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command was to take place. The German Command, which since the beginning of June had sent 16 divs. and numerous higher staffs to the support of the front S. of the Pripet, urgently demanded an increased influence on the conduct of operations on that front, controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Com- mand. Already German troops were fighting on all parts of the front, except with the II. Army; and German groups and corps commands were now systematically pushed in where German troops were placed, the intermediate and adjacent Austro- Hungarian formations being put under their command. It is undeniable that, by interspersing German troops and commands in this manner on the Austrian eastern front, which was at that time badly battered, no mean increase in the power of resistance was obtained. But these measures 'also produced an increase of the influence which the German General Staff arrogated to itself in the conduct of the war.

x In order to bring about a fundamental improvement in the position S. of the Dniester, which was going from bad to worse, the two Supreme Commands proposed to deliver a counter- attack on a grand scale on both sides of the river in a south- easterly direction. For this purpose a new army the Austro- Hungarian XII. was to be formed from the troops of the inner wings of the VII. and South Armies and the new divisions now being brought up by train. It was to be under the command of the Archduke Karl Franz Josef to whom General von Seecket was appointed chief-of-staff. But since the incoming troops had always to be thrown into the battle as soon as they detrained, the formation of this army never took effect. On the other hand, the section of the former VII. Army lying between the Jablonica Pass and the Dniester was handed over, as the " III. Army," to the III. Army Command (Generaloberst von Kb'vess), which was on the way by train from Tirol. Archduke Karl was made commander of an " Army Front " consisting of the VII., III. and South Armies. This new distribution came into effect on July 20. Another result of the agreement reached by the two general staffs was the appointment of Gen. Field-Marshal von Hinden- burg to the supreme command of all the remainder of the eastern front, i.e. from Riga up to and inclusive of the II. Austro-Hun- garian Army. He took over the command on Aug. 30, with Brest Litovsk as headquarters. The German Command decided fur- ther to give the 2nd Jager Bde., now brought up to divisional strength and known as the " Carpathian Corps " (later as the zooth Inf. Div.), to the VII. Army, so as to enable this army to take the offensive, believing that the anticipated success would in the end dissuade Rumania from abandoning her neutrality. The Austro-Hungarian Higher Command on the other hand transferred the Austro-Hungarian 6ist Inf. Div. (worn out as it was) from Marwitz's group, and the nth Honved Cav. Div. from Hauer's Cav. Corps, to northern Transylvania, since, from reliable information received, it appeared that Rumania's inter- vention on the side of the Entente would have to be reckoned with before August was out.

Battles at Monasterzyska and in the Carpathians. In the meantime Brussilov had persisted in his mass attacks, regardless of enormous losses. Undeterred by the reverse suffered on July 7, Shcherbachev again attacked the inner wings of the XIII. and VI. Corps between the Koropiec brook and the Strypa with his II. and XVI. Corps, on July 12-13. He succeeded on the two days in breaking through the Austro-Hungarian izth Inf. Div. and German ist Res. Div. in turn, but the two divisions, each supporting the other with its own reserves, succeeded in ejecting the Russians from their positions again. Against emergencies, however, the main body of the German losth Inf. Div. was transferred from the area S. of the Dniester to the South Army.

The Russians now brought up fresh forces (nth and 82nd Inf. Divs.) to the Carpathian front, and by dogged mountain fighting forced the 8th Cav. Div. which had to give up the commanding Chomiak height back on to the wall of the Jablonica Pass, and defeated the 3rd Cav. Div. in the battle of the Ludowa massif, driving it back also to the frontier heights. About the headwaters of the White Czeremos, Russian detachments had already ad- vanced over the crest line in the direction of the Visso valley, but

were stopped in front of Borsa by the newly arrived 34th Inf. Div. which with one of its brigades pushed the Russians back on to the N. slope of the mountains, while the other brigade relieved the exhausted 8th Cav. Div. at the Jablonica Pass. Farther E. the Russians strove to wrest the pass at Kilibaba, which com- manded the Caput height, from the left wing of the XI. Corps, but without success.

Battles on the Lipa and at Beresteczko. The first attacks exe- cuted by von der Marwitz's group on July 10 and u, which were designed to screen the shifting of troops to the Stochod front, attracted the attention of the XI. Russian Army (Sakharov). This army had been comparatively inactive since the middle of June, and was now selected by Brussilov to deliver fresh blows against the centre of the battle-front.

In the night of July 15-16 a powerful assault by the V. Si- berian Corps and the VIII. Corps threw back the centre of Marwitz's group to Zwiniacze. Since a counter-attack made by 9 German battalions failed to restore the situation, Marwitz was obliged to bring back his far-advanced right wing behind the Lipa also. For the same reason the bridgehead at Werben, on the E. bank of the Styr, which was still held, had to be evacuated, for though all attacks against it on July 16 were repulsed, no operation E. of the Styr could be contemplated in view of the general situation. As Marwitz considered his right wing, now behind the Lipa and the Styr, to be adequately secured, he shifted two divisions the 22nd and 43rd Inf. Divs. which seemed to him not there indispensable, to his left wing at Goro- chow, where he feared the Russians would launch fresh attacks.

The Russians now extended the violent artillery fire which they had maintained against Marwitz's group for some days as far as to the S.E. of Beresteczko. On July 18 they undertook a demonstrative attack against the 25th Austro-Hungarian Div. N. of Brody, and on July 20, after crossing the Styr at Werben, directed a powerful blow by their XXXII. Corps S. of the Lipa against the 46th and 7th Divs. This blow so strongly affected these divisions that, in spite of a counter-attack undertaken by 6 batts. of the army reserve, they were unable to hold their ground on the new line Beresteczko-Smolaiva, as was intended by the Army Command. The whole front of the I. Army had to be withdrawn to the line Beresteczko-Leszniow-Siestratyn. But Marwitz had again to surrender his reserves the 48th Austro- Hungarian Div. and 3 batts. each of the German 22nd and 43rd Res. Divs. to the I. Army in the area S. of the Lipa. The II. Army also transferred half of the 33rd Austro-Hungarian Div. to Radzicchow behind Puhallo's Army. This part of the front was now thought to have sufficient support, and it was hoped that there would be quiet for a time.

Battle of Brody. Brussilov, however, continued his assaults against the centre of the allied front opposite him without inter- mittance. His immediate objective was Brody. On July 24th the Russian XXXII. Corps, which had been shifted to the S., attacked the 25th Austro-Hungarian Div. at Leszniow, and pressed it back several kilometres, together with the adjacent 33rd Austro-Hungarian Div. N. of it. In the following night the Russian XVI. Corps, next in line to the XXXII. Corps on the S., attacked the N. wing of the II. Army and forced it back to a prepared position on the frontier of the Dual Monarchy.

To ensure unity of command in the Brody area, the Austro- Hungarian XVIII. Corps was placed under the II. Army Com- mand, but the troops of the I. Army standing W. of the Styr were put under the command of Linsingen's group of armies, as Lt.- Gen. von Dieffenbach's group, and the I. Army Command was dissolved. The Austrian io6th Landsturm Inf. Div. arrived in the Brody area from the Italian theatre of war, while the German loth Landwehr Div. was coming up by train by way of Lemberg, the latter, however, being short of one regiment left in the zone of the IV. Army, where comprehensive Russian attack prepara- tions had been discerned.

On July 26 Sakharov renewed his violent attacks between the Styr and Radziwilow with directions towards Brody. Difficult and changeful fighting ensued, in which portions of the io6th Landsturm Inf. Div., just detrained, took part with success.