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764 arms industry and the use of firearms was familiar to all. On this front and on others, the German and the Belgian accounts alike complain of the fighting troops being fired upon from the rear. A comparison of the available items of evidence leads to the conclusion that not only did civilians participate, but that the shooting of the troops on both sides was, in the confusion of night fighting in streets and woods, frequently a wild and indiscriminate fusillade. The two brigades, after mastering this local opposition, settled down to wait for their reservists to come in from Germany. Thus the southern attack also failed on the E. side. The nth Bde. attacked between the Vesdre and Fort Fleron, and the i4th Bde. between Ft. Fleron and Ft. Evegnee, while the 3rd Regt. of the 27th Bde. maintained its position of liaison opposite the E. side of Fort Barchon. The nth Bde. followed the winding route from St. Hadelin by Magnee and Romsee to Beyne-Haussay behind the fort and village of Fleron. But their whole progress from locality to locality had been won by sharp fighting and it came to a standstill in the first houses of Beyne-Haussay. Thus, having no news of the column to the right, this brigade withdrew to Magnee to wait for the situation to clear up and to obtain ammunition for a renewed attack after dark, for, in spite of formal orders to employ the bayonet only, all the German columns seem to have shot away most of the contents of their pouches. Companies of the brigade remained in front of Fort Chaudfontaine and S. of Fort Fleron.

The I4th Bde., between Fleron and Evegnee, alone was suc- cessful. It moved off from Herve in the dark, branched off companies to observe Fort Evegnee, and through Micheroux advanced on the hamlet of Sur Fosse. There it was brought to a standstill with the loss of its general, the leading colonel, and many other leaders. Meanwhile, in the darkness and excitement, the rear portion of the column had lost touch with the front and became unsteady. At that moment Maj.-Gen. Ludendorff, who was watching the operations on behalf of II. Army headquarters, took command, and brought the rear troops for- ward. Finding the brigade commander dead, he assumed con- trol t of the column, cleared Liery and the adjacent ground, pushed on to and captured Quene du Bois (which was attacked and defended by infantry, machine-guns and accompanying artillery), and then, daylight having come, looked around for signs of the neighbouring brigades. Nothing was seen but a column of troops on the river-road N. of Supille (actually, these were Belgians), but Ludendorff determined to push on. About midday on the 6th the column, now only 1,500 strong, seized La Chartreuse, began with its field howitzers a bombardment of the city, and pushed outposts down to the bridges. Gen. v. Emmich joined it in the afternoon.

Meantime Gen. Leman, having expended his general reserves in the struggle on the northern and southern fronts and finding himself unable for that reason to check the advance or to appre- ciate the strength of the column which had penetrated between Evegnee and Fleron, believing moreover, that he had four army corps in front of him decided shortly after 7 A.M. to withdraw all field troops W. of Liege, and to leave the eastern forts to be defended by their respective garrisons only. A little later he obtained permission from the King's headquarters to send the 3rd Div. to rejoin the field army (which was assembled on and in front of the River Jette), leaving the forts alone, garrisoned by some 4,000 men in all, to bar the passage of the Germans. In the main, the order was successfully carried out, though the troops between Ourthe and Vesdre were not notified. Forgotten by both sides, these lived in the woods for a week or more, and then escaped, not without many adventures, to Tirlemont. Gen. Leman himself chose to stay with his forts, and established his headquarters at Loncin.

Thus the Ludendorff column met with no opposition when on the 6th, after an anxious night at La Chartreuse, it entered and took possession of the city. In the course of the 6th and 7th it was joined there by the nth and 27th Bdes. But behind it the fort garrisons were active, and, so far as normal communications were concerned, Emmich's 3^ brigades were isolated in the midst of the forts, while the other 3, outside, were engaged in receiving

and incorporating their reservists. Meantime more and more troops of the II. Army were coming up, and General v. Einem was placed in immediate charge of the forces outside and in general charge of the whole. The confused situation was not cleared up even when Ludendorff returned from Liege, for next day he was unable to get in again, and the impression prevailed at Billow's headquarters that Emmich and the forces inside had been destroyed by a counter-attack.

By the loth, however, the situation was cleared up, and the plan of the Germans was now to emplace the super-heavy siege artillery which was becoming available so as to demolish the forts in succession, beginning with the northern forts on either side of the Meuse (Fleron, Evegnee, Barchon, Pontisse, Liers) so as to clear the way as rapidly as possible for the crossing of the congested I. Army below Liege. This was carried out systemat- ically after the i2th; but at that date both Barchon and Evegnee had fallen to the 2i-cm. mortars alone, owing to their poor con- crete and to the fact of being bombarded from the rear. The remainder continued to hold out and, till ruined, to keep up an effective interdiction fire on all important cross roads, defiles, etc., although they were unable to locate the bombarding artillery. After the I2th, the German super-heavy artillery (30-5-011. and 42-cm. howitzers) came into play. The tactics of the attack were, in general, to push infantry as close as possi- ble to the work attacked, in readiness to seize it when " ripe for assault," to bombard steadily with 30-5- and 42-cm. and with medium long range guns till the concrete was ruined and the cupolas jammed, and to attack the gorges by means of heavy truck mortars, which here made their first appearance. To these methods there was no effective possibility of resistance. Pontisse fell on the I3th, Fleron and Licrs on the I4th; Chaud- fontaine and Embourg on the I3th fell to intensive bombard- ment by 2i-cm.; Boncelles and Lantinon the i5th. On the isth also Loncin blew up, a 42-cm. shell having penetrated to the magazine; amongst the few survivors was Gen. Leman, picked up wounded and unconscious by the Germans. The last forts, Flemalle and Hollogne, surrendered on the i6th.

The effect of the resistance of Liege on the development of the German offensive plan has been a subject of much controversy, some going so far as to deny that it had any influence thereon. Consideration of all the circumstances of time, position and intention, however, lead to the conclusion that the German failure to seize the passage on the 6th, and the subsequent resist- ance of the forts till Aug. 15-16, put back the deployment of the I. and II. Armies in the Belgian plain four days. This means that the grand offensive movement which began on the i8th would, but for the resistance of Liege, have begun on the I4th. Whether that resistance would have been possible had the Ger- mans brought up their super-heavy artillery immediately after the advanced brigades, on the 6th and 7th, instead of on loth and nth, is another question. On this their procedure at Namur, where the artillery was installed at the very opening of the attack, is a significant commentary. The delay, whatever its causes, was of incalculable importance. (C. F. A.) LIGGETT, HUNTER (1857- ), American soldier, was born at Reading, Pa., March 21 1857. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1879, was commissioned second lieutenant, and saw service in the west against the Indians. He was appointed first lieutenant in 1881 and captain 1897. On the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898 he served on the staff of the adjutant-general and later was in Cuba as major of volunteers. After honourable discharge in 1899 he again entered volunteer service and was in the Philippines for two years as major. In 1902 he was appointed a major in the regular army and spent several years with the Department of the Lakes and at Ft. Leavenworth. In 1909 he was sent to study in the War College, being promoted lieutenant-colonel the same year. On graduating from the War College in 1910 he was appointed a director there and in 1913 president, in 1912 being promoted colonel and in 1913 brigadier-general. In 1914 he was on the Mexican border and from 1915 to 1917 was again in the Philippines, being for one year commander of the Department of the Philippines. In 1917