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Rh for the farce Sergeant Brue (1904) and the morality play Everyman (1915). Madame Lehmann became well known as a teacher of singing. She died at Hatch End, Pinner, Sept. 19 1918. LELAND STANFORD JR. UNIVERSITY (see 16.406). The work of the university was so reorganized during the decade 1910-20 that the first two years constituted a so-called lower division with certain specified requirements, including biology, a course in citizenship, etc. The major department system became operative at the beginning of the junior year, and degrees were granted upon the recommendation of the departments. The institution sold some of its large ranch property in 1919, and in 1921 had about $25,000,000 in investment securities and an educational plant that included the Stanford Medical School, Lane and Stanford hospitals, Stanford school for nurses, the Lane medical library, all in San Francisco, and the Hopkins marine station on Monterey Bay, the whole valued at $10,000,- ooo. The medical school owed its origin to the fact that the directors of the Cooper Medical College in 1910 turned over that institution and the associate Lane hospital to Stanford. In addition to the schools of law, medicine and education, a gradu- ate school was organized with a dean at its head in 1917. New dormitories for women were constructed and a housing scheme inaugurated whereby practically all the faculty and students will eventually live on the college campus. Volumes in the library numbered 319,872 in 1920, of which 48,187 are in the Lane medical library and 23,360 in the law library.

In 1920-1 the students numbered 2,489, of whom 500 were women and 281 graduates, a gain of 43% over the 1907-8 figures, which were 1,738, of whom 500 were women and 126 graduates. Limita- tion in the size of the endowments and of the facilities of the plant caused a restriction in the student body to something over 2,000. Only 500 men with less than a year and a half of college standing are admitted each year, but there are no limitations for upper-class students. The tuition fee in 1920 was $40 per quarter, but after Oct. I 1921 it was to be $75.00. There was in operation a tuition note system by which worthy students might delay payment of tuition until three or more years after graduation. Although in 1921 military training was not required, there was a field artillery unit of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

During the World War Stanford was represented by about 3,000 of its members, graduates and undergraduates, of whom 70 lost their lives. A Students' Army Training Corps unit, comprising practi- cally all the men students, was organized during the war period.

Dr. John Casper Brauner, a distinguished geologist, was president from 1913 to 1915. Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur became president Jan. i 1916. (R. L. W.) LEMAITRE, FRANCOIS ELIE JULES (1853-1915), French critic and dramatist (see 16.408), died in Paris Jan. 21 1915. LEMAN, GERARD JOSEPH MATHIEU GEORGES (1851-1920), Belgian general, was born at Liege Jan. 8 1851, the son of an artillery captain who was a professor at the Ecole Militaire. He entered the Ecole Militaire at Brussels, and when he left it in 1869 had acquired a reputation for brilliance. During the Franco-German War he served in a Belgian observation corps. In 1882 he became a member of the teaching staff of the Ecole Militaire, and both then and later, as head of the school, he exerted con- siderable influence on military matters. In Jan. 1914 he was appointed commander of the fortress of Liege and also of the 3rd Div., and concentrated all his efforts upon strengthening the defences of the town against a possible German attack. This came in Aug. 1914, when Gen. von Emmich's army appeared before Liege and summoned it to surrender. On Gen. Leman's refusal the fortress was attacked and ultimately destroyed, while its heroic defender was captured and imprisons 1 in Germany. As a token of respect, however, he was allowed to retain his sword. He returned to Belgium after the Armistice, and died at Brussels Oct. 17 1920. LEMBERG (LVOV), BATTLES ROUND, 1914-5 In the Austro-German campaign against Russia, the operations round Lemberg (Polish, Lvov) both in 1914 and in 1915 formed an important part of the fighting in Galicia. They are described here in two general sections.

I. THE GALICIAN BATTLE OF AUG.-SEPT. 1914 In accordance with the general tactical and strategical situation, the main body of the Austro-Hungarian army concentrated and formed up for deployment in Central and Eastern Galicia, about Aug. 20 1914. The four armies (I., II., III., IV.) formed up for deployment under cover of a frontier guard for which provision had been made in peace-time. This was augmented by other troops as follows: (a) those corps which had been stationed in the deployment area (I. Cracow, X. Przemysl, XI. Lemberg), parts of which had even in peace-time been pushed forward to the frontier; (b) the cavalry divisions quartered in the above-named areas, which had been hastily reenforced from the interior of the monarchy; (c) the Territorial Landsturm, Gendarmerie and Customs guards, which had been called up on the first day of the alarm to occupy all the important frontier posts. These precautions were taken on the definite assumption that the Russians would employ their powerful cavalry masses in a rapid incursion for the purpose of hindering the mobilization and deployment of the Austro-Hungarian armies, an assumption which subsequent events almost completely belied.

Although all components of the army formed up for deployment according to programme, the advantage to be gained by greater speed in their mobilization, on which the Army Commands of the Central Powers had always counted, was not achieved. The fact was that, though incomparably better situated as regards mobilization and deployment, the Central Powers suffered from mistaken political and military-political calculations, which delayed effective war preparation by nearly a month, and also from the fundamentally unsound grouping of the armies. The main portion of the II. Army (IV. and VII. Corps) was first deployed against Serbia on the Sava, where portions of it were even engaged, with the result that this army having to traverse the whole breadth of the monarchy to the N. was only repre- sented by one-third of its strength (the Kovess army group, XII. Corps) in the great introductory battles. After the arrival of all forces allocated to the N. the total strength of the armies was, roughly, 750,000 rifles, 60,000 sabres and 2,000 guns.

The first-line infantry was well armed and equipped, though the rifle was ballistically somewhat inferior to the Russian serv- ice pattern. The cavalry was well mounted, but undeniably old-fashioned in its equipment. The artillery was relatively inferior to the Russian in the quantity, and absolutely in the quality of its guns. In view of the medley of races within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the violent constitutional struggles arising from the centrifugal nationalist agitation fanned from outside, doubts had arisen in many quarters as to the trustworthiness of the troops. As regards the first period of the war these doubts were certainly not justified. The spirit of the army resisted all attempts to undermine it, and the bearing of the troops in the initial battles was excellent, superior indeed to that of the enemy on more than one front.

Strategic Aims. On the Russian side the forces used in the opening operations and the preliminary battles were as follows: (a) against East Prussia the I. and II. Armies with over 20 infantry divisions; (b) against Austria-Hungary the IV., V., III. and VIII. Armies in the first line, the VII. Army in the second. These armies had each a strength of 9-12 infantry and 3-4 cavalry (or Cossack) divisions. Judged by the number of units, therefore, Russia's superiority in numbers did not appear to be overwhelming, but it was actually greater than appeared, since the Russian infantry division was about one-fifth stronger in infantry and artillery than the Austro-Hungarian. About one-quarter of the Russian forces consisted of reserve divisions.

The information received by the Austro-Hungarian Higher Command, before and during deployment, gave a far from clear idea of the operative situation. They knew that the transport of troops for deployment was going forward on all railway lines and were aware of the evacuation of Congress Poland; but as regards grouping and strength, particularly in the case of the heavy-massed groups rolling up from the E., they appear to have been in uncertainty. It is possible that they underestimated these. For the Austro-Hungarian conduct of operations two alternatives presented themselves: (i) to unite the whole of the fighting forces on the Middle and Lower San and accept a defensive battle, advantage at the same time being taken of any