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pushed to the limits of possible success. The fact that Opera- tion B. followed so closely after Operation A., the restricted available road-net, and the need for secrecy, made it difficult to withdraw the better-trained troops from the new Woevre front and again put them in the front line.

The German position between the Meuse and the Argonne was naturally strong and had been strengthened by every possi- ble artifice. Vauquois, a fortified hill E. of and overlooking the Aire valley, was regarded as an impregnable fortress, and Mont- faucon, dominating the whole plateau, afforded not only a strong defensive position but observation and command posts which greatly aided in controlling the defence of the whole line. On the other hand the German troops in the line on the front of attack consisted of only five divisions, four of them of inferior quality, and the fifth, a Guard division, much worn from intensive fighting farther N. and sent to this supposedly quiet sector for rest. Among the German divisions immediately in rear in reserve there was only one rated first class. Thus the German infantry actually in line was outnumbered by the attackers about four to one, since the American divisions had twice the infantry strength of the German divisions, while the Americans, thanks to the reenforcing French artillery, had at the outset a decisive artillery superiority, and, altogether, 821 airplanes.

On Gen. Pershing's initiative, various feints and ruses with the employment of American tanks and reconnoitring parties E. of the Moselle as well as in and S. of the Vosges Mts., had served to distract the attention of the German High Command, and led it to expect an attack upon Metz itself or the line E. or S. of Metz rather than W. of the Meuse. The real attack had con- sequently the advantage of being an almost complete surprise.

Following an artillery preparation of three hours the attack was begun at dawn on Sept. 26. The first day the attack pro- gressed well. The I. Corps, on the left, stormed Vauquois, advanced up the Aire valley to its objectives, and even made sensible progress in the Argonne forest. On the right the III. Corps crossed the difficult Forges brook with its marshy banks and also gained its objectives. But in the centre the V. Corps was held up in passing through the woods in its front, and was unable to take Montfaucon although the III. Corps had passed beyond it on its right. The second day Montfaucon was gained and the attack went forward, but not so far as had been planned.

The third day, Sept. 28, there was still less advance in the centre and not what was hoped for on the left. , By this time the German reserves from outside the sector began to pour in and, by the fourth day, having nine divisions in the line, the Germans attempted powerful counter-attacks to regain some of their lost positions. The German artillery was also greatly augmented and, from the favourable flanking artillery positions on the heights E. of the Meuse and in the Argonne forest, greatly hampered the work of the American troops in what was now a pronounced salient in the American line on the plateau between the Meuse and the Aire rivers. The weather for the first three days had been favourable, but on the 28th drizzling rains set in which added to the difficulties of both the tactical handling of troops and of supply. The reconstruction of roads across no- man's-land and traffic control had been found especially difficult on the front of the centre corps on account of the depth of the shell-battered zone created by years of intensive fighting. Friction in the railway supply, as was to be expected in a new staff, was not lacking. Under these trying conditions few gains were made on the last two days of Sept., and it became evident that the inexperienced and inadequately trained divisions which had made the initial attack could accomplish little more in the way of further advance.

The difficulties in the way of supply were speedily smoothed out and the worn and tired troops soon replaced by fresh, but the disappointment in the hopes for a clean break through the German army in this its most strongly fortified and from now on most stubbornly defended sector, hopes which had been created by the striking success of the first day's attack, gave rise to exaggerated rumours of blundering in troop leadership at the front and of supply mismanagement in rear, rumours which

finally so affected the French Government as to lead it and Foch to urge the substitution of a French commander and staff for the further conduct of Operation B. This was refused by Gen. Pershing on the ground that the honour of the American army was involved in this attack, and that, whether it finally fail or finally succeed, it must be carried through to the end as an American operation under an American commander and staff.

By Oct. 4 the I. Army line had been reorganized, and on that date the systematic renewal of the offensive was taken up.

West of the Argonne the attack of the IV. French Army (Operation C.), also begun on Sept. 26, had not been successful in making any appreciable advance, and Pershing was called on to loan some of his all-too-few veteran divisions to attack the keypoint of the German Champagne position, Blanc Mont. He complied with this request, and all the more willingly since it was the failure of the French attack W. of the Argonne which made the position of the American troops in the forest itself so trying. With these picked troops the IV. French Army, attacking simultaneously with the I. American Army on Oct. 4, gained Blanc Mont, and the German commander, after vain counter-attacks, ordered a withdrawal beyond the Aisne. East of the Argonne the right of the I. Corps gained an advance of 10 kilometres along the right bank of the Aire, an advance exploited three days later by bringing a flank attack on the Upper Argonne from the E., which, combined with the success- ful advance of the IV. Army of Gouraud, W. of the Argonne, resulted in the capture, by Oct 10, of the entire forest, and enabled the French and American armies to connect their flanks through the pass of Grandpre.

The failure of the American I. Army on Oct. 4 to gain its objectives on the eastern half of the Meuse-Aire plateau in its renewed attack of that date made it clear to Gen. Petain that a broader base was required to push the attack beyond the main Hindenburg line, and that the possession by the Germans of the heights E. of the Meuse afforded them too favourable artillery positions and observation posts to make possible an extended advance to the N.W. of the Meuse. Accordingly, on Oct. 5. Petain placed at the tactical disposition of the I. Army the XVII. French Corps, at the time passively holding the line E. of the Meuse, and directed that, reinforced by two or three American divisions, it should be called on to gain the line Dun- sur-Meuse-Damvillers. This attack was made Oct. 7, coinci- dently with a renewed attack on the west. It was partially successful and gained an advance of 6 kilometres. By Oct. 10 the I. Army was, in general, up to the rearmost carefully pre- pared positions of the German army in this region, known as the Kriemhilde Stellung. On Oct. n Petain called for a renewal of the attack on both banks of the Meuse with the same objectives as before on the E. bank, but with the breaking of the Kriemhilde line and the capture of Buzancy as the objectives on the W. bank.

This attack was carried out on Oct. 14 and resulted in small but material gains, including the Cote Dame Marie, Cunel and Romagne-sous-Montfaucon. The troops by this time were well worn. There was no adequate replacement system and, not- withstanding the breaking-up of newly arriving divisions, it was impossible to keep units at full strength. For the remainder of the month the I. Army had of necessity to limit itself to local operations and to preparation for a systematic renewal of the offensive. On Oct. 12 the I. Army front, which had hitherto extended E. to the Moselle, was divided into two army sectors and, on the i6th, Gen. Pershing transferred the immediate command of the I. Army to Lt.-Gen. Liggett, and exercised su- pervision, as group commander, of both armies. On Oct. 21 Pershing ordered a renewal of the offensive with plans for a break-through for Oct. 28, but this attack was, on request, deferred until Nov. i to enable the IV. French Army to make plans for attacking simultaneously.

On the German side there was no lack of appreciation by either the opposing army commander or General Headquarters as to the threat which the American attack constituted. Von der Marwitz declared to his army, on Oct. i, after the first break