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838 The Manchester Ship Canal, on which the capital expended has been 17,084,110, was not able to pay a dividend on ordinary shares until 1915. The port was extended in 1912-3 at Trafford Park and elsewhere on the canal, and seed-crushing was undertaken at Partington.

During the World War Manchester's energies were devoted to recruiting, war charities, war loan campaigns and not unprofitable munitions work. At the general election (1918) Manchester, with 10 Parliamentary seats, for the first time in its history returned no Liberal candidate. Subsequent to the war there were six months of trade depression, followed by a boom period and a slump (1920). Several serious trade disputes occurred, one of the most interesting in its effects being the printers' strike (Aug.-Sept. 1920) during which the local newspapers appeared as typewritten bulletins. In 1921 were celebrated the centenary of the Manchester Guardian and the quincentenary of the Manchester cathedral. (E. A.*) MANCHURIA (see 17.552). By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which concluded the Russo-Japanese War (Sept. 5 1905), both the signatory Powers agreed to evacuate Manchuria and to restore China's unfettered administration throughout its three provinces, with the exception of the Liaotung peninsula, the lease of which was transferred, with China's subsequent consent, to Japan. Russia also ceded to Japan the southern section of the Manchurian railway, from Dalny to Changchun (514 m.), retaining the section from Changchun northwards to Harbin. The sovereignty of China and the " open door " were expressly recognized by this treaty.

With a view to the development of commerce and industry, which Russia and Japan had pledged themselves not to obstruct, the Chinese Government proceeded in 1908 to enlist the support of British and American capital for the construction of railways in Manchuria. After prolonged negotiations, a preliminary con- tract was signed, in Oct. 1909, for the construction of a trunk line from Chinchou to Aigun; but, in the meanwhile, Russia and Japan had come to a definite understanding for the protection and advancement of their respective " special interests " in northern and southern Manchuria. The American State Depart- ment's proposals for the " neutralization " of the Manchurian railways (Nov. 1909) brought Russia and Japan more closely together, and on July 4 1910 an agreement was concluded be- tween them, which in its operation materially infringed China's sovereign rights in Manchuria and Mongolia, and violated the principle of the " open door." A joint protest against the con- clusion of the Chinchou-Aigun railway agreement was addressed to the Chinese Government by the Russian and Japanese minis- ters at Peking, and the project, like that of the British loan agreement for a line from Hsinmintun to Fakumen, was sub- sequently abandoned. Later in 1910 an agreement concluded by the " Four Nations " Consortium, to finance the development of Manchuria, was blocked by Russia and Japan until their participation therein had been conceded, under conditions which secured to them continuance of their privileged position.

As early as Dec. 1905, the claims advanced by the Japanese Government, in negotiating at Peking the treaty wherein China perforce concurred in the arrangements of the Portsmouth Treaty, had given evidence of an intention not only to insist upon the reversion of all the undefined rights, privileges and concessions formerly held by Russia in South Manchuria, but also to extend the limits of Japan's " sphere of influence " in that region. By this treaty, concluded with China in Dec. 1905, Japan obtained, inter alia, the right to build and finance a railway from Mukden to Antung on the Korean frontier, and to undertake the con- struction of lines from Hsinmintun to Mukden and from Chang- chun to Kirin. By the beginning of 1911, the " peaceful penetra- tion " of Manchuria and Mongolia was proceeding steadily and under conditions generally similar to those which had characterized Russia's forward policy from 1898 to 1905.

In 1912 the railway from Changchun to Kirin was opened to traffic. In May 1915, by the terms of a new treaty concluded by China as the result of the Japanese ultimatum accompanying the " 21 demands," the lease of the South Manchurian railway was extended to 99 years (i.e. to 1997), and that of the Antung-Mukden line to A.D. 2007. By the same treaty Japanese subjects became entitled to lease land for trade, manufactures and agricultural purposes, and to reside and travel freely in South Manchuria. In 1917 the whole of the railway system of Korea was linked up with the South Manchurian railway and placed under its administration.

Under these conditions the activities and influence of the railway rapidly became dominant factors in the economic life of Manchuria. Controlling numerous branch lines, owning its own coal-mines and a fleet of chartered steamers, possessing some 50,000 ac. of land adja- cent to the railway line and independent powers of administration within the territory of the railway zone, its business naturally expanded with great rapidity. In 1913 the company carried 4,143,687 passengers and 5,782,161 tons of freight, as compared with 1,888,140 passengers and 2,609,036 tons of freight in 1908.

In Dec. 1915 a loan agreement was signed between the Chinese and Japanese Governments for the construction of a railway from Ssupingkai (120 m. N. of Mukden) to Liaoyuanchow in Mongolia; this line was completed in Dec. 1917. In Oct. 1917 a revision of the Changchun-Kirin loan agreement was concluded between the Chinese Government and the South Manchurian Railway Co., the result being a loan of 6^ million yen for a term of 30 years, during which period the management of the line is vested m the South Manchurian railway, on behalf of the Chinese Government. At the same time a loan of 50 million yen was issued by the Industrial Bank of Japan for four new railways in Manchuria and Mongolia.

The disorganization of the central Government in China and the collapse of Russia after 1917 served to increase the economic, financial and political ascendancy of Japan in Manchuria. As the result of a special mission sent by the Japanese Government to Washington in 1917, an exchange of Notes took place between Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii, in which the United States recognized that " Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous." The precise significance of the term " special interests " was unde- fined. As the result, however, of the negotiations initiated by the United States in July 1918, for the establishment of a four- Power consortium to cooperate in Chinese finance, and of the subsequent pourparlers between the British and Japanese Govern- ments on the same subject, the latter finally agreed (May 10 1920) to withdraw the claims, previously put forward by the Japanese bankers, to exclude from the scope of the Consortium " all the rights and options held by Japan in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia where Japan has special interests." The position adopted alike by the British, French and American Governments in regard to this question was based on the ground that Manchuria is an integral part of China, and on the desir- ability of eliminating all spheres of influence together with their special claims to industrial preference. The Japanese Govern- ment, in modifying its general claims and withdrawing its par- ticular reservation of certain railways from the scope of the Consortium's operations, placed it on record that it did so because of the British Government's repeated assurance that the Consor- tium would not " direct any activities affecting the security of the economic life and national defence of Japan, and that the Japanese Government might firmly rely upon the good faith of the Powers concerned to refuse to countenance any operations in- imical to such interests." The whole question came up for further inquiry at the Washington Conference at the close of 1921.

The economic progress achieved in Manchuria had been very rapid since 1912, and much of the expansion of its trade and industries must undoubtedly be ascribed to the enterprise shown by the Japanese in the development of mines, forestry and agriculture, and in the provision of improved transport, communications and currency.

The accompanying figures not only show the rapid increase of South Manchuria's trade, but they reflect the effects of the Russian debacle upon the commerce of the northern province.

There are five Chinese Customs collecting stations m Northern Manchuria, namely: Aigun, Sansing, Manchouli, Harbin and Sui- fenho. In South Manchuria, there are six, namely: Hunchun, Lungchingtsun, Tatungkow, Antung, Newchwang and Dairen (Dalny). The greater part of the trade of the whole country passes through the last named, which now ranks second only to Shanghai in the list of China's maritime ports; in 1908 it occupied the 42nd place. In 1918 56% of all Manchurian imports and 69% of all exports were handled at Dalny ; it is also of interest to note that in 1917 Japan's share of the foreign trade of the four principal South Manchurian ports amounted to 123 millions out of a total of 157 million taels. The Chinese Customs trade report for 1919, comment- ing on Manchurian affairs, observes that America and Europe will probably continue to purchase Chinese goods through Japan, owing to the greater freight facilities afforded in that country and to the fact that Japanese currency is less liable to fluctuation. In 1908 the trade of Manchuria represented 11-5% of China's total; in 1918 the proportion had risen to 16-8%. The chief source of the provinces'