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934 through his lines: "... The heaviest part of the task will thus fall on the V. Army ... in the coming weeks, and the safety of the Fatherland will be in its hands. It is on the firm resistance of the Verdun front that depends the fate of a great part of the Western Front, perhaps even of our nation. . . . " Hindenburg in his memoirs added on this subject: " It was plain that this situation could not last. Our armies were too weak and too tired. Moreover, the pressure which the American masses were putting upon our most sensitive point in the region of the Mouse was too strong."

It is debatable whether a quicker perception on the part of German General Headquarters of the threat of the Meuse- Argonne attack might not have led to a greater concentration of effort against it and a speedier evacuation of the French territory to the N., W. of the Meuse, and thus to a prolongation of the resistance of the German army. Hindenburg and Luden- dorff appear, however, to have been at this time preoccupied with events in the Near East (the surrender of Bulgaria occurred on Sept. 29), and the home political situation in both Germany and Austria. In any case, without apparent forethought of consequences, the German strategic reserve of fresh divisions was doled out piecemeal by G.H.Q. until, by Nov. i, it had ceased to exist. Thereafter troops could be neither relieved nor rein- forced. The result was that the general, carefully prepared attack on Nov. I broke through the enemy's line at all points, and thenceforth it was a case of rapid pursuit with occasional rear-guard actions until the Armistice on Nov. n. The chief preoccupation on the Allied side during this pursuit was holding the troops in leash in their sectors and determining who should have the honour of first entering important towns such as Sedan. The main line of the Carignan-Sedan railway, the real objective of the Meuse-Argonne attack, was brought under artillery fire on Nov. 3 and reached, by the I. and V. Corps, on Nov. 7, while the III. Corps had, by the same date, forced the crossing of the Meuse and advanced 10 kilometres to the N. and E.

The I. Army, during the Meuse-Argonne operation, had employed 22 American divisions and 4 French divisions. Of the 22 American divisions 12 were engaged on other fronts dur- ing a part of the period (Sept. 26 to Nov. n). On the German side, in addition to the 5 divisions originally in the sector, 42 divisions had, in the course of the battle, been thrown into line. Thus, in all, one-fourth of the German army in the W. had been engaged and decisively beaten by the I. American Army, although occupying successively the numerous and strong defensive positions prepared long in advance. The strength of the American troops involved was, in the aggregate, about 750,000 men, their losses 117,000 killed and wounded, their captures 26,000 prisoners and 846 guns.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. -Final Report of General John J. Pershing (1920) ; F. Palmer, Our Greatest Battle (1919); A. W. Page, Our no Days' Fighting (1920); de Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army in the European Conflict (1919) ; The Literary Digest History of the World War, vol. vi. (1920). ' (A. L. C.) MEXICO (see 18.317). The ten years of revolutionary conditions following the elimination of Porfirio Dfaz had a profound effect on all phases of the national life. A census was impossible. The appended last official count, 1910, gave a total pop. of 15,063,207. The table 1 gives the pop. of the states and territo- ries, arranged in descending order, according to the 1910 census.

In 1912 the pop. was estimated at 15,501,684. Since then there has been a movement toward the cities for safety from banditry, and across the borders for employment and political refuge. Mexico City was estimated in 1920 to contain over 900,000 inhabitants. Decrease has come in the rural districts from the causes mentioned, as well as from famine and influenza. A small return movement set in after conditions became more peaceful. In Jan. 1921 foreign residents numbered about 14,000 Americans, as many Spaniards, 4,000 each of Germans, English and French, and 5,000 Chinese and 3,300 Japanese.

Communications. The revolution was an almost continuous

'From A. Petermann's Mitteilungen aus Justus Perthes' Geographischer Anstalt, 57. Jahrgang, 1911, II. Halbband, p. 191.

States or Territories

Area in sq. km.

Popula- tion 1910

Per cent of increase in 10 years

Density per sq. km. 1910

Jalisco

86,752

,202,802

4-24

14-

Vera Cruz.

75.863

,124,368

14-61

14-8

Puebla

31,616

,092,456

6-99

34'5

Guanajuato

28,363

,075,270

1-3

38-

Oaxaca

91,664

,041,035

9-75

n-3

Michoacan

58,694

991,649

6-

17-

Mexico

23-185

975,019

4-34

42-1

Distrito Fed.

M99

719,052

32-8

480-

Hidalgo S. Luis Potosi. ;

22,215 62,177

641,895 624,748

6-1

8-6

28-9 10-04

Guerrero.

64,756

605,437

28-4

9.4

Zacatecas. . ,

63,386

475,863

2-9

7-5

Chiapas

70,524

436,817

17-4

6-19

Durango

109,495

436,147

17-8

4-

Chihuahua

233,094

405,265

23-6

1-7

Nuevo Leon

6i,343

368,929

12-5

6-

Coahuila

165,099

367,652

23-8

2-2

Yucatan

42,751

337,020

9'

9-

Sinaloa

71,380

323,499

4-5

Sonora

198,496

262,545

18-4

1-32

Tamaulipas

83,597

249,253

14.

3-

Queretaro.

11,638

243,515

4-8

20-9

, j I laxcala

4,132

183,805

6-7

44-2

Tabasco

26,094

183,708

15-

7-

Morelos

7,082

179,814

12-3

25-2

Tepic Aguascalientes

28,371 7,692

171,837 118,978

H-5 16-

6-4 15-3

Campeche.

46,855

85,795

-0-86

1-8

Colima

5,887

77,704

19-3

13-2

Baja Cal., Sur

85,279

42,339

o-5

Baja Cal., Norte

69,921

9,905

0-13

Baja Cal..

155,200

52,244

9'7

o-33

Quintana Roo.

48,450

9,086

0-18

Total for republic

1,987,350

15,063,207

10-7

7-58

struggle for possession of the railways. The result was disastrous to practically every line. Between 1910 and 1913 the Southern Pacific of Mexico suffered traffic losses of $3,000,000. The Mexican Central to Laredo gave the most regular service, running passenger trains and vast amounts of freight to the border with only tempo- rary interruptions. Much freight in northern Mexico was handled by privately owned trains; in 1919, 30 such trains were operated, mostly by American mining companies. From 1910 to 1919 over 10,000 freight cars, about 175 passenger and express cars and a huge number of locomotives were destroyed. In 1919 the Government was using on five systems 837 standard-gauge and 302 narrow-gauge locomotives, 520 standard-gauge and 259 narrow-gauge passenger cars and 12,293 standard-gauge and 2,810 narrow-gauge freight cars. Military campaigns and private use of railways by military officers reduced railway efficiency, and peculation almost prostrated the serv- ice. In 1920, 500 freight and passenger cars were bought, and a num- ber of locomotives ordered, in the United States. On Jan. I 1921 free interchange of traffic between the United States and Mexico, sus- pended since 1915, was resumed. Since 1914 the Yucatecan roads have been operated by the State. In May 1919 500 m. were in operation. In the year ending June 30 1918 the 8,119 m - f national railways carried 393,968 tons of forest products, 1,236,719 tons of agricultural products, 216,443 tons of animals and animal products, 1,938,105 tons of mineral:; and 372,475 tons of general merchandise. Gross receipts for the same year were $29,240,485; operating expenses, $19,151,808; net operating income, $10,088,677. The Mexican railway from Vera Cruz to Mexico City was returned to its British owners, with indemnities pending, in the spring of 1920. Lines in Morelos were opened about the same time. War on the railways practically ceased with the success of Obregon. In the spring of 1921 return of the national railways, seized by Carranza in 1914, was being discussed. The Government might still retain the 51 % of the stock, as it was acquired in 1906 by Limantour, Diaz's Minister of Finance, and would be liable for indemnities propor- tionate to earnings for the five years prior to 1914, returning the lines in the condition in which they were received. The liability of the Government was estimated at 990,000,000 pesos of a nominal value of $ .50.

Commerce. The total trade in 1911 was 20,583,578 in imports and 29,375,214 in exports; for 1912, 18,266,231 in imports and 29,798,912 in exports; for 1913, 19,577,233 in imports and 13,088,508 in exports. Trade with the United States was in 1917, $110,829,375 in imports and $130,526,935 in exports; for 1918, $97,788,736 in imports and $138,643,427 in exports; for 1919, $131,451,901 in imports and $158,926,376 in exports; for 1920, $143,785,526 in imports and $168,033,626 in exports. The total trade, estimated at $70,000,000 in 1890, was over $300,000,000 in 1919. Exports to the United States for 1917-9 were 70% greater