Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/787

Rh numbers. Fighting with extraordinary bravery they were nevertheless ousted from all their positions by the morning of Aug. 25, the I. Army attempting to envelop the Russian right wing. In their hasty retreat the Russians left behind them 6,000 prisoners, 28 guns and a number of standards.

Under the influence of these events the Austro-Hungarian Army Higher Command, on the evening of Aug. 24, issued the definitive dispositions for developing its offensive. In accordance vith this the I. and IV. Armies were to deliver the proposed great blow northward, i.e. against the IV.and V. Russian Armies, the general direction given being " Lublin and Chelm." The III. Army and the available portions of the II. Army were to be entrusted with the defence against the Russian III. and VIII. Armies advancing from the E., which mission it must be emphasized they were to carry out offensively. Thus on the Austro-Hungarian side a mass of 350 first-line battalions was allotted to the main blow northward while 150 battalions (which could soon be reenforced up to 200) were to act on the defensive towards the east.

The first great scheme in the operations, which aimed at a rapid advance and an attack on the enemy's oncoming main groups before they could unite, might therefore be considered a success at least as regards the first part. In view of the difficulties sur- mounted this was certainly a considerable strategical achieve- ment. It now remained to secure the tactical results that is to ay, the blow in the N. must end in a complete victory, and the enemy in the E. must be effectually repulsed. The first of these efforts succeeded, the second did not; and from this failure arose the general battle of Grodek-Rawa Ruska and eventually the retreat beyond the San.

It should be added that Gen. von Kummer's army group had received instructions as early as Aug. 15 to invade Russian Po- and from the concentration area at Cracow and to traverse that country in a north-easterly direction, thus forming a strategic protecting flank for the main army advancing on the right bank of the Vistula. It was also expected to provide the necessary reserve and nucleus for the anticipated revolutionary movement in Congress Poland. The execution of this task should not have been difficult, in view of the fact that the Russians had at first only the one cavalry division (the I4th) in the area W. of the Vistula, but in fact it proved extraordinarily .difficult, as the whole army group excepting the 7th Cav. Div. was made up of Landsturm formations which had been thrown together on the spot and whose armament and equipment were quite inadequate. 1 In these circumstances and with these masses, it became almost , work of art to carry through the extremely exhausting marches and small skirmishes which arose out of the Russian opposition. As, too, the desired insurrection almost entirely failed to ma- terialize, the Army Higher Command recalled the whole army the Vistula, where it was placed under the command of the I. ^rmy, which had thenceforward 12 divisions at its disposal. In addition to this Gen. von Woyrsch's Silesian Landwehr corps had now pushed through from Prussia, so that, from Sept. 4 on, the I. Army had the strength of 14 inf. and 3 cav. divisions. This army had meanwhile continued its advance to an attack in tie general direction of Lublin, according to orders. By Sept. 2, it had, after winning a succession of skirmishes, come within dalf a day's march of the line which had been formed S. of the central point just referred to, and was being vigorously defended by the whole of the IV. Russian Army, which had come up in
 * roup from below Zawichost on Aug. 24, to the right bank of

1 It was a singular fact that the Army Higher Command brought on to the field in the very first moments of the battle all the fighting forces that could by any means be got together. Nearly one-third of the battalions assembled in the deployment area were second or rather third-line troops (the third line is practically non-ex- istent in Austria-Hungary). But this method, though demonstrat- ing great energy in the leading and employment of fighting masses, was hardly suitable to apply to troops about to be sent to two sep- arate theatres of war. Here again the totally inadequate armament and equipment of the Landsturm formations formed a serio'us drawback. Not only was their fighting power materially damaged but unusually heavy losses were suffered on the march and in action vhich might have been avoided.

the meantime. The I. Army's attempt to envelop the Russian right wing met with but slight success, but a group that had formed up behind the Russian left wing delivered a thrust which, at a later stage in the action, was to influence the course of events considerably. Before going further into this it will be well to describe the operations and battles of the IV. Austro-Hungarian Army which culminated in the eight days' battle of Komarow.

Battle of Komarow. Portions of the IV. Army's II. Corps had gone into action on the afternoon of the 24th being attached to the I. Army. It was known that a strong enemy group (the XXV. Corps) was in the act of deploying before Zamosc. The IV. Army had at its disposal, prepared for prompt service, only the 3 divisions of the II. Corps, the loth Div. of the IX. Corps and parts of the VI. Corps. The remainder (the 26th Div. of the IX. Corps and the XVII. Corps) were still forming up for deployment and in some cases had not yet arrived on the scene of action. The army commander decided to proceed to the attack with the troops on the spot, in order to bring the enemy to a stand, and then make an enveloping attack on both wings, in which he would be supported by the Archduke Joseph Ferdi- nand's army group (3rd and 8th Infantry, 4ist Landwehr and 2nd Cav. Divs.) which had been 'allotted to the army command on the evening of the 24th. But first the nearest enemy corps had to be repulsed and the advance of the Russian XIX. Corps, marching from Tyszowice, cut off.

To deal with the first of these tasks a group was formed of 3 divisions (4th, I3th and 2 5th) of the II. Corps and the loth Div. of the IX. Corps, under the command of General of Infantry Schemua. From 6 A.M. on Aug. 26 this group went forward in several parallel columns along the ridge W. of the Tomaszow- Zamosc road. The collision with the enemy, who were established in. hastily erected shelters, took place in the afternoon. By evening the enemy had been thrown out of their positions and forced back to the northern ridge. Here they established themselves firmly in prepared positions.

The VI. Corps, advancing in three divisional columns (3Qth, 2yth and isth Divs.) echeloned in rear to the right, had first of all to change its direction of march from north-east to north. The 39th Div., advancing on and E. of the Tomaszow-Zamosc road, came up against the enemy (the Russian XIX. Corps) in a strong position and captured his outposts; but, in front of the main position at Tarnawatka, the division was surprised by gun- fire and forced to retire to the heights N. of Tomaszow until evening. The 27th Div. (especially the 8sth Infantry Regt.), advancing eastwards on the right, delivered an exceptionally brave and persistent attack which unfortunately entailed heavy losses owing to inadequate artillery preparation. The attack in itself succeeded, but the enemy could not be prevented from taking up another position farther back. The right-wing division of the corps, which had had the greatest distance to come, did not come into action that day. On the other hand a violent fire-fight had occurred in the afternoon, E. of the Huczwa at Posadow, in which a cavalry corps under Gen. von Wittmann, formed from the 6th and zoth Cav. Divs., fought with some success against a Cossack division reenforced by infantry. In the evening, %fter the fight, the cavalry corps retired for the night to Dyniska, fol- lowed by all portions of the IV. Army which were echeloned to the rear (26th Div. and the temporarily formed XVII. Corps con- sisting of the XIX. Infantry Div. and three march brigades).

For the following day (Aug. 27) the II. Corps had as their allotted task to. drive the enemy back beyond Zamosc. At the. same time a combined attack, in which portions of the VI. and IX. Corps took part, was organized against the Russian XIX. Corps, which had dug itself in above Tarnawatka, and in particu- lar against the right wing. The remainder of the army was to continue its advance, but here some delay was caused by the Higher Command's granting and withdrawing alternately, three times over, the right of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army group to make its own dispositions. The unfavourable turn of events in the E. was the cause of the Higher Command's difficulty in deciding as to the definite distribution of this fighting group. The day (Aug. 27) began with a misfortune to the IV. Army.