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der Goltz's half-detrained division at Biesselen) was eminently possible, and could hardly fail to be disastrous to the Germans. Meantime 4^ German divs., pursuing the relics of two Russian divs. southward, had advanced to the region N. of Passenheim and of Ortelsburg, so far separated from the main body of the VIII. Army that liaison was maintained by aeroplane. It seemed that they, like von Francois, were missing the moment of wheeling-in for envelopment, and drawing off eccentrically. And on this day news came that Rennenkampf was at last begin- ning to advance from Insterburg-Angerburg. Already his cavalry was ranging the country behind Mackensen and Below; the Russian II. Corps from Angerburg was moving on Gerdanen, with a detachment in advance, threatening Lotzen from the rear; the IV. Corps on Friedland and Allenburg, and two others on Konigsberg. Against such an advance as that of 4 cav. divs. and 4 inf. divs. to consider only the troops S. of the Pregel the two cav. bdes. of the German ist Cav. Div. and the Lotzen Landsturm could not be expected to offer more than a trifling resistance. But if the situation of the Germans was critical, there was still the possibility, and even the necessity, of attempting the " Cannae " with the principal effort of encircle- ment made by the corps in the N. instead of by von Francois. The threatened westward movement of the Russian XIII. Corps could itself be taken in rear by bringing in the I. Res. Corps, while von Mackensen could close some, and von Francois, by an eastward extension of his left, others, of the routes behind Samsonov's XV. and XXIII. Corps. In any event some such movements were necessary if the two separated parts of the VIII. Army were to be got together, whether for offence or for defence. The crux of the problem lay in the direction to be given to von Mackensen whether he was to continue southward and join hands with von Francois, forming the ring round the whole of Samsonov's army, or to bear up north-westward, behind the I. Res. Corps, and re-form N. or E. of Allenstein, ready either to cooperate in Below's envelopment of part of the Russians or to stave off Rennenkampf's advance on the Alle. In truth, this problem was too difficult for a definitive solution, and thus we find that Mackensen spent Aug. 28, first in marching from Passenheim to E. of Allenstein, and then in marching back, no doubt under successive instructions from headquarters.

The battle of Aug. 28, like that of Aug. 27, presented changing situations. As the Germans expected, the Russian XIII. Corps wheeled in from Allenstein, to cooperate with the XV. at {lohenstein, but, having been for days out of touch with the VI. Corps, and therefore ignorant of its rout, it assumed certain troops (Below's) seen to the N. of Wartenburg to be that corps moving on Allenstein. Thereupon, giving up the westerly direc- tion to its supposed comrades, it turned sharp S.S.W. to assist the XIII. Corps more directly. If any particular moment can be fixed as the turning-point of the battle it is this, for it com- pleted the confusion at Hohenstein. West of that point, on the morning of Aug. 28, Morgen's 3rd Res. Div. had advanced from the Jablonken Forest to the attack of the Russian XV. Corps without waiting for support from the 37th Div. on its left or Unger's men on the right. It had driven the defenders into the W. side of Hohenstein at the same time as von der Goltz's Landwehr Div., detrained on the previous day, entered it from the north. To right and left of Morgen, the 37th Div. and Unger were soon heavily engaged and advancing generally eastward. To the S. of the Muhlen See the German 4ist Div., attacking alone on the front which had previously been that of the whole XX. Corps, was repulsed by the Russians posted at Waplitz and S. of it. The fight was already extremely involved when on the rear of von der Goltz came the leading bds. of the Russian XIII. Corps. But, while for the German command there was nothing to do but to " wait for Below as Wellington waited for Bliicher at Waterloo," as a German staff officer has put it, the Russian/ leaders were in reality in the worse position. They were out of touch with each other and with Samsonov. The commander of the XIII. Corps would not promise his companion of the XV. the arrival of his whole corps at Hohenstein in less than 24 hours, and the advanced brigade above mentioned,

involved in fighting with the German 37th Div. as well as with von der Goltz, lost its way in the woods, units opening fire upon each other, and finally broke away in panic. In the evening, the perplexed commander of the XIII. Corps found Below on his flank and rear, and came to a standstill. The XV. Corps com- mander had already, after the ruin of the XIII. Corps, decided that he could not continue this offensive till the intervention of the rest of that corps next day, and made up his mind to retreat while his left was still protected by the Waplitz forces. And, late in the evening, both the XIII. and XV. Corps received orders from Samsonov to retreat at once. The German ring was now rapidly forming itself. Not only had Mackensen, when drawing off to the Alle as ordered, taken the precaution of leaving de- tachments at Passenheim and S. of Mensguth, but, above all, the German I. Corps had arrived at Neidenburg, and its advanced troops were well on the way to Willenberg.

At the outset of the battle before Soldau which von Frangois had projected for Aug. 28, the Germans realized that little effort was necessary for the capture of that town ; and Schmettau's detachment on the left of the southward-facing line was pushed westward on Neidenburg, preceded by cavalry, which, passing round Neidenburg by the S., made havoc amongst the trains and convoys of the enemy on the Willenberg-Chorzele road. Soldau was captured about 10 A.M., and leaving Miihlmann to guard it von Francois pushed his ist Div. after Schmettau. Shortly afterwards he received orders to move his 2nd Div. on Rontzgen to relieve pressure on the retiring 4ist Div., and this order was soon supplemented by one of general pursuit in the Lahna direction. By evening the corps was beginning to reap a great harvest of prisoners, guns and trains.

Before these events were fully known at the headquarters of the VIII. Army, the German commander seems, for a moment, to have given up hope of bringing about a great encirclement. The Supreme Command was notified that the victory was won, but that it was improbable that the "boxing-in" (Einkessdung) of the two northern corps of the enemy would succeed, and army orders for Aug. 29, issued at 5 :3O P.M. from Tannenberg, directed a general pursuit eastward by the troops of the XX. Corps and I. Corps, while Mackensen, instead of closing the avenues of escape, was again to march off to the Alle, which he was to occupy between Guttstadt and Allenstein. The 3rd Res. Div. and the two bodies of Landwehr fighting in the Hohenstein area were to fall out of the pursuit and assemble in readiness for other employment. For Rennenkampf, heralded by his cavalry, was at last really on the move. Later in the evening, however, it became apparent that the two northerly Russian corps had not yet made off. Below's divisions, swerving S.S.W. before reaching Allenstein, came upon rear-guards of the XIII. Corps atZaszdrocz and Thomsdorf, and enforced a stand. The opportunity of boxing-in was seen to be still open; and, taking the risk of ignoring Rennenkampf for yet another day, Hindenburg and Ludendorff issued new instructions, bringing Mackensen's corps back again to the eastern gates of the Russian lines of retreat, and stimulating von Francois to a farther advance. Driving inward, the I. Corps, on Jedwabno and Willenberg, and the XVII., on Malga and Kannwiesen, were to attack both flanks of whatever forces were retiring through the forests S. of Passen- heim, and, if possible, to join hands and to close the ring. Meantime the I. Res. and XX. Corps, von der Goltz, Morgen and Unger were to continue the now concentric effort against the Russians between Thomsdorf, Hohenstein, and Wuttrienen, and especially to master the lake defiles E.S.E. of Hohenstein. These orders did not reach their destinations till Aug. 29; but the corps commanders were already in substance carrying them out, and, in particular, Mackensen had not begun to draw away to the Alle.

In the battle of Aug. 29 the envelopment became definitely tactical. On three sides German regiments and battalions pressed the retreating and now greatly disordered XIII., XV. and XXIII. Corps in the dense country lying between Hohenstein and Passenheim. Von Francois posted part of his forces at the forest outlets about Muschaken and pressed on his westernmost troops towards Jedwabno and Willenberg. Mackensen barred