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the lake intervals S.W. of Passenheim and pushed his left to Malga. Meantime Ludendorff assembled all the German forces which were successively crowded out by the concentric advance, as the nucleus of a defence group to be posted along the lakes behind the Alle, at Allenstein and at Passenheim. But the next day severely tested the strength of the ring that had been formed round the Russians. Already on Aug. 29 a part of von Francois's Corps, which was barring the exit of the forest at Rettkowen, was hard pressed by the weight of the opposing forces that were seeking an outlet, and only the arrival of Mackensen's troops from Malga enabled the gate to be closed again. On Aug. 30, another gate, N. of Muschaken, was burst open from the inside, and the Germans holding it were made prisoners. Reenforce- ments, however, arrived on the German side, and the emerging columns were pushed back again into the forest. Finally, in the night of Aug. 30-1, a desperate attempt was made to break out by way of Kannwiesen and Puchalowken, but was repulsed. But it was at all times doubtful whether the gates would hold firm, for Mackensen had been ordered to keep the bulk of his forces about Passenheim ready for action toward Allenstein if required, and the southern and south-eastern parts of the ring were in some places no more than a chain of posts. Moreover, on Aug. 30, serious Russian threats were made from outside the ring. Not only did Rennenkampf advance to the line Preuss.-Eylau- Bartenstein-Bischofsburg, with cavalry raiding nearly to Allenstein, and not only did attacks develop on Lotzen, but Ortelsburg, now in rear of Mackensen's corps, was threatened from the S.E. (no doubt, by a rallied portion of the Russian VI. Corps), and, above all, the Russian I. Corps and part of the XXIII., which had followed its retreat by Soldau, now resumed the offensive from Mlawa on Neidenburg, with the aid of parts of the newly arrived XVIII. Corps, while the Russian cavalry division farther W. again broke in behind the German disposi- tions. To meet this, von Frangois had to face S. with part of his corps, while the rest, facing N., maintained the ring of invest- ment against heavy attempts to break through from the inside; and army headquarters had to place at von Francois's disposal the forces that it was collecting for the defence of the lakes behind Allenstein. In the event, the crisis was mastered by energetic frontal attack on the head of the Russian I. Corps column, combined with an audacious threat to its left by Muhlmann's Landwehr and Ersatz from Soldau. In fact, the Russian counter- advances were not pressed with any vigour. Rennenkampf certainly, and the Mlawa force probably, had received instruc- tions to withdraw after demonstrating in aid of Samsonov, for the headquarters of the Russian "N.W. Front" (General Zhilinsky) had been informed by Samsonov on Aug. 29 of his decision to retreat, and was quite unaware of the fact that he needed assistance to enable him to do so.

On Aug. 31, all crises being past, it remained only for the Germans to complete the capture of what was left of the Russian XIII. , XV., and XXIII. Corps. As on the two previous days, the resistance of the Russians was stubborn, but there was no common action or higher leadership. Entangled in the woods, artillery and trains constantly blocked the way to the infantry, which, after making its way past them, had to attack forces of all arms unaided. Outside the forest, the Germans cut off at their leisure the long columns of transport vehicles which had headed the retiring movement. Hindenburg's victory, doubtful even as late as the afternoon of Aug. 30, was complete by the evening of Aug. 31. The Russian losses in killed and in evacuated wounded are unknown, but 92,000 wounded and unwounded prisoners, 300 guns and immense numbers of vehicles and stores remained in the hands of the Germans. General Samsonov, after wandering in the forest in search of a way of escape, broke up his staff, and, left alone, shot himself.

II. BATTLE or THE MASURIAN LAKES, OR ANGERBURG

During the battle of Tannenberg the Russian I. Army had advanced to within a menacingly close distance. On Aug. 28, and again on Aug. 29, the German VIII. Army headquarters had almost given up the effort of encirclement in order to form

a northward and north-eastward front against Rennenkampf; and as soon as the victory was complete, no time was lost prepar- ing to take the offensive, both with the strategical object of gaining a free hand for a campaign into Poland in concert with the Austrians, and with the political object of freeing East Prussia from hostile occupation. Reenforced by two corps (Guard Res. and XI.) and a cav. div. (8th Saxon) from the western theatre, Ludendorff planned to attack Rennenkampf as soon as the new corps had detrained and those engaged in the ring of Tannenberg had been sorted out. This process took some time. The defensive group that was being formed to face Rennen- kampf on Aug. 29-30 had to be dissolved again so as to reenforce von Francois against the counter-attacks on Aug. 30 from the S., and to secure Mackensen's rear, threatened on that day at Ortelsburg. Thus, at the close of the battle of Tannenberg, the VIII. Army had to be completely regrouped before any part of it, except the I. Res. Corps, could engage Rennenkampf. But even on Aug. 31, before the end of the battle, there were indica- tions that Rennenkampf's forward movement had been given up.

The Russian general had, in fact, advanced half his army against Konigsberg and only two corps and three cav. divs. into the open country S.W. of Insterburg-Angerburg. One of these corps (the IV.) had advanced on a comparatively narrow front and reached Preuss.-Eylau and Bartenstein, while the other (the II.) from Angerburg had made a feeble attack on Lotzen with one brigade and advanced to the line Bartenstein-Bischofstein with the other three. The XX. Corps, on the Deime, N. of the Pregel, and the III. Corps on the lower Alle S. of it, had allowed themselves to be imposed on by local activity of the Konigsberg Landwehr and Ersatz forces. The three cav. divs. working with the II. and IV. Corps had raided as far as Wormditt, nearly to Allenstein, and to Sensburg, but without doing serious damage to the road and railway system. Behind the front, res. divs. were coming up to set free the XX. and III. Corps, from the Konigsberg front, and eventually to besiege that fortress. Other forces, both active and reserve, were assembEng at Grajevo, and skirmishing was in progress between Russian light forces in this region and a detachment of East Prussian Land- sturm at Ruvezanny and Johannisburg under Col. Bacmeister, which, like the Lotzen force, had remained in its own area undis- turbed during the Gumbinnen and Tannenberg operations. On Aug. 27 Rennenkampf was informed that troops hitherto in front of him had been identified at Gelgenburg and Bischofsburg and Soldau, and he was instructed to help Samsonov by pushing his left wing as near to Bartenstein as possible, his cavalry towards Bischofsburg and the II. Corps towards Passenheim. On Aug. 29 he was ordered to send two corps to meet Samsonov, who was heavily engaged (in reality, practically encircled), and cavalry to' Allenstein. But almost immediately this last order was cancelled, as the II. Army was understood at Zhilinsky's headquarters to be retreating. Rennenkampf thereupon drew back on Aug. 30-1 to the line Lower Alle-Allenburg-Gerdanen- Drengfurt. After some discussion between the chiefs of staff of the I. Army and of the N.W. front, Rennenkampf decided to make a stand on the line Wehlau-Deime-Ottenburg-Gerdanen- Nordenburg-Lake Mauer, so as not to enhance still further the crushing moral effect of Tannenberg. But he had no intention of allowing himself to be cut off in this position; and to secure his left flank he ordered a considerable part of the II. Corps to attack Lotzen. This order, executed in the usual tardy fashion, led to nothing, but the forces thus gathered in front of Lotzen proved, as will be seen, a fatal obstacle to the full realization of the German plan.

This plan was, in sum, a strong frontal attack by the left wing and centre of a long, deployed array, while the right wing broke out through the Masurian lakes at Lotzen, Arys and Johannisburg, against the left and rear of the Russians. The newly arrived Guard Res. and XI. Corps, and the I. Res. Corps, with the 6th Landwehr Bde., formed the left wing in the region N. of Allenstein, the XX. Corps the centre about Allenstein, the XVII. Corps and the I. Corps with the 3rd Res. Div. the right at Passenheim and Willenberg. On the extreme left, the