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Rh Frommel's corps had to push forward on Lodz, the Posen corps on Sieradz and Lask. The Breslau corps was not yet ready.

It was anticipated that the II. Army would come in by the middle of Nov. from the area N. of Czenstochowa, and that towards the end of the month 8 German divs., released by the breaking-off of the Ypres battle, would have come up by train. The Zastrow corps and the Westenhausen brigade of the Thorn fortress garrison had also begun to advance on Nov. n, the Zastrow corps being reenforced by Hollan's cavalry corps (2nd and 4th Cav. Divs.), likewise brought from the west. , The Russian I. Army had on Nov. 9 advanced its front to Wloclawek. The rest of the front remained more or less stationary. Their preparations were apparently not complete. They also assumed the German and Austro-Hungarian forces to be so thoroughly beaten that they could begin the offensive at their leisure. Their great distance from the drafting base, too, made very thorough preparations essential.

On Nov. 1 2 the German N. wing came up against the Russian front quite unexpectedly on the line Wloclawek-Lubraniec. After a brief but heavy battle, the Siberian V. Corps and the Russian 79th and 5th Divs. were overthrown, Wloclawek taken, and the Russian I. Army forced to retreat to the line Plock- Gostynin-Kutno-Ozorkow, where it established itself afresh, prepared for a stubborn resistance. To withdraw from this posi- tion would mean losing the Vistula crossing at Flock, and with it the possibility of bringing the corps on the N. bank of the Vistula over to the S. bank by the shortest way. On the isth Mackensen overran this line also. In the battle of Kutno on Nov. 16 the resistance of the Russian I. Army was broken, and it withdrew to a sort of bridgehead position S. of Flock. Mackensen left only the one reserve corps under Lt.-Gen. von Morgen to protect him in rear against the Russian I. Army, and pushed forward with his main force on the line Leczyca-Lowicz.

The Russian situation had become critical, for the I. and II. Armies had been torn apart. As the right wing of the II. Army was in danger of being surrounded, the Grand Duke Nicholas led the army back to the line Strzykow-Lutomirsk, which it reached on the evening of Nov. 17. Here, together with the IV., II. Siberian and XVII. Corps and the I. Corps, brought up to the right wing from Lask, it was to intercept Mackensen's blow, aimed in the direction of Lodz. The Russian V. Army, consisting of the XIX., V., I. and IV. Siberian Corps, was also brought up, instead of being sent to march towards Silesia, as was originally intended. At the same time the advance of the Russian corps still engaged on the right bank of the Vistula was diverted towards Flock, Wyszogrod and Warsaw for the purpose of making a thrust at Mackensen's left flank.

On Nov. 17 the German corps crossed over the Lowicz- Leczyca line, and, after the Russian II. Army's right wing had been thrown back on Brzeziny, and Brzeziny itself had been taken by the XX. Corps on Nov. 19, advanced concentrically on Lodz. As in the meantime Lask had been taken by the Posen corps, a close ring was, on the 2oth, formed round the Russian II. and V. Armies, consisting of 14? divisions, which stretched in a long course of 90 km. from Tuszyn through Bukowiec, Nowosolna, Lutomirsk and Lask to Grebuszow, leaving only a gap of 20 km. open to the south-east.

The middle of Nov. also saw the beginning of the en- veloping attack on Nowo-Radomsk by the IV. Army, Woyrsch's army and Bohm's army, by which the Russian IV. and IX. Armies were prevented from sending any of their forces to the dangerously situated Russian II. and V. Armies.

On the 2ist, when Mackensen's victory over these two armies seemed to be assured, there arrived Russian reinforcements, coming from Lowicz and Warsaw by way of Skiernewice, which pressed forward on the German rear up to Brzeziny.

Although Plock had fallen on Nov. n, and Gen. von Morgen, who had fetched the main reserve of the Thorn fortress garrison across the Vistula for his own use, was holding out against the numerically superior Russians, the diversion of Russian forces to Lodz could not be prevented.

To repulse the Russian forces advancing from Warsaw and

Skiernicwice (the II. Corps, 55th Infantry Div., Russian 5th and Caucasian Cav. Divs.) Richthofen's cavalry corps, the Guard Reserve Division and the XXV. Res. Corps reversed their front. The German ring had to be opened. On the 2$rd the right wing fell back on Zdunska Wola, the left on Nowosolna. When the XX. Corps gave way on Nov. 24, the XXV. Res. Corps, with the $rd Guard Res. Div. and Richthofen's cav- alry corps, became cut off and surrounded by the triumphant Russians, who had trains in readiness for transporting their prisoners. But in the night of the 24th-25th, Lt.-Gen. Schaffer- Boyadel, commanding the XXV. Res. Corps, succeeded by means of a vigorous attack in breaking through to the N. and joining up with the left wing of his own front, taking with him all the surrounded units and 10,000 prisoners.

The effort to encircle the two Russian armies had not suc- ceeded, and the hope of annihilating the Russian armies in the bend of the Vistula had therefore once more to be deferred.

By the end of November, after the arrival of the Schaffer- Boyadel group, Hindenburg had organized a strong connected front on the line Dobrzykow-Zychlin-Piatek-Zgierz-Szadek- Zdunska Wola-Widowa-Rusiec, at which point a junction was made with Bohm's army. Against this front the Russians battered in vain.

Meanwhile in the latter half of November the battle of Cracow was being fought N. of Cracow and E. of Czenstochowa.

Battle of Cracow. At the Austro-Hungarian Army Higher Command the attack by the Russian V., IV. and IX. Armies was expected on Nov. 15 on the front of Woyrsch's and Dankl's armies. Woyrsch was to hold his own position at all costs, and to echelon Bohm's army in rear of his N. wing for a subsequent counter-attack. Dankl's army was also to maintain its front and be ready on the morning of Nov. 16 to advance to the attack from its N. wing in conjunction with the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army.

The Archduke was instructed to execute a surprise assault on Nov. 16 on the flank of the attack which the Russian IX. Army was expected to deliver on Dankl's army front. To this end one group consisting of the XIV. Corps, with 4 infantry divisions, under Field-Marshal-Lt. Roth was to attack by way of Pietrzejowici; a second group -the VI. Corps, with 2 infantry divisions, under Field-Marshal-Lt. von Arz wg.s to attack at Slomniki; the XVII. Corps was to be in readiness at Wieliczka to gain the N. bank of the Vistula at Niepolomice and Szczurow on the 1 7th, and to join in the attack by Field-Marshal-Lt. Roth's group. On Nov. 16 the line Nowo Brzesko-Proszowice- the heights E. of Slomniki was to be reached.

In fact, however, the Russian IV. Army came within artillery range of Woyrsch's army and the left wing of the I. Army on Nov. 15. The Russian advance had, it is true, an appearance of great caution, and only minor artillery battles and skirmishes between advanced detachments took place on that day. Still more hesitatingly did the Russian IX. Army advance its right wing to the line Wolbrom-Skala. The left wing was meantime being technically strengthened in the Wawrzenczyce-Smardzo- wice position, facing the Cracow ring of forts, which it had reached on Nov. 14.

Again, on Nov. 16, no particular battles were fought by Woyrsch's army and the deploying II. Army. The right wing of the Russian IX. Army, on the other hand, made a vigorous attack on the Austro-Hungarian I. Corps of Dankl's army, but was repulsed. Neither had the somewhat premature attack by the right wing of Dankl's army (X. and V. Corps) and the whole of the IV. Army any success that day.

On the morning of Nov. 17, the II. Army advanced to the attack with the 35th Reserve Div., while Woyrsch's main body and Dankl's N. wing (consisting of the II. Corps, the Tschurt- schenthaler group and the i2th Infantry Div.) were repulsing strong Russian attacks. The right wing of the I. Army gained some ground. The IV. Army came up against strong Russian positions but, towards evening, had managed to work its way up to the heights S. of Gorzyce and to Smardzowice. The XVII. Corps achieved the crossing of the Vistula in the course of the day.