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lommiers-Montmirail-Chateau-Thierry. In this great pocket Gen. von Kluck's soldiers were fighting desperately to hold off the converging attack of their opponents; while, on the side of the Allies, the French VI. Army, the British army and the French V. Army were struggling to nip the German I. Army from the main body of the enemy.

The fighting on the Ourcq on Sept. 7 was, therefore, to be hard and bitter. Each of the opposing commanders had special reasons for vigorous attack. On the French side Gen. Maunoury had rather overestimated the success, reported to him, of the V. Army of Gen. Franchet d'Esperey, and was inclined, in conse- quence, to believe that the Germans might fight merely a delaying action on the Ourcq. As a matter of fact the exact contrary was the case. Gen. von Kluck clearly realized that not only his task of safeguarding the right of the whole German advance but even the preservation of his own army depended on hurling back the attack launched from the direction of Paris. By an order issued at 5:30 P.M. on the 6th the IV. Corps was withdrawn across the Marne and hurried on through the night to reinforce the new front. Thus on the morning of Sept. 7 the II. Corps, the IV. Reserve Corps (still minus a brigade left at Brussels) and the IV. Corps stood between the Therouane and the Gergogne (a tributary of the Ourcq), with their units inter- mingled, and covered on the N. by the 4th Cavalry Div. The original right flank had thus been strongly reinforced, but Gen. von Kluck felt that it was no time for half measures. Even at the cost of weakening himself elsewhere, even at the risk of creating a gap between his own and the II. Army, every man must be thrown upon the Ourcq. Merely to repulse the attack from Paris would not be sufficient; the French VI. Army must be defeated by an outflanking counter attack from the N., and accordingly the IX. and III. Corps were ordered to march early on the forenoon of the 7th in the direction of La Ferte-Milon- Crouy. These corps had, only the night before, been lent to Gen. von Billow, but the II. Army commander had now perforce to send them off, though not without a protest. The effect of his action was that a gap, soon to yawn into 30 m., was opened between the I. and II. Armies, and into this gap the British army and the left of the French V. Army were rapidly moving. Gen. von Kluck now found himself committed to an isolated battle on the Ourcq, facing W. and with his left and rear exposed. Unless he could hold off Sir John French and Gen. Franchet d'Esperey sufficiently long to enable him to crush the French VI. Army and could then turn against the danger to his left and rear he was a beaten general. The task, however, was to prove too great. He had not the time necessary for the opera- tion, and even if he had he had not the men for it.

So far as the actual fighting of the day is concerned the bulk of it fell upon the French VI. Army. Gen. Maunoury's left flank had been reinforced by Gen. Sordet's cavalry corps as well as by the 6ist Reserve Div., which had been railed from Paris. At dawn the army was set in motion, and at first some progress was made, but gradually the weight of the reinforce- ments reaching the Germans began to tell. The II. and IV. Corps had now become available, and the various divisions had been thrown into the fight as they arrived, without regard to corps organization. Strong enemy columns debouched near Etavigny and Acy-en-Multien, and at the latter village the fighting was especially severe. As has so often happened on French battlefields the cemetery was the scene of desper- ate fighting, 500 dead being subsequently counted within an area of little more than 200 sq. yd. Around the farm of Nogeon, too about half-way between Vinoy and Bouoilancy the battle raged with particular fierceness, and the buildings changed hands several times throughout the day. Here a body of the French 2p8th Regt. fell to the last man, preferring death to surrender. Two companies of the same regiment after dark avenged the loss of their comrades by a desperate hand-to-hand attack, in which they captured a colour of the 38th Magdeburg Fusiliers decorated with the Iron Cross. After a day of hard fighting the French VI. Army had made some further progress, and its front ran generally from Chambry through Barcy,

Marcilly, the high ground N.W. of Brunoy, Pusieux, Acy-en- Multien to the hill W. of Etavigny. The moral of the French facing the Ourcq at the close of Sept. 7 was high, and Gen. Maunoury determined to outflank Gen. von Kluck's right wing early next day with the I. Cavalry Corps and the 6ist Div. As the German army commander was committed to a similar attempt to outflank the VI. Army's left the centre of gravity of the fighting in the western sector of the whole Marne battle was now unmistakably shifting to the neighbourhood of Betz.

The reinforcements hurried off to strengthen the German line upon the Ourcq had now left a comparatively small force to withstand the British. The task of holding back the army of Sir John French was now being carried out mainly by German cav- alry, reinforced, as was the German custom, by Jager battalions. In Gen. Joffre's initial orders for the battle the direction assigned for the advance of the British army had been practically due E., but the course of the battle since its opening necessitated a change in the original instructions. The French generalissimo had apparently visualized either a continuation of the German advance S. and S.E., or in the event of a suspension of that operation a withdrawal of the German I. Army towards the E.; but Gen. von Kluck had on the contrary shown every inten- tion of pushing westwards so as to beat back the French VI. Army. In these circumstances it was clear that a more northerly advance would bring the British quickly on Gen. von Kluck's communications, and the necessary change was decided upon by the two Allied commanders. Orders were consequently issued by Sir John French directing the march upon the Grand Morin river, which was to be passed with all possible speed upon the 7th.

The British cavalry acted everywhere with great vigour, particularly on the right of the line where the 2nd Caval- ry Brigade was operating beyond Dagny. At Moncel a spir- ited cavalry action took place, and a charge by a troop and a half of the pth Lancers effectually dealt with a squadron of Guard Dragoons, the fate of the latter being sealed by dis- mounted-fire action of the i8th Hussars. Later a squadron of the i8th, holding a position dismounted, was charged by a German squadron, but by well-directed rifle fire the attackers were almost annihilated. A few passed through the firing-line but were accounted for by the horse-holders in rear. Thirty-two dead and wounded Germans were counted on the ground in front of the squadron, and of the 60 or 70 who charged not more than a dozen escaped. By evening the bulk of the German cavalry had fallen back to the Petit Morin, S.E. of La Ferte- sous-Jouarre, and the British position was roughly as follows: on the left was the III. Corps about La Haute Maison; the II. Corps, in the centre, was round Aulnoy; and on the right flank the I. Corps lay about Chailly and Jouy-sur-Morin.

The French V. Army, no less than the British, felt the relax- ation of pressure on its front caused by the withdrawal of German, troops across the Marne, and the task of its left and centre was really one of pursuit, which was carried out in the general direc- tion of Montmirail. The Germans held their ground stoutly, but finally the XVIII. and III. Corps were able to reach the general line La Ferte Gaucher-Trefols, which represented a gain of some six miles of ground. Farther to the right the fight- ing had been considerably more severe, for about noon Gen. Franchet d'Esnerey had received word from Gen. Foch that the- left of his (IX.) army was being violently attacked and was in sore need of assistance. The I. and X. Corps were, therefore, directed to go to the assistance of Gen. Foch.

By the evening of Sept. 7 the original orders of Gen. Joffre " pour profiler de la situation avcnluree de la I. Armee allemande " were three days old, but that army was still in being and fighting tenaciously. Further, the geographical objectives alluded to by the French generalissimo were far from having been reached. The French VI. Army was to force the passage of the Ourcq and then to advance en direction generate de Chateau-Thierry; while the British army was to attack towards Montmirail. But by the evening of the 7th the passage of the Ourcq had still to be accomplished, and until that preliminary step had been taken Chateau- Thierry and Montmirail were mere names. A some-