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Rh It is evident that if the organization and transport of the new irmy corps which were to swell the forces of Sir John French had >een accomplished more quickly, and the N. of France occupied tarlier, that region would have been more easily freed from the memy invasion, and the blow at his flank aimed at by the Com- nand would have resulted instead of the " Race to the Sea." But t must not be forgotten that Great Britain created this new army ib oi)o a stupendous military effort and that armies cannot be mprovised. Until about Oct. 8, the Germans had only cavalry in he regions around to the north of Lille. It was then strengthened >y the arrival of a strong army corps, which came from the neigh- raurhood of Antwerp by way of Courtrai.

The Lille Question. On Oct. 8 the enemy arrived before Lille. The ortress closed its gates and resisted with the few troops that it assessed. The Germans did not trouble to attack it in earnest. They contented themselves with bombarding the town from a iistance and demolished about a thousand houses. On Oct. 13, ifter five or six days of bombardment, Lille yielded. This short esistance was not useless, for it enabled the British army to take up ts position behind Lille and to consolidate it. The question of Jlle gave rise to much discussion in France. The arguments cannot ubject. If it had held out longer, it might have formed part of the lattleline, like Reims, in which case it would inevitably have been iestroyed, and with it the industrial towns of Roubaix and Tour-
 * examined here, but a few words must nevertheless be said on the
 * oing. Should the sacrifice have been made? The British front

vould have gained about 15 km. on the E. but the general line would lave passed along the Yser on the N. and through Arras on the S. ust the same. It would, moreover, have been difficult to find a good
 * onnecting line to link up Lille and Arras, across country very ill-

Idapted for defence, especially in the southern half. If the defence if Lille had been included in the general scheme of operations from he beginning, a very strong garrison must have been left there, proportional to the extent and number of works of the entrenched amp. It would have had to be an immobili/ed force whose task vas to immobilize an enemy force also, as at Maubeuge. But it voiild not, any more than Maubeuge, have hindered the enemy's urning movement. Thus, to assume the resistance of Lille, until he arrival of the British army at the beginning of Oct., is to assume hat it could have sustained a siege and bombardment from the last veek in Aug. onwards that is, for over 40 days. The fate of other solated fortresses, such as Liege and Antwerp, leaves no doubt that his would have been impossible.

On Oct. 12 a junction was effected between the Belgian army, etreating towards Ypres with the French marine fusiliers, and the I. British Corps (General Smith-Dorrien) in the region between Jethune and Bailleul, along the canal and the Lys, while the III. Dorps (General Pulteney) marched on the left of the II. towards the ine running from Armentieres to Ypres, to occupy the heights of Vlessines, later so fiercely disputed. On Oct. 13 the British cavalry, vhich held the left of the advance, took the heights which stretch '>etween Cassel and Messines (Mont Noir, Mont des Cots, etc.) and vhich are of great military importance. On Oct. 14 the II. Corps
 * ntered Bailleul. The same day General Byng's cavalry division

irrived at Ypres, with a French territorial division.

i Definition of the Front of Contact. Although the struggle never
 * eased and a great German offensive was immediately prepared

In Belgium against the left of the line, at Ypres, on the Yser, the ' Race to the Sea " must be considered to have ended on Oct. 15
 * 9i4, the date on which the Allies occupied the whole front

rom Ypres to the sea. At that date the left, on the Yser, was it Nieuport, and possessed a bridgehead at Lombartzyde in idvance of the line of the river and near its mouth. The Yser ront passed through Dixmude. To the S. of that town it is lelimited partly by the course of the river, which spreads out ike a fan a little farther to the S., partly by the Ypres canal, after >assing the ancient fort of Krocke. Then it goes beyond the anal to the villages situated farther E. on the stream of the it. Jean, in order to arrive at the heights which surround the msin of the Yser and its tributaries, reaching them at Gheluvelt, m the road from Ypres to Mcnin. It held the crest and the icights as far as Messines. The French were on the left, from N'ieuport to Dixmude; the English on the right, on either side of

[ypres: the Belgians were between the two, their feeble effectives

j iccupying only a small portion of the front.

From the beginning the Yser front was well selected and lent tself well to defence, not so much owing to the obstacle formed )y the Yser, as because the country behind, much cut off by vater-courses, was very ill-adapted for an offensive by large nasses. At the same time, this part of the front, which was
 * ntirely defensive, had not its full value until it was flooded.

The dykes were burst open on Oct. 22, the floods then gained jround little by little as they rose higher. The effect was not

obtained very rapidly, because the whole volume of water in the basin is not great. It did not hinder the enemy from crossing the river below Dixmude on Oct. 26, and penetrating thence to a depth of 4 km. till he was stopped by the lines in the rear, and especially by the railway embankment. But two days later the Germans were forced to retreat, partly by the Allied counter- attacks, partly by the water, which was spreading and rising. The part of the line which passed in front of the Ypres canal near the little river St. Jean could not be made very solid, but it was necessary in order to form a link with the Gheluvelt heights. But the true line of battle, which overlooked a large stretch of country to the E., was only attained in the last phase of the war, with the capture of the entire line of heights in the direction of Staden, at least as far as Westroosebeke, the point where the ridge is crossed by the high road from Ypres to Ghent. Also, during the whole of the first period of the struggle, the British army was always very vigorously attacked around Ypres and at Ypres itself. The most important point d'appui was the por- tion of the heights lying directly to the S. of Ypres, Wytschaete and Messines, that is, the eastern end of the line of the Monts de Flandre, which run from Messines to Cassel and appear again farther on to the N. of St. Omer. These hills are of im- mense importance in the whole defence of Flanders. This was seen in the last phase of the war, when they fell into the hands of the enemy as far as Bailleul, and it took very hard fighting and the greatest energy to arrest his progress in this direction and to stave off still more fatal consequences.

Between the promontory of Messines and the cliff formed by the heights of Notre Dame de Lorette and of Vimy, above the plain of Lens, stretched a sector with a front of nearly 50 km. which afforded no continuous line of any length, and included only isolated strong-points, sometimes in a position favourable to the Allies, sometimes to the enemy. Those most useful to the Allies were the ridges of Messines and Vimy. The first was taken by the Allies on Oct. 15 1914; the second was at first occupied by the French, and later their success was repeated by the British. The French front line passed 2 km. to the west of Notre Dame de Lorette, the key to the position. The attack on this point began on Oct. 20; but the conquest of the whole ridge necessi- tated efforts which were renewed up to the middle of April 1917.

In the plain, about midway between Messines and Arras, is a point relatively stronger than the rest, owing to the canals and marshes which protect its approaches. This is the little town of La Bassee, occupied and strongly fortified by the Ger- mans; and for a long time it delayed the progress of the British army. The difficulty of the advance towards Vimy was very largely owing to the part played by La Bassee in preventing the British in the plain of Lens from taking part in it, in striking at the rear of all their attempts in the neighbourhood of Lens, especially those which aimed at outflanking the town on the north. But hard as were the local struggles in the Messines- Vimy sector, no great action ever developed there until 1918: first, because as regards an Allied action a great offensive in the direction of Lille, would have been very risky unless it was led up to by a more strongly protected movement either to the S. in the region of Arras, Peronne and Ham, or in the N. towards Belgium; secondly, because as regards a German action, the sector to be conquered to carry out a flank offensive against the Allied left was that of Ypres and the Monts de Flandre.

Such was the real meaning of the German project Nach Calais!, which cost the army of William II. so dearly. For the Germans, to engage themselves in the Messines-Vimy sector, in order to reach St. Omer, would have been to run into the jaws of a pair of pinchers formed on the N. by the Monts de Flandre and on the S. by the ridge of Vimy-Notre Dame de Lorette, extending to the S. of Bethune and Brie. It would have meant the formation of a salient, which would be more vulnerable the farther it was pushed in the direction of Calais. The result of all this was that almost up to the end of the war the front passing through Armentieres and Arras underwent very little change.

It has already been related how the front was determined first between Arras and Albert, then S. of Albert in front of the Somme between Pdronne and Ham, and lastly as far as the salient opposite the forest of Laigne. The attack on this very strongly fortified part of the German front was only begun in the early part of Dec. 1914.