained. The Germans, forced to transfer troops to the Somme, had to relax their pressure on Verdun. The French retook Fort Thiaumont on June 30, while throughout July they slowly regained part of the ground which had been won from them, and on Aug. 17 drove the enemy out of Fleury. Verdun was no longer in danger, and Petain and Nivelle were able to
 * plan at leisure counter-attacks on a more extensive scale. The

second object of the battle of the Somme, the exhaustion of the i enemy's reserves, was being obtained as surely. When the battle began, the front attacked by the British was held by 6 German divisions, that attacked by the French by two. In the 2 months

36 German divisions had been engaged on the British front, 18 on rthe French. In the 6 months of Verdun the Germans had em-

ployed 43 divisions in battle, so that their defence on the Somme was far more exhausting than their attacks at Verdun.

i At the end of Aug. the failure of Falkenhayn's plans was [publicly admitted by his supersession by Hindenburg, with

Ludendorff as his chief assistant. The latter, after visiting the fields of Verdun and the Somme, found the German position on the western front to be one of great gravity, and the chief problem confronting him to be how to stop " the progressive falling off " of the German fighting power. The situation of the Allies had improved marvellously since June, when men were wondering how long it would be before the Germans entered Verdun. Not only had Verdun been saved and the Germans been forced to fight desperately on the defensive, but the Italians had driven back the attacking Austrians in the Alps and had then passed themselves to attack on the Isonzo. On the Russian front Brussilov had won great victories on the Bukovina, and Rumania had entered the war, too late certainly to profit by Brussilov's success, but none the less adding apparently another ally to those who confronted the Central Powers. The whole machinery of the Allies was, for the first time, simultaneously at work, and Joffre's strategy appeared to be triumphant.

It was in these encouraging circumstances that the third phase of the battle of the Somme began on Sept. 15. The attack of that day was made famous not only by the successes won, which were considerable, but by the fact that tanks then made their first appearance in battle. There has been much controversy as to the wisdom of this step (see TANKS). The experts have maintained that the value of this invention was discounted by premature use, that it should have been kept in reserve to surprise the enemy when large numbers of the new weapon were ready, and that it should have been first used on ground more favourable than a shell-torn battlefield. It was decided to employ tanks in the Somme battle for two reasons. Firstly, so much having been gained at great cost, the moment seemed to have come to press the enemy with every available means. The chief obstacle to the progress of the infantry continued to be the German machine-guns, and tanks were reputed to be the ideal means of overcoming machine-guns. If it would have been foolish not to have pressed the advantage won, it would have been criminal to have withheld from the sorely tried infantry the protection and aid which was at hand. The second reason was that experience was required in the use of tanks in battle. It was necessary to learn both how the tanks would comport themselves when put to the highest test, and how they would work in combination with infantry and artillery. The effective cooperation of infantry, tanks and artillery undoubtedly went a long way towards winning the war in 1918, but it is a legitimate belief that this cooperation would not have resulted unless ex- perience had been gained in 1916.

Despite the employment of tanks, and despite the splendid valour of the infantry of the New Armies, the resistance of the enemy was not broken in the third phase of the battle of the Somme. The days were growing shorter and the weather became uncertain, while the enemy, drawing troops from all parts of the front to prevent his line from breaking, fought with fine courage. By Nov. 17, when rain and mud put an end to the battle, the Germans had engaged no less than 127 divisions. The enemy's reserves had indeed been worn down; in the valley of the Ancre he was hemmed by Cough's V. Army into an awkward salient, but the weather had broken and it was too late to reap the harvest on the battle-front. The first fruits of the Somme were garnered elsewhere.

On Oct. 24 Nivelle began an attack on the right bank of the Meuse, and on the following day recaptured Fort Douaumont. This conspicuous success was followed by the recapture of Fort Vaux on Nov. 2. The battle ended in a complete victory for the French, 6 French divisions overcoming 7 German di- visions at surprisingly small cost. Nivelle and Mangin, who commanded the army corps engaged, became the heroes of France. The victory was largely due to the skilful handling of massed artillery, and the Nivelle method became famous. Its fame was extended when, on Dec. 14, a second attack won an even more brilliant success, which made Verdun quite secure and brought in 11,387 prisoners and 115 guns, again at small cost.

When the statesmen of Paris and London compared the results of these two battles at Verdun, which had resulted not only in