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786 by the Senate. The President refused to accept the reservations, a prolonged deadlock ensued, ending in rejection of the treaty as submitted by the President. At the Republican National Convention in 1920 Senator Lodge served as permanent chair- man. He was one of the four U.S. delegates at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, in 1921. LODGE, SIR OLIVER JOSEPH (1851- ), English physicist (see 16.860). Subsequently to 1910 Sir Oliver Lodge became increasingly prominent as a leader in psychical research and a strong believer in the possibility of communicating with the dead. Amongst his later publications are The Survival of Man (1909); Reason and Belief (1911, 3rd ed.); The War and After (1915); Raymond, or Life and Death (1916), a memoir of his son killed in the World War, with an account of communications thought to have been received from him since; Christopher: a Study in Human Personality (1918), etc. In the early part of 1920 he made an extensive lecturing tour in the United States, having just previously retired from his post as principal of the university of Birmingham. LODZ-CRACOW, BATTLES OF, 1914.—Under this heading an account is given of the offensive operations of the Central Powers in the eastern theatre of war in Nov. 1914, succeeding the Vistula-San battles, which had ended in their retreat through Poland and West Galicia to the verge of Silesia. The battle- front was enormous, extending as it did from the country N. of Warsaw, across western Poland and past Cracow into the Carpa- thians. But this front was held in very unequal density, and, in this event, the execution of the general plan led to the focussing of the German operations upon the manufacturing town and rail centre of Lodz, while the Austrian centre of gravity lay at and to the S. of Cracow.

Having decided to break off the battles of Warsaw and Ivangorod, the Central Powers instantly formulated a new plan of campaign, regrouping their troops and placing them in readi- ness for a new offensive. The Russian IV. and IX. Armies had kept in touch with the Austro-Hungarian I. Army after the battle of Ivangorod, but the Russian I., II. and V. Armies soon lost all contact with Hindenburg's army, owing to his rapid retreat and the destruction of all communications. By Nov. 3 these three armies had reached the line Kovel (Kowel)-Klodawa- Uniejow-Zdunska Wola-Belchatow-Checiny, where they lay without attacking until Nov. 8. It may be assumed that the Grand Duke Nicholas left them in this section to recover and prepare for a great new offensive through Silesia into the in- terior of Germany.

The Russian III. and VIII. Armies pursued the Austro-Hun- garian Armies very cautiously in their retreat in Galicia, while the Russian XI. Army was being formed under Lt.-Gen. Selivanov for the second siege of Przemysl.

Hindenburg, who on Nov. i had taken over the supreme command of the whole German E. front, resigning the command of the IX. Army to Gen. von Mackensen, commander of the XVII. Corps, proposed to meet the Russian attack by sending the German IX. Army from the Silesian frontier by train to the Posen-Thorn area and pushing off the German I. Corps and XXV. Res. Corps of the German VIII. Army then fighting in East Prussia to meet it there.

With this force consisting of 5^ corps and 2 cavalry divisions he intended to make an enveloping attack on the Russian I. Army, which was advancing on the N. wing, and to entrust the direct protection of the Silesian frontier to Landsturm formations, the Posen and Breslau garrisons, Frommel's newly formed cavalry corps (German sth and 8th and Austro-Hungarian 7th Cavalry Divs.) and Gen. von Woyrsch's army detachment, con- sisting of 5 infantry divisions which had been left in the area of Czenstochowa and Zarki.

On the right bank of the Vistula Zastrow's German corps, consisting of the war garrisons of the Vistula fortresses and of Landsturm, was to simulate a strong attack on N. Poland from Soldau, while the main reserve of the Thorn fortress pushed forward up the Vistula towards Plock (Plotsk).

The Austro-Hungarian I. Army, having the Cracow fortress as

a support for its S. flank, had by Nov. 8 established itself on the line Zarki-Komolow-Bydlin-Proks-Krzeszowice. In conjunction with Woyrsch's army, which was under the Austro-Hungarian Army Higher Command, it was to intercept the expected impact of the Russian IV. and IX. Armies. The Austro-Hungarian IV. Army was to join up with the I. Army, cross the Vistula either within or to the E. of the Cracow fortress area on Nov. 10 or n, according to the stage reached in the battle, and fall on the flank of the Russian IX. Army attack. The S. wing of the I. Army was to join in this attack at discretion.

In Galicia no important Russian offensive was expected in the near future. Confirmation of this view was provided by the very slight pressure exercised upon the retreating Austro-Hungarians by the Russian III. and VIII. Armies, and also by^some intercepted radio telegrams. On the one hand, the Russians were exhausted after the heavy fighting on the San and the successful attacks by the II. and III. Austro-Hungarian Armies at Chyrow; on the other, the siege army raised for Przemysl had absorbed a large part of their mobile forces.

In case of an attack, the Austro-Hungarian Army Higher Command intended to answer by a counter-advance in western Galicia in touch with the IV. Army and on the Carpathian ridge. This it hoped to be in a position to carry out even after the original front had been weakened. In the Silesian frontier defence, N. of Woyrsch's army, there was a large, inadequately defended gap which the German Supreme Command ardently desired to see filled. The Austro-Hungarian Army Higher Command therefore withdrew the II. Army Command with the IV. and XII. Corps from the front, added a Hussar regiment, and sent them all by train through Silesia to Woyrsch's N. wing, to be placed under his command. In the deployment area this army was also joined by Hauer's cavalry corps, consisting of the 2nd and gth Cav. Divisions.

The remaining army groups of the II. Army including the VII. Corps, 1 7th and 34th Infantry Divs., 38th Honved Infantry Div., ist, sth and Sth Cav. Divs., iO3rd and xosth Landsturm Bdes., and -the ist, 2nd and I7th Landsturm territorial brigades were placed under the III. Army Command and, in conjunction with this army, had to prevent a Russian advance over the Carpathian ridge. The direct protection of western Galicia was left to the XI. Corps (Field-Marshal-Lt. von Ljubicic).

In Oct. an army group was formed under Gen. von Pflanzer in order to defend the eastern Carpathians and drive the Russians out of Austria-Hungary. On this group fell the task of defending the Carpathians E. of the Verecke pass, and of protecting the reconquered portions of Bukovina.

In accordance with this plan of operations big battles now developed, during Nov. and Dec., in Russian Poland, at Cracow in western Galicia, and on the Carpathian ridge.

Mackensen's attack on the Russian I. and II. Armies led to the two battles of Lodz (Nov. i7-Dec. 15), the Austro-Hungarian IV. and I. Armies' operations to the battle of Cracow (Nov. 12-26), to which was added in Dec. the battle of Limanowa-Lapanow in western Galicia (Dec. 3-12).

In the second half of Dec. a Russian counter-offensive set in, leading to the battle of Jaslo.

First Battle of Lodz (Nov. i?-Dec. i). The advance of the German IX. Army from theThorn-Posen area between the Warta and the Vistula began on Nov. n. On the N. wing the XXV. and I. Reserve Corps advanced on Wloclawek, the XX. Corps and the 3rd General Reserve Div. from Hohensalza on Kutno, the XVII. Corps from Gnesen through Kolo towards Leczyca, and the XI. Corps from Wreschen (Wrzesznia) through Konin towards Dabie.

Before the front a screen was provided by von Richthofen's cavalry corps formed from the 6th and oth Cav. Divs. which had been brought up from the W. and was driving back the Russian cavalry through Lubomin and Blena. In the space between the XI. Corps and Gen. Woyrsch's N. wing the formation of the Posen and Breslau corps was screened by German Landsturm and by Frommel's cavalry corps, which had been winning battles against Novakov's Russian cavalry corps.