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Interdependence of States had so far advanced during the course of the iptli century that this principle received some slight and tentative recognition in the international conventions for the peaceful settlement of international disputes drawn up by the conferences at The Hague. But the principle needs full recognition and application if countries are to be prevented from drifting into armed conflicts which, in these times, certainly will involve the interests of their neighbours.

And lastly, it is desirable, though again not essential, that the League should be given the necessary powers to enable it to act as the coordinating agency for the international activities of its members in all the multifarious spheres hitherto governed by international bureaux, by general treaties, and by other forms of official and unofficial cooperation.

Features of the League. Impartial consideration of the Cove- nant of the League, first signed by the 32 signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, and accepted and acted upon by the 48 States who in 1921 were members of the League, will show that it embodies every one of the features which have been enumer- ated as the essentials of an effective league. It may further be said that where the Covenant goes beyond the essentials it does so in a way which was intended to make, and does make, for greater completeness and efficiency.

Article i of the Covenant consists of the rules of membership. It stipulates that the original members of the League shall be the signatories to the Covenant and such other States named in the annex thereto as shall accede to it without reservation; and that any fully self-governing State, dominion or colony may become a member if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the members, and provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations and shall accept the regulations of the League in regard to its military forces. Article i also makes provision for the with- drawal after two years' notice of any member who wishes to abandon its membership. These rules constitute a statement of the principles concerning membership that are essential if the members of the League are to have confidence that their mutual undertakings will be carried out.

With regard to agreements to meet in conference, Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Covenant stipulate for the creation of an assembly consisting of three representatives of each member of the League, and for a smaller council consisting of representa- tives of four Great Powers and of four smaller ones. The Cove- nant does not lay down the intervals at which these bodies shall meet: it merely stipulates that the Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require; and that the Council shall meet in the same way, and at least once a year. It leaves these questions to be dealt with in what- ever rules of procedure the Council and the Assembly may respectively consider it wise to adopt.

The question of representation of the members at the Assembly was one which naturally involved serious difficulties. It was solved by according to every member an equal right to send three representatives. There was considerable discussion when the Covenant was being drafted as to whether three was a sufficiently large number. In practice this point has been dealt with in a way indicated later on.

The question of representation on the Council was still more difficult. A definite preponderance of influence in international affairs had been recognized prior to the war on the part of the Great Powers of the world. It was inevitable, and surely right, that the Great Powers who are members of the League should be accorded permanent representation on its principal execu- tive organ, and this has been done. The representation of the smaller Powers an exceedingly difficult matter was dealt with in a way which in practice seems likely to prove quite satisfactory, namely by providing that the four non-permanent members of the Council shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion.

Articles 6 and 7 provide for the necessary secretariat, and for the nomination of a secretary-general who shall make all the appointments to the secretariat with the approval of the Council,

and who shall act as secretary at all the meetings of the Assembly and of the Council. These Articles also provide that every posi- tion in the secretariat shall be open to women.

So much for the institutional organization of the League as it is established by the Covenant.

With regard to the agreements not to resort to war, which are included above among the essentials, the Covenant embodies practically everything that any responsible authority had advo- cated as practicable. By Article 12 the members agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree that they will in no case resort to arms until three months after an award has been made by the arbitrators or a report has been made by the Council. Article 12 thus not only embodies an agreement not to go to war without previous recourse to peaceful methods of settlement for disputes, but also lays down two alternative procedures by which, through the agency of the League, settlement can be effected. The first is ambiguously referred to as " arbitration," but it is evident from Articles 13 and 14 that the use of the word " arbitration " is a loose one, and that what is really intended is recourse to legal decision. For Article 13 proceeds to give a definition of disputes which the members recognize to be " gen- erally suitable for submission to arbitration "; and this defini- tion is textually that agreed to by various high authorities in international law as the best that can be devised for disputes which may be called "juridical," i.e. suitable for decision by means of legal verdict. Further, while Article 13 leaves the parties free to choose any court or board of arbitration to which they may agree for the judicial settlement of their disputes, Article 14 nevertheless charges the Council with formulating, and submitting to the members of the League for adoption, plans for the establishment of a permanent court of interna- tional justice which shall be competent to hear any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. While, therefore, these two Articles leave great elasticity, it is evident that the intention was to lay down a normal legal pro- cedure, and to secure the establishment of a permanent inter- national court to which the parties should, in the normal course, take disputes of a legal nature. There is, moreover, at the end of Article 14 a clause which greatly increases the value of the Permanent Court. This clause provides that the Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. It is evident that in the course of a dispute one party may maintain that a whole or a part of the question at issue is juridical in nature, and should be determined on legal grounds. If one of the parties put forward such a contention and were able to support it by sound arguments, there is no doubt that the Council would act on the final clause of Article 14 and would submit the question to the Court for an advisory opinion; and it is to be particularly noted that they could do this as a matter of procedure, and, therefore, by a majority vote. If, then, a litigant should bring to the League a dispute in which it believes the law to be on its side, it will be able to demand, even if the other party does not agree, that the Council shall secure on the juridical questions at issue an advisory opinion from the Court: and the Court in rendering this opinion will give the Council the elements for a decision which would have all the force of a legal verdict.

Thus, while avoiding the pitfall of " obligatory arbitration," which very few of the States of the world at the present time are ready to accept, the Covenant includes provisions which go very far towards securing that all international disputes of a genuinely legal nature shall be determined by legal methods.

With regard to the other alternative method provided for the settlement of disputes, which members agree to by Article 12, that is to say, inquiry by the Council, Article 15 lays down in considerable detail the procedure which is to be adopted. It provides that any party to a dispute can oblige the League to take cognizance of it by giving notice to the Secretary-General, who is then obliged to make all the necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. The parties under-