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S.E. of Torczyn established communication with the Szurmay Corps standing on the S. bank of the Polanka, facing north. But this corps, threatened by the Russian attempts to break through, was obliged to wheel back on June 9 behind the Leni- ewka line, between Korszew and Czarakow, and the bent-back N. wing of the I. Army could only be extended as far as Lawrow. There were no longer sufficient forces for the widening curve. A dangerous gap yawned between the I. and IV. Armies.

Meanwhile the Russians had also continued their attacks against all the armies farther to the south. The S. wing of the I. Army near Sapanok had, thanks to the arrival of the 25th Inf. Div., been able to ward off a Russian assault; and the I. and South Armies also repelled all attacks, the South Army being able even to send a brigade of its reserves to the N. wing of the VII. Army. But in the case of Pflanzer-Baltin's Army the Russians gained some important success on June 7 at Jazlowiec, where the Russian II. Corps of Shcherbachev's Army succeeded by dint of continuous assaults in breaking through the XIII. Corps and forcing it back behind the Strypa. On June 8 even this position became untenable, and the corps had to retire behind the Buczacz-Karopiec line before it could stabilize itself; and on June 9, Buczacz and the Strypa line as far as Bobulince were lost by the VI. Corps, which had now also begun to waver. On the S. wing of Bothmer's Army, both then and after, all the Russian assaults broke down. In the area between the Dniester and the Pruth, Letchitsky directed his efforts principally against Benigni's group on the N. wing, which, though it was able for the moment to ward off a Russian assault at Okna, had to sacrifice the positions on the N. bank of the Dniester to the necessity of forming reserves. The situation of the defenders here was undoubtedly very tense. All the available reserves (4 regts. of 3 divs.) had been given to the XIII. Corps; in Benigni's group there were troops from 8 different divs., already inextricably mixed. In sum, this section of the front was no longer in a condi- tion to withstand a powerful push.

The allied Higher Commands were now confronted with the problem of finding measures to restore the equilibrium of the eastern front, which had been so rudely and abruptly disturbed. On the western front violent battles were raging, and in the Italian theatre all forces were engaged. Yet it seemed inadvisable to consider seriously the idea of leaving the eastern front to its fate, without sending new forces; for the distress already felt by the Central Powers forbade the abandonment of so much terri- tory, with all its grain and other products, and the industries started and re-started in it. It was necessary, besides, for the Central Powers to avoid as far as possible any defeat in Galicia and the Bukovina, lest their neighbour Rumania, once more in a state of indecision, should deem it advisable to join the Entente; and, finally, the German front N. of Polyesie, still faced by numerically superior Russian forces, had to be considered. In short, it was essential immediately to improve the situation. The two Higher Commands therefore decided to proceed at once to a counter-offensive in Volhynia. This was to take the form of an assault on both sides of the Kowet-Rowno railway by a group consisting of 7^ divisions. Until this attack-group should have been formed, decisive battle was to be avoided. If pressed by the enemy, the Szurmay Corps, X. Corps, the Bernhardi group and the II. Corps were to fall back in a north-westerly direction if necessary as far as the Stochod.

Battles on the Styr. Brussilov made his troops follow up into the bend W. of Luck with great caution, fortifying each section as it was taken. He directed his energies towards breaking through the Styr front, as yet intact, thus widening the breach towards the north. After several vain attempts at crossing on the fronts of Path's Corps and Hauer's Cav. Corps, the Russian XXX. Corps finally succeeded, on June 9, in setting foot on the N. bank of the Styr E. of Kolki. But a counter-attack by the 4th Inf. Div. threw the Russians back to the S. bank and cost them 1,500 prisoners. Another later attempt by the -Russians to cross at Sokul on June 12 ended likewise in failure.

On the S. wing of Linsingen's group of armies, preparations for the proposed counter-attack were meanwhile going forward

systematically, without any serious interruption from the Rus- sians. The IV. Army (loth Cav. Div., the Szurmay Corps and X. Corps), now commanded by Generaloberst von Tersztyan- szky, was shifted to the line Biskupiczy-Chorostow-Siviniarin, to make room for the attack-group (io8th Inf. Div., Rusche's combined German Inf. Div., and the German X. Corps consisting of the i9th and 2oth Inf. Divs.), under the experienced command of General von der Marwitz, which was deploying in the area Siviniarin-Ozierany.

The Russians also carried out a series of violent attacks against the Stochod and Styr section between the Kowel-Rowno railway and Kolki, but here again the attacks were repulsed with heavy losses except for a passing local success at Kolki.

The result of shifting the IV. Army to the N.W. and forcing back the I. Army, whose N. wing had reached Molatyngorni on the Lipa, was to extend the gap between the two armies by 50 km. Owing to the shortage of fighting troops this gap could, for the moment, only be kept under observation by line-of-communica- tion troops. Had the Russians had more troops, in particular cavalry, or, still more important, sufficient enterprise, this could have been an opportunity for undreamed-of successes. But Kaledin obstinately persisted in his attacks on the Styr front, thereby allowing the allies to close the yawning gap, for the time being, with cavalry. This was achieved by hastily bringing up the Ostermuth Cav. Corps (4th and 7th Cav. Divs. and ist Landsturm Hussar Bde.) to the area round Gorochow, in addition to the loth Cav. Div. and a German cav. bde., which were placed in front of the IV. Army to hide its movements. Finally the 6ist Inf. Div., which was on its way by train from the Tirol to the VII. Army, was detrained at Stojanow behind the left wing of the I. Army and placed under its command.

It was not until June 14 that the Russians brought forward great cavalry masses against the area between the I. and IV. Armies. As a result, violent battles were fought, first at Lokaczy against the loth Cav. Div. and, after Ostermuth's Cav. Corps had hurried up to assist that division, against the 4th and 7th Cav. Divs. at Swiniuchy; and the Russians were forced to realize that the gap between the two armies was now closed.

The Break-through at Okna. At the same time, events in the Bukovina and Eastern Galicia had taken a most unfavourable turn for the allies. After many vain attacks on the Bukovina front, Letchitsky eventually succeeded in breaking through Benigni's Corps on June 10 to the W. of Okna by means of a powerful push between Dobronoutz and Doroschoutz. Although the right portion held its ground, the left was driven back in spite of all the reserves that were put in, and this whole section of the front had to be taken back to the line Dobronoutz- Zastawna. A renewed attack delivered by the Russians, forty deep, on Zastawna, undermined the corps' power of resistance to such a degree that the XI. Corps, immediately to the S. of it, had to be withdrawn behind the Pruth during the following night, while Benigni (who could only with difficulty prevent his corps from being driven away southward) and the Hadfy group tried to take up a position again 12-15 km. to the W. of the original front. The Russians, who at first pursued hotly, forced General Pflanzer-Baltin, whose vigorous leadership was nullified in these critical days by illness, to put back the Bukovina front to a line running from Bojan (on the Rumanian frontier) up the Pruth to Zablotow, then bending northward through Gwozdziec-Obertyn- Niezwiska. This line was reached on June 14 by the Austro- Hungarian troops, who were now being but little moles ted; as the VI. and XIII. Corps had been placed under the South Army, General Pflanzer-Baltin's command area became limited to the troops S. of the Dniester.

These battles in Bukovina and Eastern Galicia, of which the outcome was so unfortunate for the Austro-Hungarian troops, were of very great importance, not only on account of the grievous sacrifice of ground, prisoners and war material, but also because of their repercussion on the attitude of Rumania. The continuous violent attacks by the Russian VII. Army against the two weakened and confused VI. and XIII. Corps on the South Army's right wing offered no prospect whatever of a stabilization of the