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Rh the executive committee of the League to Enforce Peace, and later was a strong supporter of the League of Nations.

His brother (1855-1916), American astronomer (see 17.73), died at Flagstaff, Ariz., Nov. 12 1916. In 1910 he lectured in London before the Royal Institute and in Paris before the Association Astronomique.

His sister (1874- ), American poet, was born in Brookline, Mass., Feb. 9 1874. She 'was an accomplished writer of vers libre and well known as a critic.

 LOYSON, CHARLES (1827-1912), better known as "Pere Hyacinthe," a famous French preacher, was born at Orleans in 1827. He was educated for the priesthood and entered the Carmelite order. His eloquence drew all Paris to his Advent sermons in Notre-Dame between 1865 and 1869, but his orthodoxy fell under suspicion, and in 1870 he associated himself with Dollinger's protest against the dogma of Papal infallibility (see 14.512, 20.67). Being excommunicated, he broke finally with the Church of Rome, and removed first to Geneva and then to London. He married an English lady, Emily Jane Merriman, and settled in Paris in 1877, where he founded an Old Catholic church. He died in Paris Feb. 9, 1912.

 LUCK (LUTSK), BATTLES OF, 1916.—The battles in the World War which constituted the Russian summer offensive of 1916 are known collectively by the name of Luck (Lutsk), a town in Volhynia, on the river Styr, which before the war formed part of the Russian fortified region of Rovno. The choice of this point as indicative of a series of great battles which extended in space from the river Pripet to the frontier of Rumania and in time from early June to late Aug. and, with decreasing intensity, into Nov. is justified by the fact that the break-through of the Austrian front at Luck was the principal factor in determining the course of the whole series.

After the fruitless attacks of the Russians in Courland and Lithuania in March 1916, a perceptible lull had set in on the eastern front. It was nevertheless obvious to the Central Powers that Russia was preparing for a new trial of strength. Their artillery, in particular, which had been augmented in comparison with the previous year, was initiated into all the intricacies of the newest fire-tactics, French and Japanese instructors being employed in some cases. A very ample supply of ammunition was accumulated, and air reconnaissance and aeroplane photography were brought to a high pitch. The general attack of the Entente was planned for July 1. Brussilov's Offensive. From the disposition of the Russian troops in May 1916, it was assumed that they would repeat their attacks against the former pressure-points on the German front, N. of the Pripst, viz.: at Baranovichi, Smorgon, Lake Naroch and Dvinsk. But the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy made it imperative for Russia to go to the relief of her ally, and accordingly General Brussilov was called on to take the offensive against the front S. of the Pripet, which was almost entirely occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops. However, no troops were shifted at first from the area N. of Pinsk to the Russian S.W. front. Brussilov's command included the following: the IX. Army (Letchitsky), with 10-11 inf. divs. and 2-3 cav. divs., from the Pruth E. of Czernowitz along the Bukovina-Bessarabia frontier and on the N. bank of the Dniester to the N. of Uscieczko; the VII. Army (Shcherbachev), with 6-8 inf. divs. and 2 cav. divs., generally on the E. bank of the Strypa as far as Bohatkowce; the XI. Army (Sakharov), with 8 inf. divs. and i cav. div., from the upper course of the Strypa across the watershed between Sereth and Horyn (Goryn) to the E. bank of the upper Ikwa as far as the N. of Kremieniec; finally, the VIII. Army (Kaledin), with 12-13 inf- divs. and 3 cav. divs., on the E. bank of the Ikwa to Mlynow, from there through gently undulating country to the Putilowka, N. of Olyka, thence to the bend of the Styr between Kulikowce and Kolodia, and on through the marshy regions W. of the Styr along the Wiesiolucha to the Pripet.

The Austro-Hungarian Higher Command looked forward with confidence to the next battle on the eastern front. For although the offensive against Italy had meant the removal of five good attack divisions and much heavy artillery to the Tirol, the regiments, excepting those of the VII. Army, had been brought up to full fighting strength again by the march battalions that were drafted to them monthly, some of them being even in a position to form supernumerary companies or battalions. Compared with the previous year the number of guns had also been increased through the development of the general artillery organization. But the allocation of ammunition was meagre. Much time and labour were spent on organizing the positions. The defence system consisted for the most part of three positions, which were supposed to be at such a distance apart that, after the failure of the first position, the battle for the second position would require a new movement of the enemy's artillery. The first position, which again consisted of two or three lines, each behind the other, was in fact very well organized. But for the construction of the rearward positions there was not enough labour, time or wire left over. They were therefore incomplete.

The plan for the defence was conceived to be that the troops were to stand by, during the very violent artillery demolition fire that was expected, in deep dug-outs (so called "fox holes") either near the front line or actually in it. As soon as the enemy infantry rushed to the attack the defenders, promptly warned by observers, were to hurry into the fighting trenches, while their own artillery by barrage-fire (where possible, oblique) mowed down the storming enemy infantry, or at least prevented the enemy reserves from following up. In this way the troops in the trenches would have only the first rush of the enemy's attack to beat back in hand-to-hand fighting. These tactics were open to serious objections. Timely detection of the moment when the enemy's storming columns should break forth, and consequently the instant alarming of the garrison in its dug-outs, as also the instantaneous putting down of the barrage, could not be counted upon, in view of the destruction of observation and liaison by the hostile drum-fire. Further, the defence was concentrated far too rigidly on the fighting in the front line, the loss of which would mean also the loss of the greater part of the fighting material there, such as machine-guns, trench mortars, flame-throwers, searchlights, flanking guns, etc. The troops' power of resistance was bound up far too closely with the possession of the foremost position.

The calm assurance with which the Russians went about their attack preparations, which were plain to see but impossible to hinder, induced such a state of nervousness in the staffs and troops of the defence that the launching of the Russian attack would have been felt almost as a relief had it not been for the annihilating results of the attacks at various points.

On the part of the front under the Austro-Hungarian Army Higher Command, stretching from the Pruth to the Jasiolada N. of Pinsk, there were: (1) VII. Army (Pflanzer-Baltin), with the XI. Corps, Benigni's and Hadfy's groups, the XIII. and the VI. Corps (12 inf. divs. and 5 cav. divs.), from the Pruth E. of Czernowitz to Wisniowczyk on the Strypa; (2) the German South Army (Graf Bothmer), which now contained only 1 German inf. div., the 48th Res. Div. with Hoffmann's Corps and the IX. Corps (6 inf. divs.), along the middle Strypa and as far as Czerniechow on the upper course of the Sereth; (3) the groups of armies of Generaloberst von Bohm-Ermolli, comprising the Austro-Hungarian IV. and V. Corps and Kosak's group (5 inf. divs. and 1 cav. div.) forming the II. Austro-Hungarian Army under his own command and holding from E. of Zalosce along the upper reach of the Ikwa up to Bereczy; together with the XVIII. Corps (2½ inf. and 1½ cav. divs.), constituting the Austro-Hungarian I. Army (Puhallo), along the lower course of the Ikwa up 