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Rh by the Mesopotamian treasury, and certain frontier levies, con- sisting partly of Kurds and partly of Assyrians enlisted from among the refugees. In addition there were arrangements for maintaining public security by means of a powerful air force.

The Kurdish portion of the mandated territory was (1921) in a special position. Article 62 of the Treaty of Sevres pro- vided for the elaboration of a scheme of autonomy for that part of Kurdistan which lies north of Mesopotamia, east of the Euphrates and south of Armenia; and Article 64 provided that if the Kurds in that area asked for autonomy within a year of the signature of peace with Turkey, " the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet " might declare their voluntary adhesion to that autono- mous state. Article 16 of the final draft of the mandate for Mesopotamia is in harmony with this. It declares that " noth- ing in this mandate shall prevent the mandatory from estab- lishing a system of local autonomy for predominantly Kurdish areas in Mesopotamia as he may consider suitable."

It may be convenient to summarize the arguments advanced on both sides in the discussion in 1921 as to the stability of the Meso- potamian state. The sceptical pointed to the following difficulties:

1. Lack of unity among the people of Mesopotamia. The Arabs never have agreed and never will. The Shiahs, who were formerly in a minority and repressed by the Sunni Turks and their Sunni Arab adherents, are now in the majority, and will not tolerate gov- ernment by Sunnis, while all the men with secular education and experience sufficient to qualify them for high office are Sunnis. Moreover, the Shiahs are under the influence of their mujtahids.

2. Lack of security. The Turks were not able to keep order in Mesopotamia. Can an Arab Government do what was beyond the powers of the Turks, especially now that every tribesman possesses a modern rifle?

3. Lack of funds. An Arab Government will lack the authority to collect the revenue necessary to pay the Government officials particularly the forces of law and order.

4. Possible trouble on the border, instigated or exacerbated by propaganda from outside.

To these arguments it was replied:

1. The establishment of an Arab Government and the accession of an emir will draw the Arabs of Mesopotamia together.

2. It is not proved that an Arab Government cannot maintain security, and if it were, why should an Arab Government insist on the degree of security which British officials demand? And finally, if an Arab Government can keep order not less well than the Turks did (not a high standard) they must be held to have succeeded.

3. Being content with a simpler organization than would be expected under a British administration, the Arab Government will not require a large income, and they can afford to tax lightly where as, for example, in the case of land revenue heavier taxation might rouse opposition. Probably they will depend in the main on customs dues, which provide more than half the local revenue, are relatively easy to collect, and are not resented by the taxpayer.

4. The mandatory and the people of Mesopotamia must be pre- pared for predatory raids by Kurdish tribes from over the border and Arab tribes from the desert, but with the conclusion of the out- standing treaties of peace and the gradual settling down of the world after the war little foreign intrigue is to be apprehended.

LINES or ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Contradictory views as to the possibility of agricultural and other economic development in Mesopotamia are held by author- ities. Some maintain that Mesopotamia was formerly and could be again " the granary of the world "; others that the numerous population of Babylon in the time of Herodotus lived mainly by trade and not by agriculture, and that in any case there is too little water or too much salt in the ground or too sparse a population for any considerable extension of agriculture. There are, however, some definite facts which bear upon the conclusion to be reached on this point.

Agriculture. Any considerable extension of agriculture depends on the fulfilment of one or more of the following requirements:

I. Increase of population. Before the British occupation the rate of increase was retarded by heavy child mortality, high death- rate from epidemics, and the deaths resulting from blood feuds and tribal fighting. How far these causes will operate in future depends on the ability of the Government to maintain order, to improve sani- tary conditions, and to provide medical aid. The settlement of nomads or semi-nomads is always going on, but this is an almost imperceptible process, and in any case it must be remembered that the nomad is also a source of wealth in that he breeds camels and sheep: consequently the settlement of nomads is not a net gain to

the country. There may be a slight influx of Kurds from the north, but the experience of the Erbil area during the last few decades leads one to believe that the result of such influx would merely be the displacement of the less industrious Arab cultivator. Immigra- tion from overseas is not likely to attain large proportions. The climate precludes the pursuit of agriculture by European settlers, while the immigration of Asiatics would probably be regarded with some distrust and fear by the Arabs.

2. Improvement in methods of cultivation. Much has already (1921) been done to introduce better implements of a simple kind, e.g. ploughs, to improve field drainage, to study local diseases of plants, and to secure clean barley and wheat seed. Moreover, tractors and mechanical implements have been introduced, and their work, under the auspices of the Agricultural Department, is being watched with interest by many landowners.

3. Extension of irrigation. In order to increase local food supplies and thus to economize in money and shipping, the British military authorities in 1917 formed a small Irrigation Department. It was not possible to take up large schemes, but the Hindiya barrage was kept working, miles of flood-banks were built, a canal taking off just above the barrage, which had been begun before the war, was completed and its sister canal dug; the Saqlawiya canal, which used to flood the country west of Bagdad, was brought under control by the construction of a regulator, and many old canals were cleared and made serviceable. Perhaps the most important work has been the construction of regulators at the head of some of the largest of the Tigris canals. The effect of this is not merely to save water which would be wasted in the marshes, but, by throwing more water down the river, to scour out its bed and thus facilitate navi- gation and prevent flooding.

It seemed probable in 1921 that no large schemes would be under- taken for the present, and that the limited funds available would be used mainly in carrying out a comprehensive survey which would serve as a basis for extensive irrigation schemes later.

Experiments have been made with products previously not grown at all, or grown without scientific attention. In the first category are ground-nuts and sugar-beet, in the latter cotton. It is too soon to dogmatize about Mesopotamian cotton, but the experiments of 1918-21 tend to show that it has a fairly long staple and should fetch a good price in the world market.

Mineral Wealth. Of minerals, oil occupies the attention of the world. The signs of oil in many places, from Mandali in the latitude of Bagdad to Zakho north of Mosul, and the existence of profitable wells in Persia not far from the Mesopotamian frontier, have induced in the mind of the public the belief that Mesopotamia is another Mexico for petroleum, but in 1921 there was no certain knowledge that petroleum existed in Mesopotamia in quantities to repay the cost of exploitation. Near Kifri there is a so-called coal-mine, which was worked by the Turks during the war when they had no other fuel for their steamers, but the " coal " has been pronounced by experts to be only inspissated petroleum, and has been proved in practice to be of little or no value. Bitumen is found at several places, notably Hit on the Euphrates, but it is doubtful whether the supply is more than sufficient for local needs.

Currency. The Indian currency is now in use everywhere in Mesopotamia. On account of the close trade connexions with India the rupee was well known in Basra before the war, and passed in the bazaar on equal terms with Turkish money and the Persian kran. The payment of large bills in Indian currency by the British forces caused Turkish silver and copper to disappear rapidly before the silver rupee and the Indian note. This process was repeated in every town occupied : there was a short period of hesitation, and then the replacement of the old currency by the new was effected in a few days. In the more remote parts of Mesopotamia Indian notes have usually been at a small premium, owing to the convenience of car- riage. The Turkish gold lira is still used in the bazaar sometimes for large transactions.

Banks. Before the war the only bank operating in Mesopotamia was the Imperial Ottoman Bank. In addition there are now branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Eastern Bank.

Trade. Table 2 shows in sterling, calculated on the basis of 15 rupees to the pound, the total value of imports and exports for the port of Basra for each year during the periods 1910-2 and 1917-9.

TABLE 2. Trade.

Imports

Exports

1910 1911 1912

1917 1918 1919

2,633,000 2,853,000 2,653,000 4,033,000 7,400,000 9,326,000

1,666,000 2,526,000 3,246,000 820,000 900,000 2,406,000

In addition, the figures for Bagdad, both for sea-borne trade and for trade by land, for 1919, were: Imports, 2,940,000; exports, 4,940,000.

The principal imports and exports (figures for Bagdad and Basra combined) are shown in Tables 3 and 4. In some cases figures for 1912 also are given.