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potamia may well have thought, that the proclamation was a wanton and quite uncalled-for attempt to thrust on the country a form of government for which it was totally unfitted: it was part of the Allies' general Middle Eastern policy, a policy which was defined, in the Anglo-French Declaration of Nov. 8 1918, as having for its object " the complete and definite liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establish- ment of National Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indige- nous populations." Unhappily, it is not easy, in an oriental country, to find out what the people do want. Early in 1919 an attempt was made by the British Government through the British political officers in Mesopotamia to find out what public opinion in Mesopotamia was on three questions of importance: (i) Should Mosul be included in Mesopotamia? (2) Should Mesopotamia be ruled by an Arab emir? (3) Who should be emir, if an emir was wanted?

The opinions, taken at their face value, showed that Mesopo- tamia insisted on the union of Mosul with Bagdad and Basra, and on the whole did not want an emir, at any rate for a few years, though a few individuals or groups asked that one of the sons of the Sherif of Mecca should be made emir. It is impos- sible to say how far the answers were influenced by the uni- versal desire of the East to give the reply which it is believed the questioner wants; nor can any reply, except a denial and a refer- ence to the conduct of British officials in the East in general, be given to critics who say the " plebiscite " was rigged by the political officers. On the other hand, it is easy to see the diffi- culty of introducing Western electoral systems among tribal Arabs who regard registration for whatsoever purpose as a certain preliminary to taxation or military service.

Prospects for Mesopotamia. The political future of Meso- potamia was not easy to forecast in 1921. The mandate for that country had been conferred on the Government of His Britannic Majesty by the principal Allied Powers, and a draft mandate was submitted by Mr. Balfour on Dec. 7 1920 to the Secretariat-General of the League of Nations for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations.

The idea of a mandate the issue of a sort of power of attorney by a group of states to one of their number for the administra- tion of a given country was new, and the novelty was empha- sized by the nature of the draft mandate. While entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Mesopotamia (Article 3) and authorized to maintain troops in the country (Article 2), the mandatory is bound to facilitate the progressive develop- ment of Mesopotamia as an independent state (Article i) : to see that no Mesopotamian territory shall pass under the control of the Government of any foreign Power (Article 4); to ensure freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of wor- ship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals (Article 8); to see that there is no discrimination in Mesopotamia against the nationals of any State, member of the League of Nations, as compared with the nationals of the mandatory or of any foreign State, in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft (Article n); and to secure the enactment within a year of a law of antiquities which shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all States, members of the League of Nations (Article 14). The immunities and privileges of foreign- ers, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are definitely abrogated in Mesopotamia (Article 5); but the mandatory is responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Mesopotamia shall safeguard the interests of foreigners (Article 6). To safeguard the mandatory from financial loss in the execution of the terms of the mandate Article 20 declares that, " in the event of the termination of the mandate . . . the Council of the League of Nations shall make . . . arrangements ... for securing, under the guaran- tee of the League, that the Mesopotamian Government will fully honour the financial obligations legally incurred by the

mandatory during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants or gratuities."

The Anglo-French Declaration of Nov. 8 1918 stated that it was the aim of His Majesty's Government to establish in Meso- potamia a national government and administration deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indige- nous populations; and Mesopotamia has been treated by the Allied Powers as one of those " Communities formerly belong- ing to the Turkish Empire " which " have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of adminis- trative advice and assistance by a mandatory Power until such time as they are able to stand alone " (Treaty of Versailles).

In 1921, pending the election of a constituent assembly, Meso- potamia was being governed by the High Commisioner and a provisional Arab Government over which the Naqib of Bagdad presided. There had been much discussion, both in Mesopo- tamia and in the English press, of the question of the selection of an emir for Mesopotamia. The idea, which did not appear to have been generally approved by the people of Mesopotamia early in 1919, seemed to be widely accepted by them in 1921, though there was much discussion as to the person to be chosen. Owing to the prominent part taken by the sons of the King of the Hejaz during the war, two of them, 'Abdalla and Faisal, were the favourite candidates for the Mesopotamian throne. Eventually, at the invitation of some of his supporters in Meso- potamia, Faisal came forward definitely as a candidate, and went to Mesopotamia to press his suit, and his brother 'Abdalla resigned his claim. On his arrival Faisal was given a warm reception by the people of Mesopotamia, such other candidates as there were withdrew, and the Arab Council of State, on the motion of the president (the_ Naqib of Bagdad), passed a resolu- tion declaring that Faisal should be regarded as having been chosen ruler of Iraq by acclamation provided that he would consent to rule as a constitutional, democratic sovereign. It had been intended to submit the question of the rulership to an assembly elected under a system based on the Ottoman electoral law, but, as this would have taken some months and the matter was pressing, a referendum was carried out. The result was overwhelmingly in favour of the Emir Faisal. A few extremists in Bagdad made their approval conditional on his being free from foreign influence, while the Basra people, on the contrary, promised their support only for so long as he should maintain the connexion with Great Britain; but on the whole the approval was unanimous and unconditional, and Faisal was accordingly crowned King of Iraq at Bagdad on Aug. 23 1921.

In the course of a speech made at the accession ceremony King Faisal expressed his gratitude to the British nation for its aid in the cause of Arab liberation and independence, and declared that it was from the British nation alone that they should seek help in order to reach their goal. He added: " My first task will be to proceed with the elections and the convoca- tion of the Constituent Assembly. The nation should understand that it is this Congress that will, in consultation with me, draw up the constitution of its independence, on the basis of demo- cratic government, and define the fundamental principles of political and social life. Finally it will confirm the Treaty which I shall lay before it in regard to the relations which are to exist between our Government and the great British Government."

In this fashion was inaugurated the policy described by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Winston Churchill, in his speech in the House of Commons on June 14 1921, as having for its object " to reduce our commitments and extricate ourselves from our burdens, while at the same time discharging our obligations and building up an effective Arab Government which would always be the friend of Britain." Concurrently with the political development of the Arab State, Mr. Churchill explained, there would be created and developed local military forces which would gradually replace most of the British troops. By the end of the financial year 1921-2 the British forces would be reduced to about 1 2 battalions of infantry, but there would also be the nucleus of an Arab army, maintained