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fighting front, and the Army Higher Command was therefore compelled to dispatch the two divisions (German ic>5th from Macedonia and Austro-Hungarian 48th from the Isonzo) origi- nally intended for Marwitz's attack-group to back up the S. wing of Bothmer's Army.

Counter- Attacks on Luck. As a result of the diversion of these two divisions the allies had no longer forces enough to carry out the flank blow planned on the right of the Kowel-Luck road. It was therefore decided to deliver a concentric attack in the general direction of Luck. The following were to take part : the N. wing of the I. Army (now also brought under Linsingen's command), with the 7th and 6ist Inf. Divs. and Ostermuth's (later Leon- hardi's) Cav. Corps, advancing from the Lipa brook to the N.E. ; the IV. Army in an easterly direction; Marwitz's group (German X. Corps, German io8th Inf. Div., and Austro-Hungarian zgth Inf. Div.), and Bernhardi's Corps with the combined infantry division Rusche and half of the 4$th Schvitzen Div., in a south- easterly direction; and the II. Corps on both sides of the Styr. This broadly conceived attack was to begin on June 16.

On June 15 the I. Army suffered another reverse. The N. wing of the Russian XI. Army (XXXII. Corps) drove back the 25th and parts of the 46th Div. at Rudnia on the Brody-Dubno railway. As there were no forces available for a counter-attack the N. wing of the Austro-Hungarian II. Army (Kosak's Corps) and the S. wing of the I. Army (XVIII. Corps) had to be with- drawn generally to the frontier between Lopuszno-Radzievilow- Beresteczko.

The offensive against Luck, on which the allies had set all their hopes, did not go well. The I. Army's N. wing had indeed suc- ceeded in reaching the N. bank of the Lipa and pushing on to Swiniuchy on June 16-17; the sparsely filled-up divisions of the IV. Army had pushed forward to the E. of Lokaczy and Wojmica; and Marwitz's group had gained ground W. of Kisielin, in spite of fierce Russian opposition. But Bernhardi was forced back to the N. bank of the Stochod by heavy counter-attacks, and, when the Russians again began to press the I. Army's S. wing, the I. Army Command had no choice but to fetch back the 7th Inf. Div. (which had just succeeded in crossing the Lipa) to the S. bank, and place it behind the threatened 46th Division. As regards the II. Corps, there could be no question of crossing the Styr, and it was obliged like Fath's Corps to devote its whole strength to warding off the continuous attempts of the Russians to cross at Gruziatyn and Kolki.

Only on June 21 did Linsingen's group of armies resume the attack, after a new attack-group had been formed on its right wing under General von Falkenhayn. This group consisted of the 6ist Inf. Div., Leonhardi's Cav. Corps, the newly arrived German 4$rd Res. Div., and the Austro-Hungarian 48th Inf. Div. brought by train from the South Army. The N. wing had also to be reinforced by the nth Bavarian Inf. Div. on account of the arrival of fresh Russian forces. Falkenhayn's blow gained ground up to the line Zwiniacze-Bubnowa, whereupon the Russians fell back also in front of the IV. Army, so that the latter was able to follow up to the Sadowa height. Marwitz broke through three positions by means of vigorous attacks, though constantly checked by Russian counter-assaults, but found himself con- fronted, just W. of Zaturcy, with a new Russian line of resistance. Meanwhile Bernhardi had difficulty, in spite of the Bavarian reinforcements, in withstanding the powerful mass-attacks which the Russians repeatedly delivered against the neck of land be- tween the Styr and the Stochod at Sokul.

But although the counter-offensive of Linsingen's group of armies had up till then met with undeniable success, the fruits of which apart from the ground gained were 12,000 prisoners, 2 guns and 54. machine-guns, Luck, the objective, was still far from being attained, owing to the growing strength of the Rus- sian resistance which was fed by drafts that were actually taken in part from the front N. of Polyesie.

In the meantime the Russian XXII. and XVI. Corps of Shcherbachev's Army continued their costly attacks against the South Army, in order to shake the southern hinge of the hitherto unchanged Strypa front at Wismiowczyk. Their temporary

successes over the 39th Honved Inf. Div. were invariably neu- tralized by counter-attacks from the Oppeln group, consisting of Austro-Hungarian and German regiments, until finally the Rus- sians after June 21 gave up their fruitless efforts. Equally bold was the stand made by Maj.-Gen. Leide's little group on the South Army's S. wing, which warded off several attempts by the Russians to cross the Dniester N.E. of Olesza.

The Loss of Bukovina. Pflanzer-Baltin in Bukovina, on the other hand, had met with fresh misfortune. After the bridge- head on the N. bank of the Pruth at Czernowitz had been levelled by Russian artillery-fire on June 16, and its garrison had retired, strong Russian forces of the XI. Corps crossed the Pruth both above and below the town, whereupon General Korda, commander of the Austro-Hungarian XI. Corps, considered it necessary to order the evacuation of Czernowitz and the S. bank of the Pruth. He led his corps behind the Sereth, and Brudermann's Cav. Corps (3rd and 8th Cav. Divs.) had also to retreat.

On June igth Korda and Brudermann were again attacked by the Russian XI. and XII. Corps and III. Cav. Corps, and forced to relinquish the Sereth line. Korda was now to retire on the line Gwrahumora-Oberwikow-Lukawetz and to hold the defiles by groups, while Brudermann in the Czermos valley was to safeguard the right flank of Benigni's group, in front of which the Russians had so far remained quiet.

In the S. of Bukovina the Russians pursued only with the III. Cav. Corps, reinforced by one infantry division. Nevertheless, Korda's troops, extended over so wide an area, could not hold the proposed line for fear of being outflanked. Papp's group fell back in sections to the often-contested position N.E. of Jakobeny, and, reinforced by the 79th Honved Bde., occupied it on June 24, while the 2O2nd Inf. Bde. and the 8oth Honved Bde. en- tirely unmolested by the enemy reached Moldawa for the purpose of blocking the route leading to Kirlibaba. Meanwhile Brudermann's Cav. Corps and, N. of it, Habermann's group (parts of the 24th and 3oth Inf. Divs.), against which the Russian XI. and XII. Corps had now turned, had to sustain severe fighting at and N. of Kuty. Evidently Letchitsky was preparing the next blow on Kolomea.

Continuation of the Counter-Attack on Luck. In the meantime the allies persisted in their intention to force a change in the situation at Luck this time by increasing the pressure on the S. flank of the bridge formed by the Russian VIII. Army, which had made over the section N. of Kulikowice (in the bend of the Styr) to the III. Army (Lyesh). General von der Marwitz, giving up his own command to General von Luneburg, now took over, on the S. wing of Linsingen's group of armies, the main attack-group, consisting of the 7th Inf. Div., recently brought to the Lipa, the newly arrived German 22nd Inf. Div., the io8th Inf. Div. brought up from the former Marwitz group, and Falkenhayn's Corps (Austrian 4th and 7th Cav. Divs. and 48th and 6ist Inf. Divs., German 43rd Res. Div. and gth Cav. Div.). After the heavy artillery, needed for the forcing of the powerful Rus- sian position at Bludow, had come up, the attack began on June 29. The IV. Army with a strong N. wing, the Luneburg group and Bernhardi's Corps, were to join in, the last-named having stormed several Russian positions at Sokul since June 24.

The attack brought encouraging initial results to all groups engaged. Bernhardi followed up his successes at Sokul, and was also able to force the Russians to evacuate the bridgehead lying on both sides of the railway on the N. bank of the Stochod. Luneburg advanced his line 2-3 km., and the Austro-Hungarian X. Corps stormed the often-contested position of Zatwicy. The greatest success was, however, won by Marwitz, who, on July i, undeterred by the rainy weather which hampered both the artillery fire and the mobility of the troops, penetrated the enemy position between Boremel and Ugrinow on a front 20 km. wide and 5 km. deep, and was able to hold his ground in spite of violent counter-attacks, some of which were delivered by cavalry. But Bludow could not be and the IV. Army was accordingly extended southward while the three divisions standing before Bludow were sent to reinforce the main attack-group to the E. of it. In spite of this, no further success was achieved in the attack.