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Meanwhile great events had taken place on the front of Bohm's army. In the forenoon the Beskiden Corps, after storming the heights S.W. of Kulikow, advanced well beyond this place, and by pushing detachments forward succeeded in blocking the road from Lemberg by Zoltance to Kamionka.

At 4 A.M. the IV. and XIX. Corps opened a bombardment against the works on the N. and N.W. fronts of Lemberg. At 5 A.M. the I3th Landwehr Inf. Div. of the XIX. Corps penetrated into the Rzesna work on Hill 320. At n A.M. the 2pth Div. of the same corps had captured the group of works at Sknitow, while the 43rd Landwehr Inf. Div. of the IV. Corps stormed the work Brzuchowice 348. At the same time the I3th Landwehr Div. continued the attack on the heights E. of Rzesna Polska, and the 27th and 32nd Inf. Divs. were heavily engaged round the Lysa Gora heights. Shortly after 1 1 A.M. this strong bulwark of the N.W. front of Lemberg also fell into the hands of the Austro- Hungarians. Under pressure of these events, the Russians, who had defended themselves by numerous counter-attacks, evacu- ated Lemberg. At noon Bohm's troops entered the city, which had been in Russian hands for over 10 months.

During the morning, the V. Corps had succeeded in storming the Russian positions on the heights E. of the Szczerek. In the afternoon the Russians, obviously as a result of the fall of Lem- berg, into which Gen. Bohm had made his own entry at 4 P.M., abandoned their whole front facing the Austro-Hungarian II. Army.

The battle of Lemberg had thus ended in a victory for the Central Powers. By the evening of the 22nd the II. Army had reached the line Dawidow-Remenow. The effect of the victory was now making itself felt along the whole front ; even the angle between the San and the Vistula, so long and stubbornly defended by the Russian XV. Corps, was evacuated by the evening of the 22nd, and the Russians fell back also before the Austro- Hungarian I. Army and the southern wing of Woyrsch's Army.

The hoped-for separation of the Russian armies, in the direc- tion of Tomaszow and Sokal on the one hand and eastwards on the other, seemed nearer, but was not yet achieved.

The Army Supreme Command, after consultation with the German Supreme Command, now ordered new dispositions.

Mackensen was to continue the pursuit of the retreating enemy in a northerly direction with the Austro-Hungarian IV. and German XI. Armies. The Beskiden Corps was subordinated to him, in order to cover his eastern flank. The II. Army was detached from Mackensen's group and ordered to pursue east- wards by way of Busk and Zlocz6w, while the Southern Army was to force the passage of the Dniester below Zurawno, in order to envelop Halicz from the N. and press on further across the lower Gnila Lipa.

By the evening of the 23rd the centre and left of the Russian IV. Army were also withdrawn, on the front of Woyrsch's right wing and that of the Austro-Hungarian I. Army, to Ilza, Sien- na, Ozark6w and Zawichost. Both armies followed them up, Woyrsch with some rearguard fighting, the I. Army practically unopposed.

The VIII. and XIV. Corps of the Austro-Hungarian IV. Army followed the Russians to the San. On the remainder of the front of the IV. and XI. Armies the situation remained unchanged.

Pursuit by Mackensen's Army Group Northwards; Battles in East Galicia (June 23- July 14). The northern wing of the II. Army met with stubborn opposition on June 23, on the line Jarycz6w-Dmytrowice, but succeeded by the middle of the day in capturing a part of the Russian positions S. of the latter village. On the 24th also the II. Army found itself faced along its whole front by strong Russian lines, from the northern wing of which the Russians even delivered exceedingly violent counter-attacks. Owing to this the relief of the Beskiden Corps by a new group under Field-Marshal-Lt. Kreysa, formed of two divisions of the II. Army, appeared almost impossible.

On the German Southern Army front, also, the Russians struck hard against the two centre corps, and drove back the igth Inf. Div. to the Dniester. Linsingen's northern wing, on the other hand, succeeded in reaching Bortniki and Chodorow, where,

however, it met with fresh resistance. His southern wing was able to secure the N. bank of the Dniester below Halicz.

The pursuit by Mackensen to the N. and by Bohm to the E. had been determined automatically by the lines of the Russian retreat. The continuation of the offensive on the grand scale, however, would involve the choice of only one of these directions for the main attack; and whether this attack were delivered to the N. or to the E. there would be serious risk of a Russian assault on its open flank.

After the battle of Lemberg the Russians had concentrated their main strength between the Vistula and the Bug, while a smaller force had retired into East Galicia. Consequently, an advance by Mackensen northwards must bring him into contact with the main force of the Russians, while the protection of his eastern flank would be comparatively easy, owing to the favour- able configuration of the ground in East Galicia, where, in order to assail him, the Russians would have to cross several tribu- taries of the Dniester flowing from N. to S. The protection of the N. flank of an army advancing eastward would be more difficult, and would require considerable covering forces. These considerations outweighed the fact that an eastward advance would be in the same direction as had hitherto been followed in the attack, and also the prospect of freeing East Galicia, which it was felt could be postponed.

The thrust to the N., moreover, was better fitted to meet the general situation. The centre of the Russian front was still bent far forward into Russian Poland. The greatest possible success to be aimed at by the Austro-Germans was to envelop this front, and, at the proper moment, helped by the pressure of their northern wing (the German E. front), to surround it. Were this to succeed, East Galicia would fall into their hands of itself. The northward advance was therefore decided on.

This might be carried out by the IV. and XI. Armies, in conjunction with the main body of the II., swinging northwards, leaving the remainder of the latter with the Southern and VII. Armies to drive the Russians out of East Galicia, or at least to contain them. A more promising alternative, however, was to leave the whole II. Army in East Galicia, while Mackensen led the northward thrust with the IV. and XI. Armies, together with fresh forces to be marched up between the II. and the XI. Armies. The shortening of the front at the end of June, as a result of the progress made by Woyrsch and Puhallo, made it possible to withdraw Puhallo's army from the front and form it up behind the inner wings of the II. and XI. Armies. Moreover, the XLI. Res. Corps, which had been ordered to the western front, was not now urgently needed there in view of recent favourable develop- ments of the situation, and was thus for the moment available. On the other hand, the complete withdrawal of the II. Army from East Galicia appeared dangerous. The Austrian and Ger- man High Commands decided therefore for the second plan.

The regrouping between the Vistula and the Bug could be completed, and the northward advance begun, by the middle of July. The armies, meanwhile, continued to carry out their previous tasks. Mackensen followed up the retiring Russians to the N., Bohm to the E. The ever- widening gap between the two armies was provisionally filled up pending the arrival of the I. Army by the extension of the II. Army's left wing to Kamionka Strumilowa and to the Rata, and the concentration of strong reserves behind their N. wing.

By the evening of the 2Sth all the XI. Army's measures for the continuance of the pursuit had been completed. On the morning of the 26th the attack was to be continued on the whole front; the XVII. Corps on the right of the IV. Army, which adjoined the XI. Army on the W., was to join in and occupy the Loczwa depression N. of Cieszan6w, while Bohm's wing corps to the E. of it was to advance on Kamionka Strumilowa.

The southern wing of the II. Army (5 corps), in the battle of Bobrka, -stormed the positions of the Russian VI. Corps W. of the Biala Potok, and by the evening of the 2Sth had forced it back to the hills E. of that brook. The XVIII. and XIX. Corps also advanced successfully E. of Budkow and at Dzwinogrod, while Brussilov's southern wing on both sides of Jaryczcw Nowy