Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/1006

970 tion (1860), presenting it with the Elcho challenge shield for a yearly competition. He retained his vigour and energy almost till his death, which took place in London June 30 1914, at the great age of ninety-five. He was succeeded by his fourth but eldest surviving son, HUGO RICHARD, LORD ELCHO (b. 1857). WERNER, ANTON ALEXANDER VON (1843-1915), German painter (see 28.523), died in Berlin Jan. 3 1915. WERNHER, SIR JULIUS CHARLES, 1ST BART. (1850-1912), British S.A. financier, was born at Darmstadt in 1850, entered a banking house in Frankfort, and early in 1870 came to London as a clerk. On the outbreak of the Franco-German War he returned to Germany to take his place in the army, and was present at the fall of Paris. At the end of 1871 he was sent by Mr. Jules Forges, diamond merchant of London and Paris, on a mission to Kimberley. There he remained till 1880, when he was transferred to London as English representative of the firm of Forges and Wernher, interested not only in diamonds but in the gold mines of S. Africa. In 1888, when the Kimberley diamond mines were amalgamated by Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit, he became a life governor of the De Beers Corporation. Beit was now a member of his firm, and in 1889, when Forges retired, the name of the firm was changed to Wernher, Beit & Co. (see 3.659). Out of his enormous fortune, Sir Julius Wernher, who was created a baronet in 1905, spent large sums on public objects, including education; he gave 10,000 to the National Physical Laboratory and, with Beit, endowed the S. African University with 500,000. He died in London May 21 1912.

WERTHEIMER, CHARLES JOHN (1842-1911), art collector, was born in London Feb. 17 1842, of German- Jewish parentage. He early devoted himself to the collection of china, pictures and objets d'art of all kinds, travelling widely with this purpose in view, and amassing a wonderful collection. He suffered a con- siderable loss in 1907, about 40,000 worth of treasures being stolen from his London house on Feb. 12. He died in London April 25 1911. His collection was sold after his death and realized a very large sum.

His brother, ASHER WERTHEIMER (1844-1918), entered his father's art galleries in Bond Street, and later assumed control of the business. He made many noteworthy purchases, the most famous being the acquisition of the Hope collection of Dutch pictures (1898) and, in conjunction with M. Seligmann of Paris, the Cheremeteff collection of Sevres porcelain (1906), which was exhibited in Bond Street. He died at Eastbourne Aug. 9 1918. By the terms of his will, the splendid series of portraits of the Wertheimer family by J. S. Sargent was left to the nation, after the death of his wife.

WESTERMARCK, EDWARD ALEXANDER (1862- ), Fin- nish anthropologist, was born at Helsingfors Nov. 20 1862. Educated at a lyceum in his native town and at the university of Finland he became professor of moral philosophy at his own university; but he came to England about 1890 and in 1907 was appointed professor of sociology at the university of London. He made a special study of primitive marriage and ethical origins and has published The Origin of Human Marriage (1889); The History of Human Marriage (1891) ; The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (1906); Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco (1914) and other scientific papers. .

WESTERN EUROPEAN FRONT CAMPAIGNS, 1914-8. The story of the successive campaigns in Belgium and France during the World War, embracing the continuous struggle on the western front from Aug. 2 1914 to Nov. n 1918, is dealt with below under four main sections, representing the phases into which it naturally divides itself: viz. the "open" warfare campaign of 1914, which ended without decisive victory to either side in the open field and left the armies " stabilized " on a continuous line from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier; the three years of trench- warfare campaigns, 1915-7; the great German offen- sives of March-July 1918, which, breaking the stability of the trench-warfare system, re-introduced a condition of semi-open warfare; and finally, the allied offensive which synchronized at its outset with the last German attack effort, and closed with the Armistice at n A.M. on Nov. n 1918.

France's Defence Problem. During the years which followed the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, a guerre de revanche for the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine was very frequently dis- cussed in France. But it implied aggressive action against Germany, and those who judged with reason and not with sentiment knew very well that such action was impossible. In fact, Germany, at every international crisis that arose, asserted, sharply and menacingly, her readiness to accept a challenge, while France prudently yielded and avoided a conflict.

It may be observed that, under similar military systems that is, under laws of universal military service the effort of France could not surpass the effort of Germany, for France counted less than 40 million inhabitants against the 65 to 70 millions of Germany. Presuming equality of national effort, the vis viiia of France in relation to that of Germany would be in the proportion of 4 to 7 ; and this calculation makes no allow- ance for the fact that in Germany all factors combined to exalt the army, to intensify war preparation, and to produce solid cadres and reserves, while in France the tendency of politics wa to depreciate the army and to lower its quality, to minimiz its training periods, and to depress its military spirit. It is not unfair to say therefore that the possible warlike power of Ger- many was at least double the possible warlike power of France.

If, next, we cast a glance at the theatre of the possible war, we see at once that France had no natural frontier with respect Germany, and was obliged to make good this defect by a syster of fortresses and entrenched camps a form of defence which it is exceedingly difficult to maintain at such a level as to be capa ble of resisting at any moment an artillery that itself is con stantly evolving in the direction of increased power. On the side of Germany, on the other hand (even leaving out of consideration her first-class fortresses, for which money was neve lacking), there was a line of defence of the very first order, the Rhine impossible to turn even if the neutrality both of Holland and of Switzerland were violated, for its flanks rest on the Alps and the sea. There are not in Europe two lines of defence of this value, and it was reinforced by a chaplet of entrenched camps. Supposing then that, in spite of the conditions mentioned, France somehow contrived an initial superiority, her penetrative effort could in no case pass the Rhine, while, in a German penetration of France, Paris was within measurable reach.

From the point of view of numbers, the French alliance with Russia might seem at first sight not only to redress the balance but even to weigh down the scales heavily in France's favour. The effective utilization of these numbers was, however, subjected in practice to grave limitations. The strategic conditions of what came to be called the eastern front are discussed in the article EASTERN EUROPEAN FRONT CAMPAIGNS, and here it is only necessary to say that these conditions and in particular the paucity of railway communications and of rolling-stock in Russia evident from a glance at any map of central and eastern Europe left it within Germany's power to use by far the greater part of her forces in an initial campaign against France. These forces might, from the relation of the two populations concerned and the characters of their respective politics, attain a figure almost double those of France. In such a contingency, the French armies almost might be crushed under a very considerable numerical superiority; the Germans could sweep up to Paris; and there probably the war would end. Germany would rapidly bring back her armies to deal with Russia, aided both by the general E.-W. orientation of her railways and by their perfect technical preparedness. That the German plans did not always take this form, that the soundness of its principle was a matter of considerable controversy, within the German General Staff as well as in military publications, and that the numerical German superiority was not in fact attained, may be freely admitted. But, as the most dangerous alternative that France had to consider, this plan was found to be taken on the logical basis upon which the military policy of the defence should be build up. Whether Germany's own allies would cooperate in such an invasion, and if so, to what extent, was doubtful. Austria's main